The text that I have translated below, and for which the paper that precedes it is a critical introduction, is Hagiwara Sakutarō's Zetsubō no Tōsō, a collection of 204 aphorisms which I have translated as The Flight from Despair. My introduction concentrates on Sakutarō's use of the aphoristic form in order to show how he both follows and subverts the genre's conventions. First, I concentrate on the author's goal to tackle the "everyday" matters of life through his text rather than intellectual abstractions. I also bring attention to the concision of Sakutarō's style and the protean nature of the aphorism, which occupies an ambiguous zone between poetry and philosophy. Finally, I demonstrate how The Flight from Despair is a modernist text, and that Sakutarō's brand of modernism reveals itself most distinctly through his use of irony and paradox. However, I also indicate that Sakutarō remained a maverick in the literary establishment, and that pigeonholing him into any particular literary movement is risky.

Thesis (MA (Philosophy))--University of Stellenbosch, 2006. / A brief introduction to the ethical philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas Emmanuel Levinas’ ethics is based on the Other/other. He argues that we are in an asymmetrical relationship with our neighbour that pre-destines us with ethical responsibility even before consciousness or choice. In the face-to-face encounter an infinity and alterity about our neighbour is revealed, which is irreducible to my ontological grasp and thereby compels me to respond to him. It is also through this relation that our humanity is released as our solipsistic all-for-myself becomes a being-for-the-other. Furthermore, the I is irreplaceable, thereby making each of us ethically responsible for our neighbour to the point of responsibility for his material misery. This paper introduces this stance with the aim to underscore it. A brief discussion on the priority of ethics before ontology in the philosophy of Emmanuel Levinas The incessant theme of Levinas’ writing over 25 years has been “Ethics as First Philosophy,” which is synonymous with “The Subject’s Ethical Responsibility for his Neighbour.” This paper is a short discussion of this theme of the origin of ethics. Levinas’ arguments on pre-original time, the Infinite, language and human corporeality by which he establishes a subjectivity that is not fundamentally determined by intentionality and self-sameness, but by the proximity of our neighbour, will be considered. For Levinas it is this relation to the Other that answers the question of the meaning of being and is also the first word of words. First Philosophy is accordingly to be found in the face-to-face which is a subordination of knowledge to a mode of meaning beyond totality.

Ever since the environment and nonhumanity became major ethical topics, human-centered worldviews have been blamed for all that is morally wrong about our dealings with nature. Those who consider themselves nonanthropocentrists typically assume that the West’s anthropocentric axiologies and ontologies underlie all of the environmental degradations associated with our species. On the other hand, a handful of environmental philosophers argue that anthropocentrism is perfectly acceptable as a foundation for environmental ethics. According to Bryan Norton’s convergence hypothesis, "If reasonably interpreted and translated into appropriate policies, a nonanthropocentric ethic will advocate the same [environmental] policies as a suitably broad and long-sighted anthropocentrism" (Norton 2004:11). Norton notes that although adherents to either ism may disagree about the relative importance of the various reasons they have for advocating such policies, they nevertheless share an equal commitment to protecting the environment. Because any form of anthropocentrism must fundamentally favor humanity over nonhumanity, nonanthropocentrists are nevertheless concerned that such favoritism is "nothing more than the expression of an irrational bias" (Taylor 1981:215). They reason that only a nonanthropocentric ethic can guarantee that policies do not arbitrarily favor humans when their interests conflict with those of nonhumans. I argue that critics of convergence fail to appreciate that Norton’s hypothesis is limited to ideologies that he deems "reasonable" and "suitably broad and long-sighted," or else they misapprehend what these terms imply. When it comes to ethics, nonanthropocentrists and anthropocentrists alike vary along a continuum according to whether their overriding intuitions are more aligned with individualistic or collectivistic axiologies and their associated timescales. The most unreasonable, narrow, and short-sighted ideologies are those that are the most individualistic. It is at the collective end of the continuum that Norton’s proposed convergence takes place. I defend a version of anthropocentrism that I term ecological anthropocentrism.

This paper will introduce the theory of blame and demonstrate how it relates to self-blame. I will begin by first highlighting two competing definitions of blame. The first of these forms, upheld by two prominent philosophers, Thomas Scanlon and Linda Radzik, looks at blame as impairing relationships. Both philosophers study how wrongful actions cause impairments in relationships and argue that blame is utilized to the extent of that impairment. Reactive emotions, according to them, are simply a byproduct of blame and not of quintessential importance to the theory of blame. The second form of blame, presented by Susan Wolf and R. Jay Wallace, refutes the Impaired Relations Theory and, instead, studies the theory of blame in accordance with reactive emotions. These two philosophers contend that blame is the reactive attitudes one has, or should have, towards wrongful actions. These emotions are, therefore, required in order for an agent to be blamed. This paper will first thoroughly outline the differences between these two forms of blame. It will then introduce the notion of self-blame with respect to these four philosophers’ viewpoints and compare them to one another. It will ultimately conclude by revealing how the Reactive Attitudes Theory represents a more accurate account of self-blame.

This thesis argues that tasting appears as an act of creative empathy and of knowledge acquisition in Virginia Woolf's writing. First contextualising my discussion within Woolf's own reading of the aesthetic and literary history of ‘taste', I then use Cixous' essay ‘Extreme Fidelity' (renamed ‘The Author in Truth') as a theoretical entryway to passages from The Voyage Out, Jacob's Room, A Room of One's Own, Mrs Dalloway, To the Lighthouse, The Waves, and Orlando which centralise the role of gustatory pleasure in creativity and epistemology. Cixous elaborates an oral, ‘poetic' and feminine ontology rooted in a receptivity to sensual pleasure, a concept that assists my reading of Woolf in several aspects. I suggest that in Woolf, both literal and figurative experiences of taste contribute to physical and psychic repletion, consequently eliciting empathy with the other (Cixous' term). This empathy which originates in the body constitutes an epistemological source distinct from intellectual or emotional intelligences, but one equally integral to the creative process. I assert that empathy features in Woolf as an extension or enlargement of the imagination through which a subject incorporates knowledge of alterity, but without consuming the other - as in the act of tasting. This ideation differs from notions of empathy as an analogical mapping or projection of self onto other. I discuss the ways in which a ‘gustatory epistemology' informs Woolf's approach to her craft, shapes the interrelationships of her characters, and materialises stylistically in her development of a ‘poetic' prose language.

No description available.

Homosexuality is an important and controversial topic in political, philosophical, ethical and religious spheres. We are exposed to the debate of homosexuality in the media on a regular basis and issues related to homosexuality have been taken up by the Supreme Court, politicians and religious institutions. Needless to say, the debate surrounding homosexuality has captured the attention of almost everyone in society to some degree. It is my goal in this thesis to give a candid overview and analysis of the arguments surrounding homosexual sexual conduct. First, I will present an argument by John Corvino, who posits that homosexual conduct can realize the same concrete goods of love, happiness, and pleasure, among others, that heterosexual conduct can realize. Namely, if homosexual conduct can produce these goods, then there is no reason on the face of things to treat homosexual conduct as morally inferior to heterosexual conduct. I will then consider an objection by Michael Levin who asserts that even if this is true, there is a prudential reason to discourage homosexual conduct because it leads to unhappiness. This fact counts prudentially against homosexual conduct and undermines Corvino’s argument. I will then examine an argument by Alan Goldman, who presents a definition of sex which he believes best matches our common intuitions and judgments in regards to what sexual activity is and isn’t. Goldman argues against definitions of sexual activity which posit that the purpose of sexual activity is to fulfill some external goal or purpose to sex itself, such as reproduction or love. Rather, Goldman outlines that sex is essentially a physical desire for contact with another’s body. If Goldman’s definition is correct, then his definition entails that homosexual conduct is not immoral. Afterwards, I will give my own thoughts as to what moral conclusions we should draw about homosexual conduct based on the above arguments.

Thesis (MPhil)--University of Stellenbosch, 2007. / On title page: MPhil in Antieke Kulture. Bibliography. Also available via the Internet.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 2007. / Title from first page of PDF file. Includes bibliographical references (p. 261-272).

xv, 103 p. : ill. A print copy of this thesis is available through the UO Libraries. Search the library catalog for the location and call number. / While research has extensively documented the inter- and intra-personal consequences of perspective taking, less is known about the mechanisms that underlie this process. Recent research has explored self-other overlap as a mediator of perspective taking on various pro-social outcomes, such as helping and decreased stereotyping. Results have been mixed, perhaps due to the use of different methodologies and scales that actually measure different facets of self-other overlap. This dissertation investigates the structure of self-other overlap and examines how perspective taking may affect only certain facets of self-other overlap, as well as the direction in which this overlap occurs. To test the conceptual equivalence of different overlap measures, in Study 1, participants completed several previously used measures of overlap for two targets: their best friend and an acquaintance. Factor analyses revealed two distinct factors of self-other overlap-- perceived closeness and attribute overlap --although small variations emerged depending on target. These two factors had unique associations with several relationship quality and individual difference measures. Study 2 extended these results by manipulating perspective taking with a stranger. Results replicated the same factor structure from Study 1, and found that perspective taking had different effects on the two factors. Study 3 examined whether or not perspective taking affected the direction of self-other overlap by changing one's attitudes and beliefs to become more like the other person. Results supported a model in which perceived closeness predicted belief change toward the target person, even after accounting for other related consequences of perspective taking such as empathy and positive attitudes. Together, these results suggest that self-other overlap is a multi-dimensional construct associated with different psychological responses. These results are discussed in connection with the relationship between self-other overlap and perspective taking and how this may lead to "self-expansion." / Committee in charge: Sara Hodges, Chairperson, Psychology; Sanjay Srivastava, Member, Psychology; Marjorie Taylor, Member, Psychology; John Lysaker, Outside Member, Philosophy