Since the early 1990s a growing number of constitution building processes in countries transitioning from authoritarian rule or recovering from war or severe institutional crisis have involved public participation. This increase stems from an assumption made by many peacebuilding scholars and practitioners that public participation in constitution building will lead to higher levels of democracy. This assumption has not, however, been the subject of systematic or comprehensive analysis. Therefore, the overarching purpose of this thesis is to scrutinize the participation-hypothesis - as it is referred to in this study. The study is a two-step investigation. The first part begins with an analysis of twenty cases of participatory constitution building that have occurred in post-conflict states, transitioning states and countries that have experienced a severe institutional crisis. In order to differentiate the cases in terms of how much influence participants were granted, an analytical framework is developed and the cases are categorized as either false, symbolic, limited, consultative or substantial participation. The participation-hypothesis is then empirically investigated by comparing democracy levels prior to and after the process for each of the 20 cases. In order to further test the hypothesis, cases of constitution making in which there was no public participation are then added to the investigation. These cases are included as a point of reference – the democratic outcome in this group is compared with the democratic outcome in the twenty participatory processes. The empirical results reveal that there is no relationship between public participation in constitution building processes and higher levels of democracy. On the contrary, some cases that involved considerable influence for participants have not experienced improved levels of democracy, while cases with low levels of influence for participants have shown democratic improvement. Moreover, a majority of cases of constitution making without public participation have also experienced increases in their democracy scores. Therefore, the conclusion of the first part of the study is that the participation-hypothesis does not stand up to empirical scrutiny. Particularly challenging for the participation-hypothesis is the fact that the analysis in part one shows that similar participatory processes have been followed by democratic improvement in some countries and democratic decline in others. Two such cases are Kenya and Zimbabwe. While democracy levels have increased in Kenya since the conclusion of the process, they have steadily declined in Zimbabwe. In the second part of the study, these two countries are therefore the object of intense, systematic and comparative scrutiny in order to explore factors beyond participation in constitution building that might explain the different trajectories of democracy. The comparison shows that the actions of political elites – in particular their ability to cooperate with each other – is the major explanation as to why the two wind up on different paths. The importance of elite cooperation is well-established in the democratization literature. One major conclusion of this study is therefore that the participation-hypothesis needs to be informed by insights drawn from this literature.

LLM / Department of Public Law / The defining moment of Zimbabwean constitutional reform came in 2008 after the disputed and violence riddled elections of 2008 when the three main political parties entered into a transitional Government of National Unity and were tasked with the establishment of a new constitution which was ultimately adopted in 2013 following a protracted and turbulent process which began in 2009. Some segments of the civil society however argued that the concerned political parties had ‘captured the constitutional project and narrowed it to a short-term struggle motivated by the pursuit of party political interests at the expense of the will of the people and nation’s broad long-term interests’, and thereby subverted and/or negated the aspirations of the people. It is against this background that the study therefore assesses the participation, role and significance of the rural populace in the drafting of the 2013 Zimbabwean Constitution. The study traces the history of constitutional reform efforts in Zimbabwe, beginning with the colonial Lancaster House Constitution of 1979, to the protracted exercise of 2009 to 2013 which gave birth to the current Constitution. It focuses on the 2009-13 constitution making process as a case study. The study employs an interdisciplinary approach by adopting both doctrinal and empirical research approaches. The study employed the doctrinal research approach to provide for a doctrinal analysis of the relevant global, regional and domestic legislation and case law. The empirical research approach, through interviews, was used to collect qualitative data from the general members of the rural populace and key institutions such as political parties and human rights organisations from three selected rural districts, namely Bulilima, Makonde and Mutasa. The study indicated that while a significant number of the rural populace participated in the constitution making process, the legal environment which subsisted during the constitution making process did not allow for the unfettered flow of information and ideas, as a direct result of repressive legislation such as AIPPA, Criminal Law (Codification and Reform) Act, Interception of Communications Act and POSA, among others similar laws, and as well as the deeply polarised political environment owing to the nature of the relationship between the ZANU PF-led government and the opposition political parties. The study further showed that the process was heavily dominated by the political parties to the Global Political Agreement and all the political parties wanted to ensure the adoption of a constitution that best reflected their preferences and partisan views rather than the will of the masses, making the 2013 Constitution an elitist negotiated document, contrary to the provisions of Article VI of the GPA which provided for the right of Zimbabweans to make a constitution for themselves and by themselves.