[pt] O presente trabalho tem por objetivo apresentar um diálogo entre dois saberes distintos – a Psicanálise e a Filosofia da Mente – como uma possibilidade de entendimento sobre o campo da Psicossomática. Neste sentido, serão apresentadas descritivamente as principais correntes do campo da filosofia da mente para então, através de críticas a cada uma delas, sugerir a possibilidade de integrar o Emergentismo com a visão psicodinâmica trazida pela teoria das relações objetais em psicanálise. Considera-se que a corrente emergentista, com sua visão monista não reducionista, pode estabelecer correlações interessantes com a concepção sobre a gênese da experiência mental a partir da interação subjetiva, tal como defendem alguns psicanalistas. Sustenta-se a tese de que a experiência mental seja fruto das relações intersubjetivas desde os primórdios do desenvolvimento individual e que distúrbios nas relações podem se configurar como agentes estressores capazes de desorganização e adoecimento físico. / [en] Abstract: This work aims to present the dialogue between two different types of knowledge – Psychoanalysis and Philosophy of Mind – as a possibility of understanding the field of Psychosomatics. Thus, the main currents in the field of philosophy of mind will be presented in a descriptive way and, then, through criticism of each one of them, the possibility of Emergentism being understood as capable of integration with the psychodynamic vision brought by Object Relations Theory in psychoanalysis. We believe that the emergentist current, a non-reductionist monist view, presents itself as a philosophical view capable of establishing correlations with the view of mental experience from subjective interaction as defended by some psychoanalytic authors. Thus, this thesis will show that mental experience is the result of intersubjective relationships existing since the beginning of individual development and that disturbances in relationships can be configured as stressors capable of disorganization and physical illness.

[pt] A partir do Enativismo, perspectiva filosófica emergente no campo das ciências da mente, este trabalho investigou a dimensão cognitiva pertinente à Educação Ambiental (EA) no Brasil. Para tanto, foi desenvolvida uma leitura analítica e crítica do livro Mind in Life, de Evan Thompson, e posterior articulação de conceitos com o objetivo de questionar as premissas em cognição predominantes na EA no Brasil. Para tal, fiz um recorte de autoras brasileiras que discutem cognição em EA, destacando seus principais argumentos, e busquei explicitar os conceitos do Enativismo que julguei mais relevantes para o diálogo. Fiz uma sobreposição entre as autoras brasileiras e Thompson, indicando aproximações e afastamentos. Saliento que, investigando sobre cognição, encontrei as dicotomias humano/natureza, cultura/natureza e cognição/emoção apontadas como algo a ser revisto e superado em EA bem como o Antropocentrismo. Encontrei no Enativismo um arcabouço teórico denso e satisfatório para superar tais obstáculos. Como parte final, encontrei em Ailton Krenak, filósofo e indígena, uma fala que aponta na mesma direção. Buscando aplicar as descobertas em algo mais concreto, fiz uma releitura dos princípios orientadores em EA no Brasil. / [en] Based on the Enactive approach, an emergent philosophical perspective in the field of sciences of the mind, this work investigated the cognitive dimension pertinent to Environmental Education (EE) in Brazil. To this end, an analytical and critical reading of the book Mind in Life, by Evan Thompson, was undertaken and, subsequently, concepts were articulated in order to question the cognitive assumptions prevalent in EE in Brazil. In this regard, I selected Brazilian authors who discuss cognition in EE, highlighting their main arguments, aiming to explain the concepts of Enactivism that I found most relevant to the dialogue. I developed an analysis of the overlap between the Brazilian authors and Thompson, indicating approximations and differences. I found that, investigating cognition, the dichotomies human / nature, culture / nature and cognition / emotion, as well as Anthropocentrism, need to be reviewed and overcome in EE. I found in Enactivism a dense and satisfactory theoretical framework for overcoming such obstacles. Finally, I found in Ailton Krenak, philosopher and indigenous writer, a point of view that points in the same direction. Seeking to apply the findings to something more concrete, I reinterpreted the guiding principles in EE in Brazil.

No description available.

This work examines British inquiry into the human mind in the early nineteenth century using a multivalent structural analysis of ideas and practices within traditions established by Hume, Hartley, and Reid. While these traditions were propagated into the nineteenth century by such figures as Thomas Brown, James Mill, Sir William Hamilton, and Alexander Bain, this later period has received a dearth of attention in the history of psychology, the history of philosophy, and the history of ideas in general. This conspicuous lacuna forms the basis for two simple questions: What was the situated significance of work on the human mind in nineteenth century Britain? What was it supposed to accomplish, or be about? In particular, I focus on the differentiation of science from philosophy as a particular kind of non-science, investigating a set of existing formulations of the respective characters of the two. Using this historiographic survey as a springboard, I establish an analytical apparatus based upon four structural dimensions that I term conceptual, expository, iconic, and genealogical. Taken together, these four elements form an historical problematic, a set of persistent features and issues that structured work on mental subjects. With respect to conceptual structure, I propose a set of a dozen persistently central, but fluid, concept clusters involved in the study of mind. Regarding texts themselves, I situate my subject in terms of specific audience groups, patterns of expository development, and topical scope. I also examine the limiting influence of authorial and editorial practices on the appearance of the conceptual systems these texts convey. Iconic structural patterns focus even more closely on textual content, demonstrating shifts in the density, nature, and extent of citation within the intellectual community. These four dimensions interact significantly, reflecting the complex character of an active community of intellectual discussion. Having established this analytical space, I return to the basic terminological distinction between science and philosophy to investigate what was at stake in distinguishing these two fields in the nineteenth century. The dichotomy was far from definitive: British mental inquiry from the time of Hume's Treatise to that of Bain's first two major works never established a firm division of science from philosophy, but the evidence suggests several directions of tension along which this split would subsequently emerge. As demonstrated by evidence from the first volume of the journal, Mind, founded by Bain in 1876, discussions among students of the human mind in the nineteenth century established a position for mental philosophy itself as arbiter of the new science-philosophy dipole. In this light, the establishment of Mind can be viewed as the creation of a boundary-object that itself constituted this distinction in psychological terms. / Ph. D.

Thesis (MA)--University of Stellenbosch, 2002. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: In this thesis it is argued that the age-old philosophical "Problem of the Self' can benefit by being approached from the perspective of a relatively recent science, namely that of Complexity Theory. With this in mind the conceptual features of this theory is highlighted and summarised. Furthermore, the argument is made that the predominantly dualistic approach to the self that is characteristic of the Western Philosophical tradition serves to hinder, rather than edify, our understanding of the phenomenon. The benefits posed by approaching the self as an emergent property of a complex system is elaborated upon, principally with the help of work done by Sigmund Freud, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett, and Paul Cilliers. The aim is to develop a materialistic conception of the self that is plausible in terms of current empirical information and resists the temptation see the self as one or other metaphysical entity within the brain, without "reducing" the self to a crude materialism. The final chapter attempts to formulate a possible foil against the accusation of crude materialism by emphasising that the self is part of a greater system that includes the mental apparatus and its environment (conceived as culture). In accordance with Dawkins's theory the medium of interaction in this system is conceived of as memes and the self is then conceived of as a meme-complex, with culture as a medium for memetransference. The conclusion drawn from this is that the self should be studied through narrative, which provides an approach to the self that is material without being crudely physicalistic. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: In hierdie tesis word daar aangevoer dat die relatiewe jong wetenskap van Kompleksiteitsteorie 'n nuttige bydra kan lewer tot die eeue-oue filosofiese "Probleem van die Self'. Met die oog hierop word die konseptueie kenmerke van hierdie teorie na vore gebring en opgesom. Die argument word gemaak dat die meerendeels dualistiese benadering van die Westerse filosofiese tradisie tot die self ons verstaan van die fenomeen belemmer eerder as om dit te bemiddel. Die voordele van dié nuwe benadering, wat die self sien as 'n ontluikende (emergent) eienskap van In komplekses sisteem, word bespreek met verwysing na veral die werke van Sigmund Freud, Richard Dawkins, Daniel Dennett en Paul Cilliers. Daar word beoog om In verstaan van die self te ontwikkel wat kontemporêre empiriese insigte in ag neem en wat die versoeking weerstaan om ongeoorloofde metafisiese eienskappe aan die self toe te ken. Terselfdetyd word daar gepoog om geensins die uniekheid van die self te "reduseer" na 'n kru materialisme nie. In die finale hoofstuk word daar gepoog om 'n teenargument vir die voorsiene beswaar van kru materialisme te ontwikkel. Dit word gedoen deur te benadruk dat die self gesien word as deel van 'n groter, komplekse sisteem, wat die masjienerie van denke en die omgewing (wat as kultuur gekonseptualiseer word) insluit. Insgelyks, in die teorie van Dawkins word die medium van interaksie in hierdie sisteem gesien as "memes", waar die self dan n meme-kompleks vorm, en kultuur die medium van meme-oordrag is. Daar word tot die konklusie gekom dat die self op 'n narratiewe manier bestudeer behoort te word, wat dan 'n benadering tot die self voorsien wat materialisties is, sonder om kru fisikalisties te wees.

Contemporary developments in cognitive neuroscience are having a profound impact on the philosophy of mind as philosophers work to understand the implications of these advances for appreciating what it means to be a human person. At the same time, a recent consensus has formed among contemporary theologians around the thesis that Jesus Christ is the revelation of what it means to be truly human. Unfortunately, very few thinkers have made any concerted effort to bring these two developments into dialogue with one another. This study addresses this lack by drawing on the anthropological insights of Karl Barth and bringing them to bear on certain aspects of the contemporary discussions regarding the mind/brain relationship. The thesis thus comprises two major sections. The first develops an understanding of Karl Barth’s theological anthropology focusing on three major facets: (1) the centrality of Jesus Christ for any real understanding of human persons; (2) the resources that such a christologically determined view of human nature has for engaging in interdisciplinary discourse; and (3) the ontological implications of this approach for understanding the mind/body relationship. The second part of the study then draws on this theological foundation to consider the implications that understanding human nature christologically has for analyzing and assessing several prominent ways of explaining the mind/body relationship. This study, then, is an exercise in understanding the nature of a christocentric anthropology and its implications for understanding human ontology. While it will devote significant attention to the theology of Karl Barth and various contemporary philosophers of mind, its fundamental aim is to draw together these apparently disparate fields of inquiry by engaging both theology and philosophy in a vital dialogue on the nature of the human person as revealed in the person and work of Jesus Christ.

Deux interrogations sont à l'origine de cette recherche: un « problème herméneutique » qui porte sur ce que l'injonction pascalienne « travaillons donc à bien penser » est en mesure de signifier dans le contexte de l’augustinisme cartésien qui disqualifie les voies traditionnelles de la raison et un questionnement méthodologique qui porte sur la manière dont on peut travailler à bien penser la somme fondamentalement incertaine constituée par les petits papiers découverts à la mort de Pascal. La première partie pose que la déconstruction et la dissémination du Texte pascalien ne peuvent autoriser une méthode herméneutique que si elles sont éclairées par une intention qui en pense la nécessité et le sens, très exactement sur le modèle gnoséologique de la Bible, que l'exégèse renaissante commence à ressaisir dans son historicité. Le renoncement visible des « petits papiers » aux trois principes de la congruence, de la non-répétition et de la non-contradiction, qui fondent dans notre coutume le « texte » peut être qualifié d'intentionnel. Sur ce fondement, qui légitime une méthode herméneutique, la seconde partie montre que si la nature de l'homme se reflète dans sa pensée, tout entière suspendue par nature entre une double polarité qui la fait osciller entre hasard et nécessité, vide et intentionnalité, ordre et désordre, alors le seul discours auquel il s'agit de se soumettre en tant qu'il restaure un sens et une nécessité au monde jusqu'au coeur du hasard apparent et du fonctionnement de la pensée humaine (que seule la pensée peut penser) est l'enseignement des deux Testaments. / This research work stems from two main questions: on the one hand, from a 'hermeneutical problem' funded on what Pascal‟s famous injunction -'Let us strive, then, to think well' -might mean in the context of Augustinian Cartesianism, which disqualifies traditional reasoning, and on the other hand, from a methodological questioning funded on the ways in which one might strive, then, to think well the notes found on the many scraps of paper discovered after Pascal‟s death. The first part argues that the deconstruction and dissemination of the Text can only authorize a hermeneutical approach provided they are enlightened by a specific intention, which might think out its very necessity and meaning, on the same mode as the gnoseological model of the Bible, which the emerging exegesis is just beginning to seize again by adopting a historicist approach. In the „scraps of paper‟, the renunciation to the three principles of congruence, non-repetition and non-contradiction, which are the foundations of the „text‟, can clearly be described as intentional. There entails from that a legitimate hermeneutical approach, which is developed in the second part. It shows that if the nature of man is reflected in his thought, itself held up by nature between a double polarity, with thought oscillating between chance and necessity, emptiness and intentionality, order and disorder, then the only discourse to which one can be submitted is the teaching of the two Testaments, inasmuch as it re-installs some meaning and necessity to the world, as well as to the workings of human thought (which our thought only can think).

A transcript of the audio that constitutes the work by the same title, along with an introduction and relevant bibliography.

The notion that we are voluntary agents who exercise power to choose and, in doing so, determine some of what happens in the world has been an important notion in certain theological accounts concerning our relationship with God (e.g. 'the freewill defence' for God's goodness and omnipotence in light of moral evil and accounts of human moral responsibility in relation to God). However, it has been claimed that the physicalism supported by contemporary neuroscience research calls into question human voluntary agency and, with it, human power to choose. Emergentist (or non-reductive physicalist) accounts of psychological phenomena have been presented as a way of reconciling the physicalism supported by contemporary neuroscience and the theologically important notion of human power to choose. But there are several issues that remain for the plausibility of the required kind of emergentist account; namely - Does recent neuroscience research show that voluntary agency is an illusion? and Is there evidence for neurophysiological causes which, along with neurophysiological conditions, determine all we do? In this dissertation I set out to address these issues and, in doing so, present an account of voluntary agency as power to choose in the state of being aware of alternatives. I argue that this account allows for the notion that human beings determine some of what happens in a way that is consistent with what contemporary neuroscience shows. Thus, contemporary neuroscience does not undermine this notion of human voluntary agency; or, then, the predominant theological view that we are morally responsible in our relationship with God.

The thesis comprises three foundational studies on the topics named in its title, together with an introduction. Ch. 1 argues against a popular combination of views in the philosophy of language: Propositionality, which says that the semantic values of natural language sentences (relative to contexts) are the propositions they express (in those contexts) and Compositionality, which says that the semantic value of a complex expression of a natural language (in a context) is determined by the semantic values its immediate constituents have (in that same context) together with their syntactic mode of combination. Ch. 1 argues that the Naïve Picture is inconsistent with the presence of variable-binding in natural languages. Ch. 2 criticizes the strategy of using “operator arguments” to establish relativist conclusions such as: that the truth values of propositions vary with time (Time Relativism) or that they vary with location (Location Relativism). Operator arguments purport to derive the conclusion that propositions vary in truth value along some parameter P from the premise that there are, in some language, sentential operators that operate on or “shift” the P parameter. I identify two forms of operator argument, offer a reconstruction of each, and I argue that both they rely on an implausible, coarse-grained conception of propositions. Ch. 3 is an assessment of the prospects for semantic internalism. It argues, first, that to accommodate Putnam’s famous Twin Earth examples, an internalist must maintain that narrow semantic content determines different extensions relative to agents and times. Second, that the most thoroughly worked out version of semantic internalism – the epistemic two-dimensionalism (E2D) of David Chalmers – can accommodate the original Twin Earth thought experiments but is refuted by similar thought experiments that involve temporally or spatially symmetric agents.