Submitted by BRUNO TENORIO COELHO null (brcoelh00@gmail.com) on 2017-11-28T00:35:31Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Bruno-final.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) / Submitted by BRUNO TENORIO COELHO null (brcoelh00@gmail.com) on 2017-11-28T12:13:07Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Bruno-final.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) / Submitted by BRUNO TENORIO COELHO null (brcoelh00@gmail.com) on 2017-11-28T14:22:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Bruno-final.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) / Submitted by BRUNO TENORIO COELHO null (brcoelh00@gmail.com) on 2017-11-28T14:31:58Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Bruno-final.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) / Submitted by BRUNO TENORIO COELHO null (brcoelh00@gmail.com) on 2017-11-28T14:37:46Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Bruno-final.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) / Submitted by BRUNO TENORIO COELHO null (brcoelh00@gmail.com) on 2017-11-28T19:04:29Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Bruno-final.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) / Submitted by BRUNO TENORIO COELHO null (brcoelh00@gmail.com) on 2017-11-30T18:58:22Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Bruno-final.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) / Submitted by BRUNO TENORIO COELHO null (brcoelh00@gmail.com) on 2017-12-04T14:43:24Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Bruno-final.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) / Submitted by BRUNO TENORIO COELHO null (brcoelh00@gmail.com) on 2017-12-05T14:11:15Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação-Bruno-final.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Satie Tagara (satie@marilia.unesp.br) on 2017-12-07T17:47:44Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 coelho_bt_me_mar.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-12-07T17:47:44Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 coelho_bt_me_mar.pdf: 518219 bytes, checksum: 1bcc2b6a8cdcaa2a2fda145866f37b1c (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-25 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / A hipótese da mente estendida afirma não existir um limite identificável para os processos cognitivos, e que por vezes, eles se estendem para o ambiente. Irei neste trabalho inicialmente detalhar os argumentos que sustentam a hipótese, expondo casos onde o uso recorrente de ferramentas e tecnologias acabam se tornando um extensão do corpo. Detalho a cognição incorporada e situada, programa de pesquisa de teor revisionista que dá base para a hipótese, e questiona diretamente os pressupostos da ciência cognitiva tradicional, nomeadamente, de um agente epistêmico passivo que processa e manipula representações. Em seguida, apresento objeções que foram levantadas contra a hipótese, assim como possíveis respostas a estas objeções. Por fim, apresento uma defesa da hipótese a partir de evidências empíricas presentes na pesquisa em psicologia ecológica. / The extended-mind hypothesis states that there is no identifiable limit for cognitive processes, and that sometimes the mind extend into the environment. In this paper I will first detail the arguments that support the hypothesis, exposing cases where the recurrent use of tools and technologies end up becoming an extension of the body. I detail the embodied and situated cognition research program, who has a revisionist content that provides the basis for the hypothesis, and questions directly the presuppositions of traditional cognitive science, namely, a passive epistemic agent that processes and manipulates representations. Then I present objections that have been raised against the hypothesis, as well as possible answers to these objections. Finally, I present a defense of the hypothesis based on empirical evidence in ecological psychology research.

Intentional Attributions to Animals without Language: Aspectuality and Referential Opacity”. It is generally accepted that intentional attributions are referentially opaque. But, as it is also stressed in the literature, referential opacity introduces difficulties to those who defend the attribution of intentionalmental states to non-human animals. In this paper: i) I identify one of these difficulties –which I call the problem of nonsense–; ii) I offer an answer to that problem. In order to accomplish ii), I begin by examining which are the behavioral and representational requisites that a creature has to satisfy so that our mental states attributions to it are referentially opaque but, at the same time, avoid the problem of nonsense. Secondly, I offer some empirical examples of non-human animals which seem to follow such requirements. / Usualmente se acepta que las atribuciones intencionales son referencialmente opacas. Pero, según se suele señalar, dicho rasgo comporta dificultades para quienes defienden la legitimidad de atribuir estados mentales intencionales a los animales no humanos. En este trabajo: i) identifico uno de tales inconvenientes–al cual denomino el problema del sinsentido–; y ii) ofrezco una respuesta al mismo. Para llevar a cabo ii) examino, en primer lugar, cuáles son los requisitos conductuales y representacionales que debe satisfacer una criatura para que nuestras atribuciones intencionales a ella resulten referencialmente opacas sin caer en el sinsentido. En segundo lugar, ofrezco algunos ejemplos empíricos de animales no humanos que parecen satisfacer tales requerimientos.

Depuis une décennie, les études sur la pensée de Brentano connaissent un souffle de renouveau. De sa doctrine, on retient le fameux thème de l'intentionnalité qui a soulevé un certain nombre de discussions sur ce que signifie réellement ce concept et ce que Brentano a voulu dire lorsqu'il l'a réintroduit. Dans la philosophie contemporaine, le passage en question qui décrit ce concept l'interprète le plus souvent comme la marque d'une irréductibilité du mental au physique, l'idée qu'il existerait un idiome ou vocable particulier pour décrire les états mentaux et l'esprit en général (intensionnalité). Récemment dans les contributions en philosophie de l'esprit, sa conception de l'esprit a connu un accueil favorable qui se distingue nettement de la première reception de son concept d'intentionnalité dans la philosophie du langage. D'une manière significative, sa théorie de la conscience s'est vu associée à différentes conceptions rivales de l'esprit : théories d'ordre supérieur, autoreprésentationnalisme et différentes autres variétés de représentationnalisme et d'intentionnalisme qui se réclame d'un aspect ou un autre de la conception de l'esprit de Brentano. L'objectif de cette thèse est d'explorer le thème du néo-brentanisme en identifiant dans la littérature contemporaine les théories dîtes "néobrentaniennes". / The famous intentionality quote from Brentano's Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint gave rise to many different glosses on how to understand what is meant by intentionality. Since Chisholm, Quine, and Davidson, the passage has often been referred to as making a claim about the irreducibility of the mental to the physical, turning Brentano's thesis that intentionality is the mark of the mental into a thesis about the peculiar idiom or vocabulary of the mental – a thesis about intensionality. However, in recent contributions to the philosophy of mind, the reception of Brentano's philosophy of mind has departed to a large extent from this first reception of the intentionality thesis. Interestingly, his conception of intentionality and consciousness has been integrated into diverse and sometimes competing accounts of the mind: higher-order theories of consciousness, self-representational accounts and varieties of representationalism and intentionalism often relate to Brentano's conception of the mind. The goal of this thesis is to explore neo-brentanian's subject identifying the neo-brentanian theories of mind and consciousness.

Resumo: O presente trabalho pretende delinear uma possível interpretação do behaviorismo radical como teoria da mente, o que significa, em outros termos, contextualizá-lo no âmbito da filosofia da mente. Para tanto, primeiramente apresentaremos as principais teorias que figuram na filosofia da mente contemporânea, incluindo suas teses centrais e seus respectivos problemas. Em seguida, trataremos dos fundamentos do behaviorismo radical enquanto filosofia da ciência e enquanto teoria do comportamento. Esses dois passos servirão ao propósito de estabelecer os parâmetros da discussão subseqüente entre behaviorismo radical e filosofia da mente. Nesse sentido, o primeiro problema que pretendemos responder é: o que é a mente? Trata-se de um problema conceitual que envolve o mapeamento dos fenômenos normalmente caracterizados como mentais. Veremos que, para o behaviorismo radical, a mente é comportamento. Já o segundo problema que pretendemos responder é: qual a natureza da mente? - problema que, no contexto do behaviorismo radical, deve ser substituído pelo seguinte: qual a natureza do comportamento? Discorrer sobre a natureza de um fenômeno implica investigar quais são as características essenciais à sua existência. Trata-se, portanto, de um problema ontológico. Sugeriremos que as características essenciais para a existência do comportamento podem ser contempladas pelo posicionamento metafísico denominado relacionismo substancial. Em tempo, além dessas duas questões principais, discorreremos ao longo do trabalho sobre diversos problemas levantados pelas teorias da mente contemporâneas, tais como o problema da subjetividade, o problema do fisicalismo, o problema dos limites da ciência, o problema mente-corpo, o problema da causalidade mental, o problema do significado, o problema do reducionismo, o problema das qualidades das experiências, o problema do conhecimento ... (Resumo completo, clicar acesso eletrônico abaixo) / Abstract: The aim of this work is to delineate a possible interpretation of radical behaviorism as a theory of mind. That means putting radical behaviorism in the context of philosophy of mind. To do so, firstly we will present the main theories of contemporary philosophy of mind, including its central thesis and its respective problems. Next, we will present the principles of radical behaviorism as a philosophy of science and as a theory of behavior. Those steps will serve to establish the parameters for subsequent discussion between radical behaviorism and the problems of philosophy of mind. The first problem with which we pretend to deal is the conceptual problem of mind: what is mind? As we will see, for radical behaviorism the mind is behavior. The second problem with which we pretend to deal is the ontological problem of mind: what is the nature of mind? In the radical behaviorist context, the question must be substituted by this: what is the nature of behavior? Discussions about the nature of things demands investigating what characteristics are essential to its existence. We will suggest that the essential characteristics of the existence of behavior can be contemplated by the metaphysical view denominated substantial relationism. Moreover, in addition to our two principal problems, we will discuss through this work several problems of philosophy of mind, such as the problem of subjectivity, the problem of physicalism, the problem of science limits, the mind-body problem, the problem of mental causation, the problem of meaning, the problem of reductionism, the problem of qualitative character of experiences, the problem of privileged knowledge, the problem of qualia, and others. In the end, we hope that this work may represent a step toward the construction of a radical behaviorist theory of mind / Orientador: Jonas Gonçalves Coelho / Coorientador: Kester Carrara / Banca: Tereza Maria de Azevedo Pires Serio / Banca: João de Fernandes Teixeira / Mestre

Submitted by MARCELO ALEXANDRE ALBINO FILHO null (marcelus.filho@gmail.com) on 2017-10-17T12:26:16Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Dissertação Marcelo Alexandre Albino Filho.pdf: 950686 bytes, checksum: 903df5b81eddd02c41e20a879b3344fa (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Monique Sasaki (sayumi_sasaki@hotmail.com) on 2017-10-18T19:55:00Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 albinofilho_ma_me_mar.pdf: 950686 bytes, checksum: 903df5b81eddd02c41e20a879b3344fa (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-10-18T19:55:01Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 albinofilho_ma_me_mar.pdf: 950686 bytes, checksum: 903df5b81eddd02c41e20a879b3344fa (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-09-28 / Nas últimas décadas, a temática da consciência tem atraído atenção de pesquisadores em filosofia da mente, e em diversas disciplinas científicas e tecnológicas. O objetivo desta pesquisa foi realizar uma revisão das principais escalas e métodos de avaliação do nível de consciência e da experiência dolorosa utilizados na área da saúde, no âmbito internacional, tendo em vista responder a indagações que emergem no contexto da prática dos profissionais de saúde. O procedimento metodológico consistiu em adotar o Monismo de Duplo Aspecto e Reflexivo como referencial teórico, e levantar os principais procedimentos relativos à avaliação do nível de consciência e da dor na área de saúde, para então discutir se abordam os fenômenos de modo conceitualmente apropriado. Concluímos que os critérios utilizados pelas escalas de avaliação do nível de consciência e pelas escalas de profundidade anestésica avaliam possibilidades de ocorrência da experiência consciente. / In recent decades, the theme of consciousness has attracted attention of researchers in the philosophy of mind, and in various scientific and technological disciplines. The aim of this study was to review the main scales and methods of assessing the level of consciousness and painful experience used in the health area field, internationally, in order to respond to questions that arise in the context of the practice of health professionals. The methodological procedure was to take Double Aspect and Reflexive Monism as a theoretical framework, to review relevant procedures in the Health Sciences and then discuss whether they are conceptually adequate to the phenomena. We conclude that the criteria used by rating scales level of consciousness and the anesthetic depth scales assess the possibility of occurrence of conscious experience.

Submitted by RENATA SILVA SOUZA null (renatynhass@hotmail.com) on 2017-10-26T17:42:23Z No. of bitstreams: 1 O PROBLEMA DA IDENTIDADE PESSOAL ANALISADO A PARTIR DE UMA PERSPECTIVA FILOSÓFICO-INTERDISCIPLINAR.pdf: 1305015 bytes, checksum: 2b8e339b7de9928b0dc3f21448f24d19 (MD5) / Rejected by LUIZA DE MENEZES ROMANETTO (luizamenezes@reitoria.unesp.br), reason: Solicitado pela autora. on 2017-10-30T19:57:17Z (GMT) / Submitted by RENATA SILVA SOUZA null (renatynhass@hotmail.com) on 2017-11-02T19:45:54Z No. of bitstreams: 1 Renata Silva Souza - O PROBLEMA DA IDENTIDADE PESSOAL ANALISADO A PARTIR DE UMA PERSPECTIVA FILOSÓFICO-INTERDISCIPLINAR.pdf: 1305034 bytes, checksum: a1e57664ae24c6b9ba18d9cd9d042980 (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by LUIZA DE MENEZES ROMANETTO (luizamenezes@reitoria.unesp.br) on 2017-11-13T13:53:07Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 1 souza_rs_me_mar.pdf: 1305034 bytes, checksum: a1e57664ae24c6b9ba18d9cd9d042980 (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-11-13T13:53:07Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 souza_rs_me_mar.pdf: 1305034 bytes, checksum: a1e57664ae24c6b9ba18d9cd9d042980 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-08-31 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior (CAPES) / O objetivo deste trabalho é analisar o problema da identidade pessoal em uma perspectiva filosófico-interdisciplinar. O problema da identidade pessoal consiste na dificuldade de se estabelecer critérios que possibilitem (ou não) a identificação de características constantes de um indivíduo, como sendo o mesmo, apesar das inúmeras mudanças a que é suscetível ao longo da vida. Analisaremos o problema da identidade pessoal empregando recursos da filosofia da mente, da Teoria dos Sistemas Complexos (TSC) e da filosofia da informação, os quais sustentam o eixo interdisciplinar de nossa pesquisa. Na perspectiva da TSC, ênfase é dada ao modo pelo qual as partes de um sistema interagem entre si em diferentes escalas. Os conceitos de auto-organização, emergência e de complexidade, centrais à TSC, servirão como recursos de investigação do problema da identidade pessoal. Analisaremos, como um estudo de caso, possíveis implicações de modificações corporais concebidas pelos defensores do projeto transhumanista de aprimoramento humano radical. Com a análise dos pressupostos filosóficos subjacentes ao projeto transhumanista, pretendemos ilustrar aspectos da pesquisa filosófico-interdisciplinar na investigação do problema da identidade pessoal. / The aim of this work is to investigate the problem of personal identity from a philosophical-interdisciplinary perspective. The problem of personal identity concerns the difficulty of establishing criteria that allows (or not) the identification of constant characteristics of an individual that remains the same despite the many changes that occur throughout his/her life. We will address this problem by employing resources available from the areas of Philosophy of Mind, Complex Systems Theory (CST), and Philosophy of Information (this emphasizes the interdisciplinary nature of the proposed research). From the perspective of CST, emphasis is given to the ways in which different parts of a system interact with each other at various levels. The concepts of self-organization, emergence, and complexity, which are central to CST, can be of assistance in the investigation the problem of personal identity. We will analyze, as a case study, possible implications of bodily modifications conceived by proponents of the transhumanist project of radical human enhancement.Using an analysis of the philosophical criteria on which the transhumanist project is founded, we intend to illustrate ways in which aspects of philosophical and interdisciplinary research can be used to investigate the problem of personal identity.

[pt] Procurando formular o conceito de mente, a Filosofia da Mente se baseou em três noções fundamentais: causação, identidade e superveniência. A crença na dicotomia entre aspectos físicos e aspectos inextensos de nossa experiência permanece um problema de considerável dificuldade. A possibilidade de diálogo tanto em uma teoria monista quanto dualista é dificultada porque cada abordagem demanda por um princípio, uma relação ou operação que solucione o problema da ligação entre corpo, mente e mundo. Noções subseqüentes, como intencionalidade, consciência ou qualia, permanecerão fechadas em seus próprios escopos conceituais. Por este motivo, analisar como cada noção fundamental é empregada auxilia na compreensão de restrições e avanços, permitindo desde a definição dos métodos apropriados de tratamento aos problemas de cada domínio às teorias que melhor se adequarão às suas possíveis resoluções. / [en] Trying to formulate the concept of mind, the Philosophy of the Mind has based itself on three fundamental notions: causation, identity and supervenience. The belief in the dichotomy between physical aspects and inextense aspects of our experience remains a problem of considerable difficulty. The possibility of dialogue as much in a dualist as in a monist theory is hardened because each boarding demands for a principle, a relation or operation to solve the problem of linking body, mind and world. Subsequent notions, as intentionality, consciousness or qualia, will remain closed in its proper conceptual scopes. For this reason, to analyze as each fundamental notion is used assists in the understanding of restrictions and advances, allowing since the definition of appropriate methods of treatment to the problems of each domain to the theories that will suit better to its possible resolutions.

Borderline conscious creatures are neither definitely conscious nor definitely not conscious. In this thesis, I explain what borderline consciousness is and why it poses a significant epistemological challenge to scientists who investigate phenomenal consciousness as a natural kind. When these scientists discover more than one overlapping kind in their samples of conscious creatures, how can they identify the kind to which all and only conscious creatures belong? After assessing three pessimistic responses, I argue that different groups of scientists can legitimately use the concept of phenomenal consciousness to refer to different kinds, in accord with their empirical interests. They can thereby resolve three related impasses on the status of borderline conscious creatures, the neural structure of phenomenal consciousness, and the possibility of artificial consciousness. The thesis has three parts: First, I analyse the concept of borderline consciousness. My analysis counters several arguments which conclude that borderline consciousness is inconceivable. Then I explain how borderline consciousness produces the multiple kinds problem in consciousness science. Second, I assess three recent philosophical responses to this problem. One response urges scientists to eliminate the concept of consciousness, while another judges them to be irremediably ignorant of the nature of consciousness. The final response concludes that scientific progress is limited by the concept's referential indeterminacy. I argue that these responses are too pessimistic, though they point to a more promising approach. Third, I propose that empirically constrained stipulation can solve the multiple kinds problem. Biologists face the same problem because of their longstanding controversy over what counts as a species. Building on new arguments for stipulating the reference of species concepts, I demonstrate that this use of stipulation in biology is neither epistemologically complacent nor metaphysically capricious; it also need not sow semantic confusion. Then I defend its use in consciousness science. My approach is shown to be consistent with our understanding of natural kinds, borderline cases, and phenomenal consciousness.

Letting the Body Lead is an exhibition and workshop series that focuses on embodiment in social context and invites attendees to engage with the work, both as viewers and active participants. Embodiment in social context refers to the understanding of lived experiences in the body. Within my creative practice, I explore the body's creativity, knowledge, and agency while bridging and brining together the fields of fine arts, movement-based and socially just art making. I believe in the transformative potential of how movement and contemplative practices can support a more liberated way of being both within an individual and, by extension, within broader communities and social movements.

In this thesis I offer a novel alternative response to Frank Jackson’s (1982, 1986) knowledge argument in support of non-reductive physicalism (NRP). The knowledge argument is framed as an attack on reductive physicalism (RP), as it suggests the possibility that the subjective experience (SE) of an event or phenomenon adds ‘real’ knowledge to a person’s existing knowledge. My novel response aims to enrich the current debate, dominated as it is by Western philosophy of mind, by introducing one specific African concept of mind into the debate. The concept of mind I introduce into the debate, is Kwasi Wiredu’s (1987) quasi-physicalist interpretation of the Akan concept of mind. My alternative reply specifically contributes to the debate by changing the negative ability reply to the knowledge argument, framed by Nemirow (1980, 1990) and Lewis (1983, 1988) in Western philosophy of mind, into a positive support for Jackson (1982, 1986) by introducing African voices into the debate. I demonstrate that although the unsolved mind-body problem is presented as an ongoing philosophical issue in Western philosophy, a turn to an African perspective can shine new light on the problem. The novel alternative reply to Jackson’s knowledge argument consists of an epistemological argument that subjective experience (SE) adds genuine knowledge to a person’s existing knowledge, and a metaphysical argument that subjective experience (SE) is an emergent mental property. These two arguments validate property dualism as well as the knowledge argument. / Thesis (PhD)--University of Pretoria, 2019. / CSIR- CAIR 2017-2019 University of Pretoria (UP) Postgraduate Bursary 2018-2019 / Philosophy / PhD / Unrestricted