This thesis is an examination of whether the “egalitarian model” for political finance that has been established by the Supreme Court of Canada, other Canadian courts and legal scholars and commentators is actually egalitarian and has been applied consistently (in Chapter 2), and whether Canada’s political finance system measures up to the Court’s model (in Chapters 3 and 4), and how it could be changed to comply with a more egalitarian model that would also be ethical in terms of preventing even the appearance of a conflict of interest (in Chapters 6 and 7). Chapter 1 sets out a general theoretical framework for evaluating the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, and I develop and set out a more egalitarian model in Chapter 5. In the Chapter 8 conclusion, I summarize the findings and propose structural and positive Charter rights court cases as a way forward, given that the platforms federal politicians and political parties from the past few elections, and the reports of parliamentary committees, have not called for the most of the changes I propose are needed to make the system more egalitarian. The thesis addresses political finance broadly defined as money, property, use of property, gifts, services, favours and other benefits and advantages provided to nomination contestants, election candidates and political party leadership contestants, electoral district associations, political parties, politicians and their staff during election campaign periods and also during the time period between elections, including support provided by “third-party” interest groups, lobbyists and other individuals, and by media outlets. In Chapter 3, I examine the rules that apply to each of these political actors in the areas of registration, donations and loans, spending, public subsidies and disclosure (including auditing), including a separate section on the role of media and social media. Given that political systems include providers (whether as contractors or donors) of money, property and the use of property (including gifts and other benefits and advantages), and services (including favours) to politicians, and given that providers could be lobbyists, I also examine in Chapter 4 the rules concerning gifts, favours and other benefits and relations between voters, lobbyists and politicians, and concerning the conflicts of interest that can be caused by these activities. Other than disclosure and auditing, I do not cover enforcement measures or systems in any of the areas. However, I do note at various points in the thesis that, as several studies and history have shown clearly, effective enforcement measures, policies and practices are key to ensure compliance with such rules. The main contentions that I make are: that the key principles of the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model have not been consistently upheld by the Court and other Canadian courts, that Canada’ federal political finance system does not fulfill the Court’s egalitarian model, and that several changes are needed to make the model and the system more egalitarian, only a few of which have been addressed by Canadian courts and scholars to date. These contentions counter the claim made in the Court’s rulings, and by many scholars and commentators, that Canada’s political finance system has developed and is based on an egalitarian model. In Chapters 5 through 7, I develop a more egalitarian model and set out specific proposed changes to make Canada’s systems more egalitarian, both in theory and in practice, within the framework of a democratic good government political system (meaning a system with separation of powers, elections, human rights protections, rule of law etc.) and a mixed market economy with both public sector institutions and private sector businesses, unions and other organizations (cooperatives, non-profit, religious organizations etc.). Both the model and many of the specific proposed measures should also be applicable in other jurisdictions with different political systems and economic systems. The framework of 19 standards for a more egalitarian model that I develop in Chapter 5 is based mainly on John Rawls’ theory of justice, but modified and expanded to incorporate critiques of Rawls’ theory, other legal principles and democratic good government theories, international standards, government ethics case law, behavioural psychology studies, and evidence of the public’s expectations. The 201 proposals I make in Chapters 6 and 7 for specific changes to the rules of Canada’s current federal political finance system (again, broadly defined), are based on the model, measures from various jurisdictions in Canada and elsewhere, and international standards. I am not claiming that these changes would definitely result in “better” or more “public interest” policy-making decisions, however that would be determined. I am only contending that the framework I develop is more egalitarian than the Supreme Court’s model, and that the rule changes I suggest would make the political finance, gifts, favours, conflict of interest and lobbying systems align with the more egalitarian model I propose. I primarily use the doctrinal research methodology by examining scholarly research and, given I also examine aspects of the laws of Canadian provinces and municipalities, and other countries, I also deploy some aspects of the comparative methodology (most fully when comparing Canada’s federal rules to Quebec’s rules, and somewhat when comparing Canada’s rules to the U.S. and U.K. rules). The research results from these sources inform the conclusions I set out in my thesis. The thesis advances knowledge in the following areas: 1. It is the first complete evaluation of the federal Canadian political finance, gifts-favours-benefits, conflict of interest and lobbying rules and systems in their current state as of May 2023, based on the findings of extensive new research into key parts of these systems; 2. It sets out the first comprehensive analysis of how the Supreme Court of Canada’s egalitarian model has been applied by the Court and other courts inconsistently, in ways that do not comply with the model; 3. It sets out the first analysis of how Canada’s political finance statutory rules, again defined broadly to include rules that apply to donations, loans, gifts, services, favours and other benefits, lobbying and conflicts of interest, do not comply with the Supreme Court’s egalitarian model, based in part on new statistical research set out in 28 charts, and; 4. It sets out a new theoretical framework based on 19 standards, and a comprehensive set of 201 innovative proposals for changes to make Canada’s political finance rules (again defined broadly) more egalitarian, and more ethical in terms of preventing conflicts of interest. Five comprehensive studies of key parts of the political finance, ethics and lobbying systems are also proposed to gather key information needed to inform the design of some of the 201 proposed changes. Eight structural and positive Charter rights cases are also proposed to challenge current rules that do not comply with the egalitarian model.

Das Demokratieprinzip ist im Völkerrecht verankert. Seine normativen Grundlagen sind zum einen das Vertragsrecht, insbesondere der Internationale Pakt über bürgerliche und politische Rechte, sowie die regionalen Verankerungen in Europa und in Amerika durch die Satzungen der jeweiligen internationaler Organisationen und ihrer Menschenrechtsinstrumente. Substantielle vertragliche Verpflichtungen ergeben sich auch aus den bilateralen Verträgen der EG. Zum anderen fußt es auf der Staatenpraxis, insbesondere im Rahmen der UNO. So ist die internationale Gemeinschaft auf die Errichtung demokratischer Strukturen verpflichtet, wenn sie staatliche Funktionen in failed states übernimmt oder den Wiederaufbau eines Staatswesens begleitet. Die Demokratieresolutionen der UNO lassen erkennen, daß alle Staaten verpflichtet sind, das Ziel der Demokratie anzustreben und erreichte demokratische Errungenschaften zu gewährleisten. Das Demokratieprinzip beinhaltet normativ die Legitimation staatlichen Handelns durch freie Wahlen und die Absicherung durch Menschenrechte, Gewaltenteilung und Rechtsstaatlichkeit. Staatliche Entscheidungen bedürfen daher einer legitimierenden Rückbindung an den frei geäußerten Willen des konstituierenden Staatsvolkes, wobei die Freiheit dieser Willensäußerung in dynamischer Perspektive die Freiheit der Willensänderung garantiert. Sowohl der Vertragsschluß als Akt staatlichen Handelns als auch der Inhalt des Vertrages bedürfen der Legitimation, und zwar über die Zeit hinweg. Das geltende Völkervertragsrecht berücksichtigt das Demokratieprinzip jedoch nur unzureichend. Die Verletzung innerstaatlichen Rechts beim Vertragsschluß kann nur eingeschränkt geltend gemacht werden. Es existiert auch kein Verfahren, mit dem die fortdauernde Legitimation eines Vertrages überprüft werden könnte. Angesichts der Zunahme von Verträgen, die innere Angelegenheiten der Gesellschaften regeln, bedarf das Spannungsverhältnis einer Lösung. Das Problem wird illustriert durch Frankreichs Ausstieg aus der NATO, Senegals Kündigung der Seerechtskonventionen, den Streit um den deutschen Atomausstieg, das Verfahren um den Donaustaudamm Gabcíkovo Nagymaros, die Frage der Vereinbarkeit von Drogenkonsumräumen mit den UN-Anti-Drogenkonventionen, das Schiedsverfahren zwischen Aminoil und Kuwait sowie der Kündigung des ABM-Vertrages durch die USA. Ein erster Ansatz zur Lösung kann in einer Neuinterpretation der völkervertragsrechtlichen Regeln liegen. So bietet sich der Grundsatz der "demokratiefreundlichen Interpretation" an. Internes Recht, das der Kontrolle der Exekutive dient, muß beim Vertragsschluß Berücksichtigung finden. Und Verträgen, die "innere Angelegenheiten" betreffen, kann ein implizites Kündigungsrecht zugebilligt werden. Der wesentliche Ansatz ist aber kautelarjuristischer Natur. Revisions-, Experimentier- und Kündigungsklauseln können bei der Abfassung von Verträgen die Vertragsbeziehung so ausgestalten, daß zukünftige Meinungsänderungen berücksichtigt werden können. Schließlich ist de lege ferenda ein Recht auf Revision, kombiniert mit einem subsidiären Kündigungsrecht, wünschenswert. Mit einem solchen Mechanismus könnten neue normative Lösungen eingeführt werden und die Legitimation bestehender Normen auf den Prüfstand gestellt werden. / International law provides for a democratic principle. It is based both on treaty law and customary law. The International Covenant for Civil and Political Rights as well as the regional treaties in Europe and the Americas - the statutes of the respective regional organisations and their human rights instruments - form a substantial body of treaty obligations toward democracy, which is complemented by bilateral treaties of the EC safeguarding democracy. State practice, especially within the framework of the UN, indicates an obligation to establish democratic structures whenever the international community takes upon itself the task of nation building in failed states. The democracy resolutions of the UN point out that all member states are obliged to strive for democracy and uphold democratic achievements so far. The normative democratic principle includes the legitimation of public affairs through free and fair elections and the guarantee of human rights, separation of powers and the rule of law. Acts of states therefore must be legitimised through the freely expressed will of the people. Under a dynamic perspective, the free will includes the possibility for changes of policy. The conclusion of treaties as an act of state as well as the content of the treaty as a rule of law need to be legitimised through the times. The current law of treaties does not acknowledge the democratic principle, however. Violations of internal law at the conclusion of a treaty can only be claimed to a limited extent. Nor does international law provide for a formal procedure to validate the on-going support for the content of the treaty. Facing an ever-growing expansion of the number of treaties dealing with the internal affairs of societies, solutions must be found. The problem is being illustrated by France's withdrawal from NATO, Senegal's withdrawal from the Geneva Conventions on the Law of the Sea, the dispute related to the question of the use of nuclear energy in Germany, the judgement of the ICJ in the Gabcíkovo-Nagymaros case, the question of the compatibility of drug consumption rooms with UN anti-drug conventions, the dispute settlement award in the Aminoil case and last not least the denunciation of the ABM treaty by the US. Realigning the interpretation of the law of treaties to the democratic principle is one way to deal with the problem. Interpretation of treaties should take into account the democratic principle. Internal law controlling the executive has to be complied with where conclusion of treaties is concerned. And treaties dealing with "internal affairs" can be considered to contain an implicit right of withdrawal or denunciation. The proper solution lies in respecting the democratic principle when drafting treaties, though. Clauses of revision, clauses allowing for experiments and clauses of denunciation or withdrawal help shaping a contractual relationship that can take into account changes of the political will. Last not least, a right of revision is recommended de lege ferenda, combined with a subsidiary right of denunciation or withdrawal. Such a mechanism allows for introducing new normative solutions and for validating the on-going legitimation of existing treaty rules. (See also the English summary at the end of the thesis.)