Thesis (M.P.A.)--University of Hong Kong, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves xxx-xxxv). Also available in print.

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, June, 2005. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 52-55)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1980. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 146-152).

Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of Nebraska-Lincoln, 2006. / Title from title screen (site viewed on Jan. 23, 2007). PDF text: 141p. : ill. (some col.) ; 2.17Mb. UMI publication number: AAT 3217537. Includes bibliographical references. Also available in microfilm and microfiche format.

Thesis (M.S.)--West Virginia University, 2006. / Title from document title page. Document formatted into pages; contains viii, 104 p. : col. maps. Includes abstract. Includes bibliographical references (p. 83-88).

Thesis (M.A.)--Ohio University, June, 2005. / Title from PDF t.p. Includes bibliographical references (p. 52-55)

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Iowa, 2007. / Supervisors: Gary J. Russell, Sri Devi Duvvuri. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 106-109).

Business models integrating the internet into their value propositions have demonstrated varying levels of viability. In particular, firms offering information-based products via the internet commonly are unable to generate sufficient revenue and, consequently, experience financial losses. Researchers continue to examine factors which motivate individuals' willingness-to-pay for online content. One factor from the marketing literature which has been argued to affect consumer behavior is social influence. The purpose of this research is to investigate the effect of the three levels of social influence, micro-, meso-, and macro-, on both willingness-to-pay for online content and each other. This is accomplished by examining social influence in the context of online gaming, which has proven to be one of the most successful industries in integrating the internet as a delivery channel for information-based goods. Our results suggested that all levels of social influence play a considerable role in the product valuation process. While micro-level influences, such as attitude, arguably serve as the best predictors of WTP, we found that macro-level social influence, in the form of reputation, played the greatest role in affecting the formation of individual attitudes and behaviors. This was due not only to its direct effect on WTP, but also a consequence of several significant indirect effects. Our hypothesis that an interaction effect occurs between social influences such that their effect on WTP would be "greater than the sum of their parts" was not supported. Nonetheless, our study demonstrates social influence's ability to affect an individual is not a straight forward process. Only examining the relationships between constructs occurring at different levels of social structure does the magnitude of interaction which occurs between them becomes apparent.

This study investigates how the adoption of say-on-pay (SoP) regulation impacts the propensity and profitability of merger and acquisitions (M&A) activities with a sample of S&P 1500 firms (2005 – 2016). We examine both (a) macro-economic effect induced by the adoption of S&P regulation in 2011, impacting all firms across the board, and (b) firm-level effect due to variation in SoP voting approval percentage in different firms. We propose and examine two relevant hypotheses: (i) ‘SoP governance’ hypothesis – to explain the impact of SoP rule adoption, and (ii) ‘reliable CEO’ hypothesis – to explain the impact of SoP voting approval percentage. ‘SoP governance’ hypothesis predicts that in the post-SoP period, CEOs will be more cautious in pursuing M&A deals – which have a high risk of failure. This should lead to a lower probability of acquisition and better acquisition performance. On the other hand, ‘reliable CEO’ hypothesis proposes that CEOs with higher SoP voting approval percentage, enjoy more shareholder confidence and are encouraged to take risky ventures to increase shareholders wealth. This should lead to a higher probability of acquisition, with better acquisition performance. Our results find partial support for ‘SoP governance’ hypothesis – that SoP rule adoption is associated with a lower probability of acquisition but does not have any significant association with acquisition performance. While examining the effect of SoP voting approval percentage, we further find support for ‘reliable CEO’ hypothesis. Our results show that SoP voting approval percentage has a significant and positive association with acquisition probability and acquisition performance. Finally, we find that SoP voting results do not have any significant moderating effect on the relationship between (i) CEO incentive pay and M&A decisions, and (ii) CEO pay slice and M&A decisions.

This study examines the effectiveness of Say on Pay (SoP) regulation as a corporate governance mechanism in the context of M&A deals. Using a large sample of U.S. firms over the 2005-2017 period, this study finds that, in the post-SoP period, overall CEO pay growth rate declines and CEO pay to acquisition performance sensitivity improves following M&A activities. This supports ‘SoP governance’ hypothesis, which proposes that SoP regulation will restrict CEOs self-fulfilling behaviour. In a macro-economic set-up, the introduction of SoP regulation was intended to discipline top managers by giving shareholders an opportunity to express their opinion on CEO compensation. It was therefore expected that, in the post SoP-era, CEOs will experience a lower growth in their pay package following M&A deals. On the other hand, the relation between SOP voting approval rates and CEO compensation following M&A activities is unidirectional. Irrespective of the performance of M&A deals, it is observed that CEOs with higher shareholder voting approval experience a significant positive change in their compensation level after an M&A deal. We term this as a ‘reliable CEO’ hypothesis. According to the ‘reliable CEO hypothesis, a very high voting percentage may legitimize CEOs action and embolden CEOs to carry out more risky ventures such as M&As. Since there is an established relation between risk and return, shareholders would like CEOs to take appropriate risks to increase firm value. A reliable CEO, who enjoys a high degree of shareholders’ support, should not be penalized for taking more risky ventures that are intended to increase shareholders’ wealth. Our results confirm this viewpoint.