The United States is and will continue to be engaged in a form of warfare in which the enemy finds shelter among and gains intelligence from the population. This is not a new form of warfare, but, given the advances in technology and increased globalization of the modern age, it has become an exponentially more lethal form of conflict. This thesis examines current U.S. unconventional warfare doctrine to determine its origins and assess its feasibility in different environments. Drawing upon the military theories of Clausewitz, this paper attempts to lay out a new approach and broaden the spectrum of American unconventional doctrine and irregular response. An examination of the American â hearts and mindsâ approach to unconventional warfare, based largely upon British colonial experience, suggests that current doctrine could be based on a faulty interpretation of history. Newly emerging knowledge points to the need to adopt an unconventional strategy focused more on establishing authority than gaining popularity. This approach, dubbed â authoritative control,â has both a historically successful track record and is fairly easy to implement. For the United States to be successful in future unconventional conflict, an expansion of doctrine must occur immediately.

Thesis--School of Advanced Airpower Studies. / Title from title screen (viewed Oct. 27, 2003). "June 2000." Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S. in Defense Analysis)--Naval Postgraduate School, March 2009. / Thesis Advisor(s): McCormick, Gordon. "March 2009." Description based on title screen as viewed on May 6, 2009. Author(s) subject terms: Improvised Explosive Device, IED, Insurgency, Guerrilla Warfare, Counterinsurgency, Strategy, Strategic Influence Includes bibliographical references (p. 87-91). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.S. in Information Systems)--Naval Postgraduate School, September 1990. / Thesis Advisor(s): Bui, Tung Xuan. Second Reader: Kennedy-Minott, Rodney. "September 1990." Description based on title screen as viewed on March 19, 2010. DTIC Identifier(s): Identification Systems, Insurgency, Expert Systems, Enemy Personnel, Theses, Computer Applications, Counterinsurgency. Author(s) subject terms: Expert Systems, Insurgency, Insurgent Identification. Includes bibliographical references (p. 67-69). Also available in print.

No description available.

Thesis (M.A. in National Security Affairs) Naval Postgraduate School, December 1994. / "December 1994." Thesis advisor(s): Jan Breemer. Includes bibliographical references. Also available online.

This thesis argues that while there are various contending notions of how a government can improve its chances of success in a small war, few strategies will be effective without the application of a comprehensive program of population control measures. For this study, small wars are conflicts in which a government uses limited means to secure national objectives against an adversary who uses primarily the tactics of guerrilla warfare. Population control measures are defined as those restrictions imposed on movement, on choice of residence, and on the availability of food that protect the population from the insurgents while simultaneously denying the insurgents access to critical resources. This work examines the vital importance of population control measures in overcoming guerrilla forces lacking external sponsors in small wars during the period 1870 to 1960. Five examples are used to determine their importance: the treatment of prairie Amerindians in the Canadian West (1870 – 1890); the guerrilla phase of the Philippine-American War (1898 – 1902); the guerrilla phase of the South African War (1899 – 1902); the Malayan Emergency (1948 – 1960); and the Kenyan Emergency (1952 – 1960). Within the broad strategies used to prosecute these campaigns, population control measures were a consistent feature and were instrumental in contributing to the termination of the conflicts. Despite their importance, these measures are typically overlooked or only treated superficially when discussed by historians. Therefore, to understand more fully the outcome of small wars, greater attention needs to be applied to the study of these measures. In small wars the primary contest between the belligerents is for control of the people. For the government, the strategic value of population control measures is in how they separate the population from the guerrillas. This denies a wide range of critical resources to the guerrillas and additionally allows the government to both prosecute its campaign more effectively and protect the population better. Population control measures need to be a key component of a government’s strategy in a small war as their proper application may be the tipping-point between success and failure. / Thesis (Ph.D, History) -- Queen's University, 2013-11-29 16:13:52.31

This thesis examines a largely unexplored area of deterrence theory: unconventional deterrence. Unconventional deterrence is defined herein as "persuading the opponent not to attack, via threats of unconventional warfare, such as guerrilla resistance and terrorism." It treats terrorism as a punishment strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to punish the aggressor's population. Guerrilla warfare is a denial strategy, through which the one deterring threatens to protract a war and deny the aggressor his political objectives. This study questions the underlying hypothesis of deterrence theory which says that the balance of the opponents' military capabilities is the basic determinant of successful deterrence. Rather, the hypothesis here is that the deterrer may deter the aggressor from attacking by adopting a strategy that makes the aggressor's military superiority irrelevant. The present thesis focuses primarily on relatively weak states. Unconventional deterrence is explored as a means for a weaker state to deter a considerably stronger opponent. This thesis discusses the requirements for successful deterrence, and the peculiarities of unconventional deterrence. As well, the dynamics of small wars are explored in order to unfold a paradoxical phenomenon: the possibility of an underdog's victory in war. Two case studies: (1) the Vietnam War of 1964-73 and (2) the Afghanistan War of 1979-89 are explored as examples of the weak denying the strong their objectives.

The three objectives to this thesis are: to determine through historical investigation the primary motivations and impetuses behind the creation and development of special operations forces (SOF) within the People's Liberation Army (PLA) of China; to provide a detailed briefing of modern PLA SOF; to determine whether PLA SOF contingents will develop an American "Green Beret"-type Unconventional Warfare (UW) capability in the immediate future. The third objective will be ascertained through a brief investigation of the history, motivations and national strategy behind the United States Army Special Forces. It will also examine the doctrinal leanings of Local War Under High Tech Conditions, as well as the strategic and political objectives of the People's Republic of China (PRC), and how both factors pertain to and affect the missions of PLA SOF. Through the course of this thesis' research, it was discovered that doctrinal changes within the PLA, post-1979 PLA modernization and professionalization efforts, financial constraints on regional power projection goals, and the First Gulf War were the primary drivers behind the creation and development of PLA SOF. At present, an integral UW capability within PLA SOF is constrained by the Chinese military's current doctrinal emphasis--fighting a short war--and the PRC's strategic and political goals--translating regional economic interdependence into regional dominance.

Thesis (M.A.)--Naval Postgraduate School, 2002. / Thesis advisor(s): Gordon McCormick, Hy Rothstein. Includes bibliographical references (p. 81-85). Also available online.