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The philosophical tradition has long understood subjectivity solely in reference to the self's place within the world and the powers of intentional transcendence which open it. Nowhere is this presupposition more apparent than in the thought of Husserl, Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty. Despite the precise differences among their respective philosophies of transcendence, each understands the self as little else than that which opens the exteriority of a world and is thereby exhausted and determined by it. Against this prevailing assumption that the self is a 'being-in-the-world', I contend that the essence of subjectivity instead consists in the unworldly interiority of life's affective self-revelation. The studies that follow accordingly investigate five related aspects of subjectivity: the irreducibility of the self's individuality to society; the blow of vanity that reveals this inwardness; the resultant life that marshals and in turn deploys it; the power of the work of art to express it; and finally the promise of immortality that sustains it.

This study is concerned with the impact of stroke, and in particular, the experiences of patients and carers following the return of the survivor to the home environment.

In this thesis I argue that the constructive philosophical project of Jean-Luc Marion offers a new way of thinking the analogical relation between God and the human person. I particularly examine his concept of the saturated phenomenon in order to show how we might construct the relation between incommensurable terms (God and the human being) without requiring a similitude to mediate the relation. I argue that for Marion God's transcendence is understood as what he describes as "impossibility" and that his immanence is understood through Augustine's interior intimo meo, the God more intimate to me than I am too myself. I demonstrate that radical immanence is God's transcendence insofar as the event of the impossible precedes the being-possibility correlation of metaphysics. Thus I develop the relation of God and the human being as a coincidence of opposites more than an analogy: the infinite distance of radical alterity becomes a belonging together of the human being with God. As a consequence of this analysis, I develop a new concept of relation, which I call "hyperbolic relation." If similitude always threatens to abolish the alterity of the terms of the relation (as was Barth's objection to the analogia entis), in this case, alterity is maintained not by removing relation but by increasing it to the level of hyperbole. Like Marion's God who is "without Being," this analogy is "without similitude" by means of excess. The concept of God that I develop (impossible as intimate and vice versa) will consequently lead to a deepening of the concept of the human person through the transfiguration that saturation precipitates within the concept of relation.

acase@tulane.edu / This dissertation argues that Hegel’s Phenomenology presents a rigorous account of the essential tension between politics and theology that lies at the heart of our striving to be at home in the world. The project has two principal components. The first argues, through a detailed exegesis of Chapter IV on self-consciousness, that Hegel derives both our political nature and our impulse to transcend the mundane from the oppositional structure of consciousness, thereby demonstrating that the two impulses are equally rooted in the ontology of man as a self-conscious being. Contrary to recent interpretations, which have tended to focus on the social conditions of normativity to the exclusion of the religious impulse, I argue that the chapter must be read as a whole, as a continuous elaboration of the essential needs of self-consciousness. Rather than understanding the philosophic postures of the stoic and the skeptic and the religious yearning of the unhappy consciousness as spiritual aberrations, resulting from an inadequate social ordering, I argue that they are developments of the bondsman’s discovery of interiority. The relation between these twain impulses then guides an interpretation of the variegated and multifaceted material encountered in the Phenomenology’s subsequent chapters, which present repeated attempts to reconcile this duality and realize the “concept of spirit.” Following a careful analysis of the first stage of “spirit”—the ethical world—I argue that the Phenomenology shows how man’s effort to achieve a harmonious twofold relation to what is other than himself is the obverse of his pursuit of self-knowledge. Ultimately, the tension between politics and theology is only overcome with the advent of absolute knowing, wherein spirit attains a comprehensive understanding of its essential structure. Hegel’s Phenomenology thus reveals the human quest for just social relations and his longing for the divine to be two facets of his search for self-knowledge. / 1 / Paul T. Wilford

Bibliography: leaves 349-369. A study, informed by phenomenology, which describes 24 nurses' meaningful experiences in practice, for the purpose of capturing the spirit embodied in nursing practice.

This dissertation investigates the ways in which the human encounter with place has an active role in shaping personal identity. I commence the study with an examination of the appearing of place in the life of the subject. This begins with a consideration of intentionality through the philosophies of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty. I then identify several characteristics of place including: place as unselfconsciously intended and tacitly known, place's bleeding boundaries, the intimate connection between the self and environment, and place's affectivity on the emplaced subject. Edward Casey, E.C. Relph, and J.E. Malpas are key influences in the development of these characteristics. <br>The dissertation continues to employ the narrative identity theory of Paul Ricoeur as he develops a sense of self-identity that is founded neither in the subject as posited in the Cartesian cogito, nor in Nietzsche's deconstruction of the subject. While Ricoeur's narrative identity is a helpful means of understanding the concept of personal identity, nevertheless, I argue that Ricoeur's framework manifests a significant oversight. In his attention to time and action, he misses the vital role of environment in the development of one's narrative. I reconsider Ricoeur's work giving attention to the way that the appearing of place in experience is effectual in shaping the self's story and thus the formation of identity. <br>I then turn to explore the question regarding why place is overlooked in everyday experience, in the work of Ricoeur, and throughout much of the history of philosophy. In the consideration of the veil of place, I utilize the inconspicuity of the ready-to-hand tool in Heidegger's Being and Time. However, I argue that to remain hidden is not necessarily the fate of place. I endeavor to exhibit the ways in which place is (and can be) self-consciously experienced. Finally, to demonstrate the ways in which place is a significant aspect of identity formation, I turn to the fictional works of author Wendell Berry and the later philosophy of Martin Heidegger. Through Berry and Heidegger I explore the themes the self's relationship with place, the effects of displacement, and the role of place-based memory. / McAnulty College and Graduate School of Liberal Arts / Philosophy / PhD / Dissertation

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Patients are living longer with many types of cancer; however, often they face sudden possibilities of dying, not only due to their advancing illness but due to complications of their treatment. Consequently, they can express substantial existential distress. Nurses’ close proximity to patients puts them in an ideal place to assess and engage with patients’ existential distress; yet this kind of research has been scarce. The purpose of this doctoral thesis was to explore nurses’ experiences of being with patients facing the threat of mortality. Yalom describes this threat as the fear of death, isolation, anxiety and responsibility about freedom, and meaninglessness. The study took place in a cancer setting where care is highly technological and goals of cure dominate, specifically, two bone marrow transplant units of one institution in Canada. Benner’s methodology of interpretive phenomenology guided data collection and analysis of focused observations and interviews with 19 registered nurses. The experience of fighting cancer while preparing for the possibility of letting go was the main theme. Letting go did not reflect nurses’ intents to abandon life but to release patients (if only briefly) from perceived norms of the curative culture. More specifically, the main theme was characterized by: 1) working within the culture of cure and the possibilities of patients dying, 2) concern about “bursting the bubble of hope,” 3) whether to and how to respond to patients’ distress and dying, and 4) coping with patient involvement. In the context of responsive relationships (patients and their families, and healthcare colleagues), nurses reported engaging in communication about the threat of patients’ mortality, and responding with letting be and supporting families to let go, the management of technology and prevention of technological intrusions, and striving for patients to have “easier” deaths. Results indicate a potential to enhance nurses’ supportive care constituted by their perceived responsibility to engage and respond to patients’ existential distress. Moreover, this study suggests that more attention is warranted not only to policy, education, and research that focuses on patients’ existential well-being, but to the well-being of nurses working within tensions of curing and comforting.

Patients are living longer with many types of cancer; however, often they face sudden possibilities of dying, not only due to their advancing illness but due to complications of their treatment. Consequently, they can express substantial existential distress. Nurses’ close proximity to patients puts them in an ideal place to assess and engage with patients’ existential distress; yet this kind of research has been scarce. The purpose of this doctoral thesis was to explore nurses’ experiences of being with patients facing the threat of mortality. Yalom describes this threat as the fear of death, isolation, anxiety and responsibility about freedom, and meaninglessness. The study took place in a cancer setting where care is highly technological and goals of cure dominate, specifically, two bone marrow transplant units of one institution in Canada. Benner’s methodology of interpretive phenomenology guided data collection and analysis of focused observations and interviews with 19 registered nurses. The experience of fighting cancer while preparing for the possibility of letting go was the main theme. Letting go did not reflect nurses’ intents to abandon life but to release patients (if only briefly) from perceived norms of the curative culture. More specifically, the main theme was characterized by: 1) working within the culture of cure and the possibilities of patients dying, 2) concern about “bursting the bubble of hope,” 3) whether to and how to respond to patients’ distress and dying, and 4) coping with patient involvement. In the context of responsive relationships (patients and their families, and healthcare colleagues), nurses reported engaging in communication about the threat of patients’ mortality, and responding with letting be and supporting families to let go, the management of technology and prevention of technological intrusions, and striving for patients to have “easier” deaths. Results indicate a potential to enhance nurses’ supportive care constituted by their perceived responsibility to engage and respond to patients’ existential distress. Moreover, this study suggests that more attention is warranted not only to policy, education, and research that focuses on patients’ existential well-being, but to the well-being of nurses working within tensions of curing and comforting.