Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:12:17Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 4157.pdf: 2904242 bytes, checksum: dbaf93c398d3df686194c9877f64eae8 (MD5) Previous issue date: 2011-03-28 / ABSTRACT This work takes its point of departure in Merleau-Ponty s Philosophy, centered in the notion of Crisis of Reason , basing itself on the presupposition that this is a fundamental concept of contemporary phenomenology. In the Cartesian thought, already it was possible to find the idea of the crisis, however, it was the finding of a crisis of sciences . Something similar was also in Valery, especially when he speaks of a crisis of spirit . The novelty of Husserl was exactly in showing that the crisis, as he lived it, was deeper, shook the Reason itself. This work assumes the task of showing that, not limiting to a crisis of sciences, of the spirit or of Reason itself, Merleau-Ponty discusses a present crisis in the man himself, or rather, in the diverse points of view that has about him. In this sense, his philosophical project is based, primarily, on the attempt to establish a dialogue with the points of view of the philosophy and of the science. Therefore, an inquiry of the divergence of these points, is warranted, elucidating not only the scenario in which the conflict is, but also its genesis. Likewise, starting from a Merleau-Pontian understanding of the crisis, finally, this study also assumes the task of asking about the repercussions of this crisis in the relation of philosophical knowledge to itself, then, in the way of his own philosophy to understand its history, being, therefore, the importance of this incursion in the desire to explain what, according to Merleau-Ponty, would be a possible way of overcoming. / Este trabalho parte de uma leitura da filosofia de Merleau-Ponty centrada na nocao de Crise da Razao , fundamentando-se no pressuposto de que se trata de um conceito fundamental da fenomenologia contemporanea. No pensamento cartesiano, ja era possivel encontrar a ideia de crise, porem, tratava-se da constatacao de uma crise das ciencias . Algo semelhante havia tambem em Valery, especialmente ao se falar de uma crise do espirito . A novidade de Husserl estava justamente em mostrar que a crise, tal como ele a vivia, era mais profunda, abalava a propria Razao. Este trabalho assume a tarefa de mostrar que, nao se limitando a uma crise das ciencias, do espirito ou da propria Razao, Merleau-Ponty discute uma crise presente no proprio homem, ou antes, nos diversos pontos de vista que se tem a seu respeito. E neste sentido que o seu projeto filosofico se fundamenta, em primeiro lugar, na tentativa de estabelecer um dialogo entre os pontos de vista da filosofia e da ciencia. Por conseguinte, justifica-se uma investigacao da divergencia destes pontos, procurando elucidar nao so o cenario no qual o conflito se encontra, mas tambem a sua genese. Do mesmo modo, partindo de uma compreensao merleau-pontiana da crise, por fim, este trabalho assume tambem a tarefa de se indagar acerca da repercussao desta mesma crise na relacao do saber filosofico consigo mesmo, logo, no modo da propria filosofia entender a sua historia, estando, pois, a importancia desta incursao no ensejo de explicitar o que, para Merleau- Ponty, seria uma possivel via de superacao.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 DissHJM.pdf: 736012 bytes, checksum: 0f33030b5c15024825637a981a06158a (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-10-09 / Universidade Federal de Minas Gerais / This dissertation is based the relationship between Phenomenology and Metaphysics, one of the pillars of contemporary French Philosophy. If, in that context, there seems to be a consensus according to which the metaphysical is originary, we, on the other hand, aim at investigating its place and its origins. This work focuses on one of the aspects over which that relationship has developed, and which, at the same time, characterize one novelty of contemporary Philosophy, namely, the concern with language and with writing. When the phenomenological discourse unveiled what it first denied, the Being, when it neutralized itself in this incapability of expression, it brought the metaphysical, which thereafter needed to be seen as originary. What characterizes the metaphysical in discourse is, thus, a rational cohesion without a concept, that is, the absence of abstract and objective categories and of pure meanings given a priori, for a thought which could possibly be prior to language. With this rearrangement of the metaphysical concerning language, and taking it as a Philosophical theme, we return to the origins and to the inauguration of Philosophy. Finally, we analyze this surpassing of Phenomenology through the return to language phenomenon, which meant having another encounter with Philosophy after Phenomenology. This re-visitation meant the narrative of a new beginning. As we proceeded in this process, the importance of language for the whole ontological project of Merleau-Ponty became more and more clear, especially concerning the initial moments of a Phenomenology of perception, when it was not in the center of our analysis, and when it was not discussed. This silence was revealing to us. / Essa dissertação ganha vida na relação entre fenomenologia e metafísica, que é um dos pilares da filosofia francesa contemporânea. Se, neste contexto, parece haver o acordo de que o metafísico é o originário, procuramos investigar o seu lugar e a sua proveniência. Essa dissertação toma um dos aspectos sobre os quais se desenvolveu aquela relação, e que caracteriza, ao mesmo tempo, uma novidade da filosofia contemporânea, a saber, a preocupação com a linguagem e com a escritura. Quando o discurso fenomenológico desvelou o que o negava, o Ser, quando ele neutralizou-se nessa incapacidade de expressão, ele trouxe o metafísico para o discurso, que precisava ser, doravante, sempre originário. O que caracteriza o metafísico no discurso é, pois, uma coesão racional e sem conceito, isto é, a ausência das categorias abstratas e objetivas e das significações puras dadas a priori por um pensamento anterior à linguagem. Com esse remanejamento do metafísico para a linguagem, tomando-a como tema filosófico, voltamos às origens e à inauguração da filosofia. Restavanos analisar esse ultrapassamento da fenomenologia através do retorno ao fenômeno da linguagem, o que significou reencontrarmos a filosofia depois da fenomenologia. Reencontro que foi a narrativa de um começo. Ao longo desse caminho de volta foi se nos desvelando a importância da linguagem para o projeto ontológico de Merleau-Ponty, sobretudo, nos momentos iniciais de uma Fenomenologia da Percepção em que ela não estava no centro das análises, em que não se falou dela. Esse silêncio foi-nos revelador.

Submitted by Maike Costa (maiksebas@gmail.com) on 2016-07-04T12:50:04Z No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1466014 bytes, checksum: bfa0417a544782d7cfb24f364fc2280d (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2016-07-04T12:50:04Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 arquivo total.pdf: 1466014 bytes, checksum: bfa0417a544782d7cfb24f364fc2280d (MD5) Previous issue date: 2015-05-07 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / The Merleau-Ponty phenomenology’s, with the desire not to put the subject or the world as precedence to understand the relationship of being and living world, splits with the main philosophical currents of modernity, namely: intellectualism and empiricism. To overcome this, Merleau-Ponty resorts to notion of body lived and presents an approach about the perception always from the point of view of the perceiver. Thus, the being-in-the-world, located in their surrounding world, is constantly in relationship with this without distinguishable ever. The cogito, therefore, elevated to absolute by Descartes, reverts to “worldly” in this phenomenological philosophy, given that the thought no longer has the power to all “swallow” separate from the world. Being-in-the-world, in short, is to be in an experiential effectiveness, in which subject and world intertwined in a mutuality that form the unique experience possible. Finally, our work will focus on overcoming this phenomenology front of the egoic absolutism left by the intellectualism of Descartes. / A fenomenologia merleau-pontyana, com a preocupação de não pôr o sujeito ou o mundo como precedência para compreendermos a relação do ser e do mundo vivido, cinde com as principais correntes filosóficas da modernidade, a saber: intelectualismo e empirismo. Para esta superação, Merleau-Ponty lança mão da noção de corpo próprio e faz uma abordagem acerca da percepção sempre do ponto de vista daquele que percebe. Com isso, o ser no mundo, situado em seu mundo circundante, está em relação constante com este, sem distinguir-se nunca. O cogito, portanto, elevado a absoluto por Descartes, volta a ser “mundano” nesta filosofia fenomenológica, tendo em vista que o pensamento não detém mais o poder de tudo “deglutir” apartado do mundo. Ser no mundo, enfim, é estar situado numa efetividade vivencial, na qual sujeito e mundo entrelaçam-se numa mutualidade que forma a única experiência possível. Por fim, nosso trabalho versará sobre esta superação da fenomenologia frente ao absolutismo egoico deixado pelo intelectualismo de Descartes.

La thèse se préoccupe de la nature d’expérience que le moi percevant fait avec les autres étants et des conditions qui rendent leur rencontre possible. L’attention est centrée sur le rôle de la spatialité qui représente un caractère distinctif des étants sensibles corporels. La thèse s’inscrit dans le courant de la philosophie néo-phénoménologique. Dans les paragraphes d’introduction, les directives méthodiques de l’approche phénoménologique sont formulées, ainsi que la spécificité de la néophénoménologie,caractérisée comme une pensée qui se distancie de l’égocentrisme dominant la phénoménologie classique, notamment husserlienne. L’exposé part de l’esquisse d’une théorie phénoménologique de la perception (chap. I) et saisit les caractéristiques ontologiques élémentaires des étants donnés (chap. II). Le chapitre suivant traite brièvement les questions concernant la nature du champ phénoménal, caractérisé comme structure de donations possibles des étants (chap. III). Les chapitres suivants décrivent le mode spatial de l’être des étants qui se donnent au moi (chap. IV) et la spatialité propre au moi qui fait expérience (chap. V). L’attention est portée notamment à la liaison essentielle entre l’étant et son contexte ; ce motif est suivi jusqu’à l’insertion de l’étant dans le tout spatial du monde. Quant à la spatialité du moi, son corps est caractérisé comme un corps percevant et perçu,donné du dedans et du dehors à la fois. Le rôle des différences spatiales pour la constitution et la distinction de l’expérience du moi et des autres étants est élucidé. Le chapitre final montre que la spatialité du monde partagé implique aussi les autres moi possibles, ce qui fonde la valeur intersubjective de l’expérience sensible (chap. VI). / Phenomenological Conception of Space. The thesis focuses on the nature of experience which a perceiving self has with other beings and on the conditions which make such an encounter possible. It emphasises the role of the spatiality, which is seen as a defining characteristic of corporeal sensible beings. Broadly speaking, the work belongs to post-phenomenological philosophy. The Introduction summarises the main methodological principles of a phenomenological approach and presents post-phenomenology as a specific discourse which rejects the egocentrism typical of classical, especially Husserlian phenomenology. The exposition proper starts with an outline of a phenomenological theory of perception (Chapter I) and continues by offering an outline of the basic ontological characteristics of sensibly given entities, especially of their trans-empirical nature (Chapter II). The following chapter briefly treats some issues related to the nature of a phenomenal field, which is described as a structure of possible ways in which beings can manifest themselves (Chapter III). The subsequent chapters form the main core of the thesis. They deal with the spatial manner of being of entities which manifest themselves (Chapter IV) and of the self which experiences them (Chapter V). The main emphasis is on the essential bond which connects the given entities with their context,whereby this idea is generalised to the level of situating them within the spatial unity of the world. Regarding the spatiality of self, the main focusis on investigating the bipolar nature of one’s own body as bothperceiving and perceived, an entity which manifests itself internally andexternally, and the role of spatial distinctions in the formation and differentiation of the experience which a self has with itself and withother beings. The concluding chapter implies that a possible other self may be an integral part of the spatially differentiated shared world, thus establishing an intersubjective validity of sensory experience (Chapter V). / Předkládaná práce se zabývá povahou zkušenosti, kterou vnímající já činís jinými jsoucny, a podmínkami, za jakých je takové setkávání možné.Vyzdvihuje přitom zejména roli prostorovosti, která je určujícím znakemtělesných smyslových jsoucen. Práce se řadí do proudu postfenomenologickéfilosofie. V úvodní části jsou vystižena hlavnímetodologická vodítka fenomenologického přístupu a zároveň jeodstíněna post-fenomenologie jako typ myšlení, které se odklání odegocentrismu typického pro klasickou, zejm. husserlovskoufenomenologii. Vlastní výklad vychází od náčrtu fenomenologické teoriesmyslového vnímání (kap. I) a pokračuje vystižením základníchontologických charakteristik smyslově daných jsoucen, zejména jejichtransempirické povahy (kap. II). V následující kapitole se výklad krátcedotýká otázek spojených s povahou fenomenálního pole, jejžcharakterizuje jako strukturu možných daností jsoucen (kap. III). Následujíkapitoly, které tvoří vlastní jádro práce a týkají se prostorového způsobubytí dávajících se jsoucen (kap. IV) a já, jež činí se jsoucny zkušenost (kap.V). Podtržena je zejména bytostná vazba jsoucna na kontext, přičemžúvaha je vedena až k zasazení jsoucna do prostorového celku světa.V případě prostorovosti já je rozvíjena zejména dvojpólovost vlastníhotěla jako vnímajícího i vnímaného, daného zevnitř i zvenčí, a roleprostorových diferencí pro utváření a rozlišení zkušenosti já se sebousamým a s jinými jsoucny. Závěrečná kapitola naznačuje, žek prostorovosti sdíleného světa patří i možná druhá já, což zakládámožnost intersubjektivní platnosti zkušenosti (kap. VI).Klíčová slova: fenomenologie, ontologie, prostor, prostorovost, MauriceMerleau-Ponty, Jan Patočka.

Este trabalho é um estudo sobre a produção de alguns artistas brasileiros procurando situar o fenômeno corporeidade percebido em algumas obras. Aspectos da fenomenologia de Maurice Merleau-Ponty servirão de base para as análises que serão feitas. Não tratamos de definir um conceito final sobre o assunto, mas propomos a articulação de aspectos estudados na arte atual com temáticas da filosofia pontiana que nos aproximam da compreensão de um entrelaçamento entre o artista e o mundo, com o qual buscaremos desvelar possíveis características da sensibilidade atual. Neste sentido, nos aproximamos da produção de três artistas brasileiros de gerações diferentes: Amélia Toledo, Carmela Gross e Ernesto Neto. E, depois, procuramos observar como algumas questões ainda permanecem operantes nas produções e experiências de criação de jovens artistas, nascidos por volta dos anos de 1980: Júlio Meiron, Amanda Mei, Lia Chaia e Vitor Mizael. Esse tratamento permite um olhar para arte do qual emerge uma nova ideia de corpo não só como presença e fisicalidade, mas como ausência e extensão, senciente-sensível manancial fecundo para a expressão artística. / This research is a study on the production of some Brazilian artists and it seeks to locate the phenomenon corporality. Aspects of the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty will be the basis for analysis that will be made. We dont try to set a final concept on the subject, but we propose the articulation of aspects studied in the current art and themes of the Merleau-Ponty\'s philosophy. So, we approach the production of three Brazilian artists of different generations: Amelia Toledo, Carmela Gross and Ernesto Neto. And then we observed how some issues continue still in production and operating in the experience of creating young artists: Julio Meiron, Amanda Mei, Lia Chaia and Victor Mizael. This treatment allows one to look at art from which emerges a new idea of the body not only as a presence and physicality, but as an absence and extension fruitful source for artistic expression.

O presente trabalho objetiva oferecer uma leitura do pensamento de Maurice Merleau- Ponty desde a tese inicial de 1945, Fenomenologia da percepção à obra inacabada O visível e o invisível, no que diz respeito a um percurso sobre as imagens pictóricas nesta filosofia. O foco central pretendido para este itinerário, não só suscita as imagens nas obras de vários artistas citados pelo filósofo francês, tendo a referência essencial às pinturas de Paul Cézanne, como busca justamente compreender certa organização do trabalho pictórico realizada pelos artistas para o ato de criação das obras de arte. Para isso, chamamos de plano das imagens o modo como os autores se abrem à organização estruturante das obras desde a sua concepção à entrega delas aos sujeitos percipientes. Conforme esta linha de articulação pretendida, enveredamos no percurso citado a fim de explicitar, primeiramente, na fase fenomenológica do filósofo, o contexto no qual se verifica a percepção das imagens da arte moderna e o sentido que elas têm diante da questão central do corpo próprio e da pintura clássica que se preocupou em representar o mundo conforme a nítida captação da natureza. Mediante a expressão que possui cada artista, Merleau-Ponty nos permite pensar quanto ao segundo passo, na linguagem expressiva que abre o sujeito ao outro numa significação atrelada ao mundo. Cézanne é o artista que especialmente restabeleceu com suas imagens a expressão que ultrapassa perspectivas de um mundo pronto e determinado. Como último ponto deste trabalho, procuramos elucidar a plasticidade das imagens como condição de envolvimento carnal no mundo, para tanto, centramos nossa leitura na direção merleau-pontyana dada para o pacto visível que os pintores têm com as imagens e por meio das quais eles terminam organizando um ato fecundo de criação graças ao plano de imagens que eles constroem e conforme a sua tarefa dinâmica. / The present work has as objective a reading of Maurice Merleau-Ponty since his inicial thesis in 1945, Perception Phenomenology to his unfinished work The visible and the invisible, in what concerns a route over the pictorial images of this philosophy. The main focus for this route, not only raises the images in the works of various artists cited by the French philosopher, having as the essential reference the paintings of Paul Cézanne, as it rightly seeks to understand certain \"organization\" of the pictorial work by the artists for the act of artwork creation. To achieve this, well use the expression pictures plane in reference to the way the authors open themselves to the structural organization of their works from their conception to their deliver to the percipient audiences. As follows this line of articulation, we set the \"route\" to explain, firstly, the phenomenological phase of the philosopher, the context in which appears the perception of images of modern art, and the sense that they have on the central question of \"own body\", and of classical painting that focused in representing the world as a clear depiction of nature. Upon the expression that each artist has Merleau-Ponty allows us to think, concerning the second instance, about the expressive language that opens the subject audience to the others self in a meaning linked to the world. In the final instance of this work, we sought to elucidate the plasticity of the images as a condition of carnal involvement in the world, therefore, focusing our reading on Merleau-Pontys direction given to the visible pact that painters have with images and through which they finish \"organizing\" a fruitful act of creation thanks to the pictures plan they construct and to its dynamic task.

Submitted by JÚLIO HEBER SILVA (julioheber@yahoo.com.br) on 2017-03-15T19:30:21Z No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Luana Lopes Xavier - 2017.pdf: 1405182 bytes, checksum: 00e4f78393fa894e68fb50c3ca26685e (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Approved for entry into archive by Luciana Ferreira (lucgeral@gmail.com) on 2017-03-20T12:44:29Z (GMT) No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Luana Lopes Xavier - 2017.pdf: 1405182 bytes, checksum: 00e4f78393fa894e68fb50c3ca26685e (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) / Made available in DSpace on 2017-03-20T12:44:29Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 2 Dissertação - Luana Lopes Xavier - 2017.pdf: 1405182 bytes, checksum: 00e4f78393fa894e68fb50c3ca26685e (MD5) license_rdf: 0 bytes, checksum: d41d8cd98f00b204e9800998ecf8427e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2017-02-22 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior - CAPES / L'objectif de cette travail est d'analyser les thèmes du Corps et de la subjectivité dans l'oeuvre de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, considérant leurs critiques tout comme leurs interprétations de la pensée phénoménologique. Nous comprenons, surtout, que la phénoménologie merleaupontienne a élu l'expérience du corps comme source de la perception. Ainsi, la phénoménologie nous mènera à une approche du corps lié à la subjectivité ou à l’entralecement de l'homme et la nature, présentée dans le travail La structure du comportement et Phénoménologie de la perception. L'intention de notre travail est de montrer comment la pensée de Merleau-Ponty s´efforce à rompre avec les dualismes de la relation corps-esprit et à récupérer les données sensibles de la conscience à partir de l'expérience perceptive, plus précisémment. Nous voudrions donc penser la critique faite par l'auteur des études classiques sur le corps et la division moderne entre l'intériorité et l'extériorité, ayant en vue une phénoménologie de l’entrelacement homme-monde. Pour ce, nous prenons en compte les références que Merleau-Ponty fait à Descartes, Husserl et Bergson, tout comme l’oeuvre La structure du comportement, mais nous proposons, surtout, une lecture possible de la Phénoménologie de la perception. / O objetivo do presente trabalho é analisar o tema Corpo e subjetividade na obra de Maurice Merleau-Ponty, tomando como viés suas críticas e interpretações do pensamento fenomenológico. Compreendemos, em especial, que a fenomenologia merleau-pontiana elege a experiência corpórea como fonte da percepção. Desta forma, a fenomenologia nos levará a uma abordagem do corpo atrelado à subjetividade ou da imbricação entre homem e natureza, expressas em obras como A estrutura do comportamento e Fenomenologia da percepção. A intenção do nosso trabalho é mostrar como o pensamento de Merleau-Ponty se empenha em romper com os dualismos sobre a relação corpo-mente e recuperar os dados sensíveis da consciência a partir da experiência perceptiva, mais especificamente, pensar a crítica empreendia pelo autor aos estudos clássicos do corpo e à cisão moderna entre interioridade e exterioridade, tendo em vista uma fenomenologia do entrelaçamento homem-mundo. Para tal, deter-nos-emos a referências que Merleau-Ponty realiza a Descartes, Husserl e Bergson, também à obra A estrutura do comportamento, mas propondo, sobretudo, uma possível leitura da Fenomenologia da percepção.

Notre thèse de doctorat approfondit le thème de l’animalité à partir de Merleau-Ponty. La recherche est structurée en trois parties, qui suivent respectivement trois pôles de recherche : sujet-monde-intersubjectivité. La première partie s’interroge sur la possibilité de définir l’animal comme un véritable sujet. La phénoménologie de Merleau-Ponty reformule la notion de subjectivité et nous conduit à une définition de l’animal comme une existence incarnée, ouverte sur le monde et caractérisée par une conduite signifiante. Pourtant, il faudra s’interroger sur le statut d’une telle subjectivité. La deuxième partie de notre travail est consacrée à la notion d’espace. En particulier, nous nous interrogerons sur les espaces animaux, c’est-à-dire sur la notion de milieu. Enfin, le dernier chapitre de cette partie approfondit la différence entre milieu et monde. La troisième et dernière partie de notre travail prend en charge la question de l’intersubjectivité qui s’établit dans la relation entre l’animal et l’homme, dans leur spécificité et dans leur différence. Loin de proposer une sorte d’égalitarisme entre les deux, le véritable défi est de définir une notion de différence qui, d’une part, n’efface pas l’essence spécifique de l’être humain et qui, d’autre part, ne le détache pas de la continuité du monde naturel. Dans ce cadre, l’animal est reconnu selon son être-au-monde spécifique, alors que l’homme se profile comme une nouvelle dimension, sans perdre la parenté avec les autres vivants. / This study examines the notion of animality in relation to the phenomenology of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. It is composed of three parts, which take up three main issues: subject – world – intersubjectivity. The first part explores the possibility of defining animals as subjects. Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology, in fact, has deeply reformulated the notion of subjectivity and led to a definition of animal being as an embodied existence, open to the world and characterised by meaningful conduct. Even so, it will be necessary to question the nature of such subjectivity. The second part of the thesis concerns spatiality, and in particular, the notion of milieu. Lastly, the last chapter elaborates on the difference between milieu and world. The third and final part deepens the intersubjectivity established in the relationship between animal and human being, in their specificity and difference. Far from proposing a kind of egalitarianism between the two, the challenge is to establish a notion of difference which, on the one hand, does not negate the uniqueness of human essence and, on the other, does not separate the human being from the continuity of the natural world. We will see that, in Merleau-Ponty’s approach, the animal being is recognised in accordance to its specific being in the world, while the human being is recognised in a new dimension, without losing its kinship and connection with other living beings.

In my doctoral thesis, I diversify so-called deviant behavior of children by means of a critical concept of nihilism and lead them back to a certain intellectual origin, namely, to the idealistic thinking tradition, which leads to the Philosophy of Lack and Not. I see this philosophy in the theories of Lacan and Merleau-Pontys, diametrically opposed to the idealistic thinking tradition. Departing from the ineradicable non-consciousness of man, Merleau-Ponty works out the laws of perception and Lacan the laws of language. As I refer to these authors and to the Philosophy of Not, my investigation proceeds not simply from the human capacity to be educated, but from the fact that in certain cases this capacity is to be yet established. The Philosophy of Not, complemented by the methodology of a cartography of negative experiences developed by the artist Robert Smithson, open up new surprising theoretical approaches to (educational) practical challenges. Starting from the laws recognized by Merleau-Ponty and Lacan, an explanation and possible forms of dealing with nihilistic behavior can be derived. / In meiner Doktorarbeit diversifiziere ich Verhaltensauffälligkeiten bzw. –störungen anhand eines kritischen Begriffs des Nihilismus und führe sie auf eine bestimmte gedankliche Herkunft, nämlich auf die idealistische Denktradition, zurück, die zu der Philosophie des Mangels und des Nicht, wie ich sie in den Theorien Lacans und Merleau-Pontys vertreten sehe, diametral entgegensteht. Vom unhintergehbaren Nichtfestgestelltsein des Menschen ausgehend arbeitet Merleau-Ponty die Gesetze der Wahrnehmung und Lacan die Gesetze der Sprache heraus. - Indem ich mich auf diese Autoren und auf die Philosophie des Nicht berufe, geht meine Untersuchung nicht schlicht von der Erziehbarkeit des Menschen aus, sondern davon, dass eine solche in bestimmten Fällen erst herzustellen ist. Die Philosophie des Nicht, ergänzt um die von dem Künstler Robert Smithson entwickelte Methode der Kartographie von Negativerfahrungen, eröffnet überraschend neue theoretische Zugriffsmöglichkeiten auf (erziehungs-)praktische Zusammenhänge. Ausgehend von den von Merleau-Ponty und Lacan erkannten Gesetzen lassen sich eine Erklärung und tatsächlich auch mögliche Umgangsformen mit nihilistischen Verhaltensauffälligkeiten ableiten.

[pt] Esta pesquisa relaciona um conjunto de criações contemporâneas movidas pela vida da paisagem. Propõe, mais especificamente, um percurso reflexivo que enfatiza três elementos – plantas, nuvens e pedras. Ao fazê-lo, busca trazer subsídios intelectuais e sensíveis para pensar a consciência como experiência por uma via fenomenológica, em diálogo crítico com teorias contemporâneas que a tomam como produto do cérebro. Partindo do pressuposto de que ciência, filosofia e arte são formas de pensamento não hierarquizáveis que mobilizam diferentes modos de criar, o percurso aqui construído recorre a criações científicas (Charles Darwin, Benoît Mandelbrot, Stefano Mancuso), filosóficas (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emanuele Coccia, Michel Collot) e artísticas (Ana Martins Marques, Wislawa Szymborska, John Constable): entrelaçando-as, propõe o exercício do pensamento de uma alteridade radical. / [en] The present research connects a set of contemporary creations driven by the life of the landscape. More specifically, it proposes a reflective path that emphasizes three elements – plants, clouds and stones. In doing so, it aims to bring intellectual and sensitive subsidies to think about consciousness as an experience through a phenomenological approach, in critical dialogue with contemporary theories that take it as a product of the brain. Assuming that science, philosophy and art are non-hierarchical forms of thought that mobilize different ways of creating, the path constructed here uses scientific creations (Charles Darwin, Benoît Mandelbrot, Stefano Mancuso), philosophical creations (Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Emanuele Coccia, Michel Collot) and artistic ones (Ana Martins Marques, Wislawa Szymborska, John Constable): intertwining them, it proposes the exercise of the thought of a radical alterity.