Responses to norm violators are poorly understood. On one hand, norm violators are perceived as powerful, which may help them to get ahead. On the other hand, norm violators evoke moral outrage, which may frustrate their upward social mobility. We addressed this paradox by considering the role of culture. Collectivistic cultures value group harmony and tight cultures value social order. We therefore hypothesized that collectivism and tightness moderate reactions to norm violators. We presented 2,369 participants in 19 countries with a norm violation or a norm adherence scenario. In individualistic cultures, norm violators were considered more powerful than norm abiders and evoked less moral outrage, whereas in collectivistic cultures, norm violators were considered less powerful and evoked more moral outrage. Moreover, respondents in tighter cultures expressed a stronger preference for norm followers as leaders. Cultural values thus influence responses to norm violators, which may have downstream consequences for violators' hierarchical positions.

In a recent paper, Bentzen proposes a semantically characterised logic called Action Type Deontic Logic, where normative concepts are applied to action expressions, rather than propositional statements. The logic offers solutions to many of the paradoxes of deontic logic. In particular, Bentzen's semantics solves many puzzles involving the interaction of permission with conjunction and disjunction. One of the reasons for these positive results is the assumption that agents always act according to norm. This assumption means that only agents with ideal behaviour are modelled; there is no possibility for norm-violation. In this thesis, proof techniques and decision procedures for Action Type Deontic Logic in the style of semantic tableau are investigated, and soundness, completeness and termination results are obtained. In order to account for the possibility of norm-violation, a new semantics based on a generalisation of Action Type Deontic Logic models is proposed. The new semantics keeps the possibility of norm-violation open, while many of the virtues of Action Type Deontic Logic remain.

In a norm game, under certain conditions, there exist Nash equilibria of mutual cooperation. Experimental work demonstrates that even in one-shot situations the level and proportion of cooperative behavior increases if an punishment option is available to the players of a public goods game. It is therefore important to analyze conditions such that this is consistent with a rational choice approach. The paper is meant as a first step toward this task. The main result will be that nonstandard assumptions about human motivations or preferences can explain norms with sanctions even in one-shot situations. This is shown by an analysis of the norm game with two well-known recent models of fairness from behavioral game theory.

In a norm game, under certain conditions, there exist Nash equilibria of mutual cooperation. Experimental work demonstrates that even in one-shot situations the level and proportion of cooperative behavior increases if an punishment option is available to the players of a public goods game. It is therefore important to analyze conditions such that this is consistent with a rational choice approach. The paper is meant as a first step toward this task. The main result will be that nonstandard assumptions about human motivations or preferences can explain norms with sanctions even in one-shot situations. This is shown by an analysis of the norm game with two well-known recent models of fairness from behavioral game theory.:Introduction; Cooperation in a norm game; Non-standard preferences in the one-shot norm game; Conclusions