En la Fenomenología de la Percepción se distinguen dos modos de estudiar el lenguaje: Una es la corriente empirista, que supone al lenguaje como un fenómeno que se interpreta como la acción de ciertos estímulos del cuerpo, asociando los vocablos a las imágenes conectadas a través del aparato nervioso. Por otra parte, se encuentra la lingüística que proviene de la tradición intelectualista, la cual contrarresta los trabajos empiristas aduciendo que el lenguaje es una elaboración de la propia conciencia. la encargada de significar el mundo exterior con sus categorías y pensamientos. Para Merleau-Ponty, tanto el empirismo como el intelectualismo, al elaborar sus hipótesis sobre el lenguaje y la relación mundo-sujeto, olvidan el punto de partida que al fenomenólogo le interesa retomar: hay una relación primera entre el sujeto y el mundo, anterior a toda concepción, a toda formulación del lenguaje, que se establece en la percepción, que es génesis de nuestras certidumbres. Lo novedosos de la obra de Merleau-Ponty es señalar este problema y deconstruir este “verdeckt”, volviendo al silencio y encontrar en él –a través del cuerpo- los orígenes del lenguaje. Merleau-Ponty dirá que en este esfuerzo de volver sobre el olvido, supone elaborar un itinerario sobre las etapas por las cuales se pueden entender la posibilidad de la emergencia del lenguaje a partir de la relación cuerpo - mundo. Para el autor, se debe volver a esa relación preconcebida (fe perceptiva), en la que no hay pensamientos que determinen nuestra experiencia. Desde el vínculo cuerpo-mundo, descubriremos de qué manera Merleau-Ponty logra integrar las concepciones anteriores. Sin rechazarlas ni suprimirlas, propone una síntesis en la cual, lo que tiene de unilateral el empirismo y el intelectualismo podría superarse en una dialéctica que las integre y cuyo secreto se encontraría en la temporalidad de la existencia humana. Para proponer esta perspectiva, Merleau-Ponty tiene que subrayar que el contacto con el mundo comienza antes del conocimiento, es decir, con la percepción. / Tesis

Resumo: A presente pesquisa visa o tema da pintura no interior da primeira parte da obra de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, com a finalidade de mostrar a maneira pela qual o autor constrói uma teoria da expressão calcada na relação do ser com a aparência, onde a pintura surge como uma proposta viável. Para tanto, é necessário um aprofundamento na história da arte e da filosofia, que elucidará o modo pelo qual esta questão é tratada pela tradição e na contemporaneidade, para que seja possível fazer uma correlação com a crítica presente na obra merleau-pontiana. Na sequência será preciso esclarecer três pontos fundamentais para a compreensão da figura do artista segundo Merleau-Ponty: o corpo, o mundo e o outrem. Estes três pontos visam esclarecer o plano de fundo sobre o qual este projeto se põe e apontam para a questão proposta: como se forma uma teoria da expressão na filosofia de Maurice Merleau-Ponty e qual a importância da pintura nessa teoria? Na primeira parte de sua obra, Maurice Merleau-Ponty analisou o mundo e o homem pelos olhos da percepção, num esforço que coincide com o da fenomenologia, a saber, restaurar o contato primeiro e original com o mundo. Este movimento em direção ao sentido inédito é assumido com a intenção de realizar uma melhor análise da relação entre o sujeito, o outro e o mundo, abandonando tudo aquilo que acarretou em prejuízo e levantando um modo novo de compreender esta relação e o que ela implica, principalmente no que supera o caráter absoluto e objetivo, criticado por Merleau-Ponty em relação aos empiristas e intelectualistas. Entender este sistema é essencial para fundamentar o modo pelo qual a pintura interage com o mundo e com o sujeito e de que maneira as significações que surgem com as obras de arte são constituintes também desta ontologia, baseada na percepção.

Orientador: Michel Maurice Debrun / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-05T06:56:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Orlandi_LuizBenedictoLacerda_D.pdf: 35140145 bytes, checksum: 3f3f1157828c46eb13630eee268e8b1a (MD5) Previous issue date: 1974 / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Luiz B. L. Orlandi / Tese (doutorado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-23T15:41:21Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Furlan_Reinaldo_D.pdf: 12868286 bytes, checksum: 399d800c51f2750b25f14e410313be82 (MD5) Previous issue date: 1998 / Resumo: Este trabalho pretende, em primeiro lugar, apresentar o movimento do pensamento de Merleau-Ponty ao longo de sua obra. Em segundo lugar, pretende fazê-lo através de contrapontos com os pensamentos de Freud e Wittgenstein. Sem a pretensão de comparações exaustivas, foram esses contrapontos - tais como as relações entre biologia e cultura, sentido e comportamento, linguagem e filosofia - que motivaram essa pesquisa, e, creio, podem contribuir para iluminar a relevância ou os limites do pensamento merleau-pontyano / Abstract: Firstly, this thesis tries to show the movement of the Merleau-Ponty's thought in his works. Secondly, my intention is to compare some aspects ofMerleau-Ponty's thought with the of Freud and Wittgenstein. These comparisons - those as the relations between biology and culture, sense and behave, language and philosophy - do not intend to be ample and precise but they were the motivation of my work and, I think, they can contribute to enlighten the importance or the limits ofthe Merleau-Ponty's thinking / Doutorado / Doutor em Filosofia

Orientador: Luiz Benedicto Lacerda Orlandi / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Instituto de Filosofia e Ciencias Humanas / Made available in DSpace on 2018-07-28T06:30:16Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Silva_ClaudineiAparecidodeFreitasda_M.pdf: 14569716 bytes, checksum: 09d3f60736626dcf8ca414f227e51594 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2000 / Resumo: A presente dissertação busca agenciar a partir do pensamento de Maurice Merleau-Ponty o projeto de restituição da experiência primordial da Natureza. Nesta perspectiva, trata-se de vislumbrar - para além do pensamento clássico - um novo sentido para a noção de "Natureza", visto o fato de que a Natureza se apresenta agora como uma manifestação exemplar e, portanto, primordial de nossa experiência existencial. Na primeira obra - La structure du comportement - a Natureza é compreendida como Logos de nossas atividades comportamentais, às quais exprimem relações dialéticas, ao criar o mundo cultural. Em Phénoménologie de la perception, Merleau-Ponty compreende a natureza como sendo a gênese perceptiva, onde por meio do corpo fundamos espacial e temporalmente nosso vínculo ao mundo. Não obstante, o filósofo avança em suas análises, procurando no contexto de seus cursos ministrados sobre a natureza em La nature fundar uma 'ontologia da natureza comovia para a própria ontologia', sob o horizonte de nossa "contingência". É em Le visible et l'invisible, que a Natureza será então articulada como "carnalidade do sensível" enquanto «ser de indivisão», isto é, como "Ser Selvagem", por meio do qual a própria reflexão se constitui / Abstract: The present dissertation looks upon tbe project of restitution of Nature's primordial experience through the eyes of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In this perspective, an attempt to envisage - beyond the classical tbougbt - a new sense for the concept of "Nature" is tried, due to the fact that Nature presents itself today as an exemplar manifestation and therefore, primordial to our existential experience. In his first work- La structure du comportement - Nature is soon as Logos of our behavioral attitudes, which express our dialectics relations, creating tbe cultural world. In Phénoménologie de la perception, Merleau-Ponty recognizes Nature as the perceptive geneses, where through our body we connect temporally and spacially to tbe world. Nevertherless, the pbilosopher advances in bis analysis trying, in tbe contexts of his courses presented about Nature in La nature, to form a 'Nature ontology as a way to ontology itself', under tbe scope of our "contingency". It's in Le visible et I'invisible tbat Nature is then soon as "sensitive camality" while "being of indivisibleness", that is, "Savage Being", by whose means reflection itself is constituted. / Mestrado / Mestre em Filosofia

Orientador : Silvio Donizetti de Oliveira Gallo / Dissertação (mestrado) - Universidade Estadual de Campinas, Faculdade de Educação / Made available in DSpace on 2018-08-01T11:15:58Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Pastre_JoseLuiz_M.pdf: 1666752 bytes, checksum: c57c464e1c7a754a50a2dbff53f26e05 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2002 / Mestrado

In what is usually referred as Merleau-Ponty´s ”early philosophy” the concept of the primordial is of major significance in relation to his ambition to ground the philosophical reflection in human embodiment. The concept plays a key role in his understanding of the paradoxical nature of perception and thus in Merleau-Ponty's endeavor to overcome both the idealist and the realist conceptions of reality. The concept is also of great importance in the essay Cézannes Doubt, which Merleau-Ponty wrote during the same period he was working on Phenomenology of Perception. According to most interpreters this essay mirrors his early philosophy, and above all the phenomenological way of doing philosophy. In the essay Merleau-Ponty suggests that the essential importance of Cézanne's paintings lies in their ability to capture the world at a primordial level. Merleau-Ponty's interpretation has also been subjected to critique from Véronique M. Fóti and Michel Haar. A common characteristic of their critique is that it questions the relationship that Merleau-Ponty seeks to establish between a primordial experience of perception and Cézanne's paintings. From both Haar's and Fóti's point of view Merleau-Ponty's analysis is inadequate because he does not sufficiently take the autonomy of the painterly expression into consideration. This critique reflects a broader critique that has been launched against Merleau-Ponty's early philosophy which considers his understanding of the impact of culture and language as naïve in his use of concepts like primordial. Consequently, the critique raises the question how the concept of the primordial really is to be understood? A point of departure for understanding this concept lies in the paradox of perception, that is: the impossibility to conceive of a thing in itself since the existence of the perceived thing always presuppose a subject that perceives. This paradox can also be understood as a paradox between nature and human beings since natures path to disclosure goes through human expression.  Accordingly, the aim of this essay is to explore how one is to conceive of Merleau-Ponty's interpretation of Cézanne's paintings as the expression of a primordial experience of perception in the essay Cézanne's Doubt. This will be done against the background of his early philosophy as expressed in The Structure of Behavior and Phenomenology of Perception and take as it departure how the concept of the primordial is related to the paradox between human beings and nature.

This dissertation is a contribution to the contemporary field of phenomenological psychopathology, or the phenomenological study of psychiatric disorders. The work proceeds with two major aims. The first is to show how a phenomenological approach can clarify and illuminate the nature of psychopathology—specifically those conditions typically labeled as major depressive disorder and bipolar disorder. The second is to show how engaging with psychopathological conditions can challenge and undermine many phenomenological presuppositions, especially phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy and its corresponding anti-naturalistic outlook. In the opening chapter, I articulate the three layers of the subject matter of phenomenological research—what I refer to as “existentials,” “modes,” and “prejudices.” As I argue, while each layer contributes to what we might call the “structure” of human existence, they do not do so in the same way, or to the same degree. Because phenomenological psychopathology—and applied phenomenology in general—aims to characterize how the structure of human existence can change and alter, it is paramount that these layers be adequately delineated and defined before investigating these changes. In chapters two through five, I conduct hermeneutic and phenomenological investigations of psychopathological phenomena typically labeled as major depressive disorder or bipolar disorder. These investigations address the affective aspects of depression and mania, and the embodied aspects of depression. In addition to clearly articulating the nature of these phenomena, I show how certain psychopathological conditions involve changes in the deepest or most fundamental layer of human existence—what I refer to as existentials. As I argue, many of the classical phenomenologists (including Husserl and Heidegger) believed that these structural features were necessary, unchanging, and universal. However, this presupposition is challenged through the examination of psychopathological and neuropathological conditions, undermining the status of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy. While this challenge to classical phenomenology is only sketched in the early chapters, in chapters six and seven I develop it in more detail in order to achieve two distinct ends. In chapter six I argue that psychopathology and neuropathology not only challenge phenomenology’s status as a transcendental philosophy, but also supply a key to developing a phenomenological naturalism (which I contrast with a naturalized phenomenology). Phenomenological naturalism, as I articulate it, is a position in which phenomenology is not subsumed by the metaphysical and methodological framework of the natural sciences, but nonetheless maintains the capacity to investigate how the natural world stands independent of human subjectivity (and how events in the natural world can bring about changes in the most fundamental structures of human existence). In the seventh chapter I argue that a phenomenology in which existentials are contingent and variable rather than necessary and unchanging allows phenomenologists to contribute to new dimensional approaches to psychiatric classification. Rather than begin from distinct categories of disorder, these approaches begin from distinct core features of human existence. These features, referred to as either dimensions or constructs, can vary in degree and are studied in both normal and pathological forms.

The musical performer’s embodied experience is an aspect of the performing process that has yet to be adequately considered in music scholarship. The embodied experience is relegated to the realm of the inaccessible and subjective, rather than being considered a valuable source of information for both the music analyst and performer. This thesis contends that the performing body can provide deep insights into musical meaning and can act as a resource for developing musical understanding. The sensations and experiences of the performer’s body during the process of creating music can lead to the recognition of important moments and fundamental meanings within a musical work. Engaging with scholarly literature from a variety of disciplines, this thesis will explore the classical singer’s embodied experience from the three primary perspectives of phenomenology, ecological perceptual theory and body communication theory. Each perspective is explored in and through a comparative listening analysis of Luciano Berio’s work for solo voice Sequenza III per voce femminile (1966) in order to illuminate specific aspects of the singer’s embodied experience. This embodied approach to musical analysis considers the singer’s body as a contributor to not only the production of sound but also to the creation of musical meaning, and can thus offer rich insights into that which is discovered through traditional analysis.

Modernism often reveled in the loss of control, the permeation of personal boundaries, the introduction of ambiguity, that evocation of the senses brings about. It strove to loosen the structures and categories culture inscribes. In this dissertation, I argue that food scenes constitute the crux of many pivotal moments in Modernist fiction and express a philosophy of the human subject. Modernists argue that, in eating, a person takes the outside world into him or herself. The senses that precede, imbue and follow eating threaten and transcend the integrity of the subject. I argue that by foregrounding such moments, Modernists posited a phenomenological view of subjectivity, one which can best be illuminated by the work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Guided by his theory of intersubjectivity, I explore the phenomenological presentation of particular sensual encounters with food in the work of Ernest Hemingway, Katherine Mansfield, Virginia Woolf, James Joyce and Willa Cather. I show how characters, in their encounters with sensual otherness, feel themselves overcome in poignant moments of ecstasy, disgust, or revelation of self-constitution through the alimentary. I also argue that Modernist fiction does not only display Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology, but also nuances his timeless and placeless presentation of the encounter between a universal subject and any object, by considering the sensual eating experience within various historical food conditions, such as the explosion of the canned food industry and the gradual dissolution of the formal meal, and from various subject positions, based on gender, ethnicity or relative political empowerment. In engaging phenomenology, my project deviates from the long tradition in scholarship of considering symbolic and structural meanings to the occlusion of sense. In each eating scene I explore I consider how gustatory, haptic, and aromatic properties of food objects--such as liquidness, sweetness, bloodiness and lightness--intervene in more cerebral human relations. Fundamental to the fascinating Modernist depictions of food and eating, is the idea that the senses have an undeniable impact on human affairs in their own right.