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«Nous ne cessons pas de vivre dans le monde de la perception, mais nous le dépassons par la pensée critique, au point d’oublier la contribution qu’il apporte à notre idée du vrai». Avec cette phrase qui ouvre un texte auquel le philosophe confie un bilan des résultats de ses premiers travaux, Maurice Merleau-Ponty récapitule le problème fondamental dont toute sa réflexion restera marquée. Poussé, depuis le tout début de sa recherche, par l’intention de dépasser l’antinomie entre les perspectives, intellectualiste et empiriste, Merleau-Ponty fait appel à une philosophie capable de se tourner à nouveau vers le phénomène humain, de rendre compte de ses modalités d’existence et de l’explorer à nouveau au-delà de la distinction cartésienne entre âme et corps, en inaugurant ainsi une anthropologie philosophique comme propédeutique à une réforme épistémologique plus générale, capable de restituer à la philosophie même, sa fonction d’interrogation radicale de l’expérience concrète.Le but de notre recherche est de montrer comment cette exploration qui, au commencement trouve dans l’observation et dans la description de la perception son point de départ, tend toujours davantage vers une thématisation et une étude du problème de l’expression à travers lequel la réflexion merleau-pontienne évolue de la phenomenologie de la corporéité à la véritable ontologie du sensible.Tout d’abord explorée comme nécessaire corrélatif des manifestations perceptrices, l’expression devient progressivement objet d’une réflexion autonome et en même temps, le pivot méthodologique d’une trajectoire philosophique dans laquelle l’enquête anthropologique laisse graduellement le pas à une philosophie de la nature.On observera ainsi l’attestation d’une ontologie indirecte, capable de rendre compte de l’historicité de l’expérience et en vertu de laquelle repenser le rapport entre nature et culture, corps et langage. C’est-à-dire de reproposer le problème de la genèse du sens au sein d’une réhabilitation accomplie du sensible ainsi que le problème de l’émergence d’une philosophie comme ré-articulation d’une archéologie de la perception et d’une généalogie de la connaissance. / «Nous ne cessons pas de vivre dans le monde de la perception, mais nous le dépassons par la pensée critique, au point d’oublier la contribution qu’il apporte à notre idée du vrai». With this sentence, which opens a text to which the philosopher entrusts an evaluation of the results of his first works, Maurice Merleau-Ponty recapitulates the fundamental problem due to which all his reflections will be affected afterwards. Led, from the very beginning of his research, from the intent to overcome the antinomy between the intellectualist and the empiricist perspectives, Merleau-Ponty calls for a philosophy capable of turning towards the human phenomenon, to account for its mode of existence and redirect it beyond the Cartesian distinction between soul and body, inaugurating a philosophical anthropology as propaedeutic to a more general epistemological reform, capable of returning to philosophy itself its function of radical questioning the concrete experience.The aim of our work is to show how this investigation, which initially finds its starting point in the observation and description of perception, increasingly stretching towards a thematization and a study of the problem of expression, through which the Merleaupontian reflection evolves from the phenomenology of corporeity to a real ontology of the sensible.First investigated as a necessary correlative of perceptual manifestations, expression becomes progressively the subject of an autonomous reflection and, at the same time, a methodological pivotal point of a philosophical trajectory in which the anthropological inquiry gradually gives way to a philosophy of nature, an indirect ontology able to account for the historicity of the experience and, in virtue of this, to rethink the relationship between nature and culture, body and language. This means to bring back the problem of the genesis of meaning within an accomplished rehabilitation of the sensible and to point out the emerging of a philosophy as a continuous re-articulation of and archaeology of perception and a genealogy of knowledge. / «Nous ne cessons pas de vivre dans le monde de la perception, mais nous le dépassons par la pensée critique, au point d’oublier la contribution qu’il apporte à notre idée du vrai». Con questa frase, con cui si apre un testo cui il filosofo affida un bilancio dei risultati dei suoi primi lavori, Maurice Merleau-Ponty ricapitola il problema fondamentale da cui tutta la sua riflessione rimarrà segnata. Spinto, fin dagli esordi della sua ricerca, dall’intento di superare l’antinomia fra le prospettive Intellettualiste ed Empiriste, Merleau-Ponty fa appello a una filosofia capace volgersi nuovamente verso il fenomeno umano, di rendere conto delle sue modalità d’esistenza e re indagarlo al di là della distinzione cartesiana fra anima e corpo, inaugurando un’antropologia filosofica come propedeutica a una più generale riforma epistemologica in grado di restituire alla filosofia stessa la sua funzione d’interrogazione radicale dell’esperienza concreta.Scopo del nostro lavoro è di mostrare come questa indagine, che da principio trova nell’osservazione e nella descrizione della percezione il suo punto d’avvio, protenda sempre maggiormente verso una tematizzazione e uno studio del problema dell’espressione, attraverso il quale la riflessione merleaupontiana evolve da fenomenologia della corporeità a vera e propria ontologia del sensibile.Dapprima indagata come correlato necessario delle manifestazioni percettive, l’espressione diviene progressivamente oggetto di una riflessione autonoma e, al medesimo tempo, cardine metodologico di una traiettoria filosofica in cui l’inchiesta antropologica lascia gradualmente il passo a una filosofia della natura. Si osserverà così l’attestarsi di un’ontologia indiretta, in grado di rendere conto della storicità dell’esperienza, e in virtù di quest’ultima di ripensare il rapporto tra natura e cultura, corpo e linguaggio. Ovvero di riproporre il problema della genesi del senso in seno a una riabilitazione compiuta del sensibile e quello dell’emergere di una filosofia come continua riarticolazione di un’archeologia della percezione e di una genealogia della conoscenza.

In this paper, I attempt to understand how Merleau-Ponty views the relation between nature and reflection, as well as the meaning behind the terms “human” and “animal” and the relations between them. I approach this by outlining the transition from Merleau-Ponty’s early philosophy (SB, PP) to his late philosophy (N, VI). Roughly understood as the shift from inquiries into the nature of experience to inquiries into the experience of nature. I show that this shift or turn can be understood in terms of a reconsideration of the nature of experience, which opens toward non-human animal reflection; to the simultaneous kinship and estrangement in animal interspecificity. The paper is divided into three parts: In the first part, oriented around Phenomenology of Perception, I outline the grounding of reflection in the co-natural corporeity of perception. In the second part, I present the implications of Merleau-Ponty’s turn to nature through his reading of Schelling. What becomes visible here is his reversal of method following his turn to nature. Essentially, this reversal of method tempts a reconsideration of reflection: reflection is no longer separated from nature, but a fold within nature itself; a dehiscence of the flesh opening a “mirroring reflexive” within nature itself as nature’s self-reflection, exemplified through the sensing-sensible human body. In the third part, the same reversal of method is considered in relation to animality. I contrast Merleau-Ponty’s account of life and animality in his second course on nature against his views in The Structure of Behavior. Consequently, his account of the grounding of reflection in the corporeity of perception is deepened and his ontology of sensing-sensible is further clarified. In the last sections of the third part, I discuss Merleau-Ponty’s account of the human-animal relation, I then briefly discuss his account of painting as a privileged form of ontological expression, and I finally speculate openly about the alterity of other animals and the possibility of animal philosophies.

É recente a preocupação com as experiências dos portadores de tumor cerebral e as de seus familiares. O intenso impacto físico e psicossocial da doença sobre os pacientes e as repercussões em seu meio familiar, as adversidades do tratamento e o prognóstico desfavorável traçam um quadro muito severo, até mesmo em comparação com outros tipos de câncer. Neste contexto, o objetivo do presente trabalho é realizar uma aproximação compreensiva às experiências vividas por pessoas com tumor cerebral e pelos seus familiares. Os colaboradores da pesquisa, pacientes com diferentes diagnósticos de tumor cerebral e seus acompanhantes, freqüentaram sessões de grupo de sala de espera no Ambulatório de Neurocirurgia Oncológica do Hospital das Clínicas da Faculdade de Medicina de Ribeirão Preto – USP. Para constituir o material discursivo, base da tarefa compreensiva, sete sessões de grupo foram gravadas em áudio e, posteriormente, transcritas integralmente. A orientação, em questões de método, segue uma perspectiva qualitativa em psicologia fundamentada na fenomenologia e as reflexões sobre o vivido fundamentam-se no pensamento de Maurice Merleau-Ponty. Na compreensão dos relatos analisados, duas questões ganharam evidência. Primeiramente, a de que a experiência do adoecimento para os pacientes, e decerto para os familiares, é marcada pelo sentido de que a vida presente é muito diferente da de outrora. Há como que um choque entre o eu-corpo atual e o eu-corpo passado. Em segundo lugar, é notável a restrição pessoal que marca esta experiência do enfermo. Tal restrição revela-se nas perturbações da motricidade, da linguagem e da sexualidade; nos temores e angústias que o assaltam; nas relações estabelecidas em família, marcadas por uma superproteção que cerceia e pela dependência em relação aos cuidados do outro; e nas experiências com o meio social extra-familiar que despertam vergonha e o ímpeto de se isolar. Quanto aos familiares, a sua experiência é pautada, sobretudo, no esforço para oferecer um cuidado que favoreça o bem-estar da pessoa enferma. Contudo, os cuidadores vivenciam uma intensa carga de preocupações e temores que os levam a uma atitude, por vezes, superprotetora. Ademais, os familiares da pessoa portadora de tumor cerebral também experienciam perdas pessoais e um grande desgaste físico e emocional. Alguns elementos da filosofia de Merleau-Ponty possibilitaram a elaboração e o enriquecimento das compreensões anteriormente destacadas. Somos um corpo dirigido incessantemente para o mundo e este corpo que somos não é o corpo do qual se fala no âmbito do conhecimento biomédico, mas um corpo fenomenal, o corpo vivido. Por conseguinte, nos casos mais graves de tumor cerebral, o movimento da pessoa em direção ao mundo pode ser severamente prejudicado. Destaca-se, ainda, a noção de que são construídas atitudes frente ao adoecimento, ou seja, movimentos do ser no mundo regidos por uma estrutura de conjunto existencial que contém, de maneira essencial, o acontecimento orgânico limitante. Por fim, explorou-se a idéia de que qualquer atitude frente à doença mobiliza todas as dimensões do ser, tendo sido abordadas, mais especificamente, a temporalidade e o ser com o outro na experiência dos colaboradores deste estudo. / Preoccupations with the experiences of brain tumor patients and their family members are recent. The disease’ intense physical and psychosocial impact on patients and the repercussions for their family environment, the adversities of treatment and the unfavorable prognosis result in a very serious picture, even in comparison with other types of cancer. In this context, this study aims to understand the experiences of brain tumor patients and their family members. The research collaborators, who were patients with different brain tumor diagnoses and their companions, attended waiting room group sessions at the Oncological Neurosurgery Outpatient Clinic of the University of São Paulo at Ribeirão Preto Medical School Hospital das Clínicas. For the discourse material, which formed the base for the comprehension task, seven group sessions were audio-taped and fully transcribed. A qualitative method was adopted, using a phenomenology-based psychology, while reflections on the experience were based on the ideas of Maurice Merleau-Ponty. In understanding the analyzed reports, two issues stood out. Firstly, for the patients, and definitely for the family members, the sickening experience is marked by the sense that the current life is very different from the past. There is as if it were a shock between the I-current body and the I-past body. Secondly, the patient’s experience is marked by a noticeable personal restriction. This restriction appears in movement, language and sexuality disturbances; in the fears and anguish the patient is attacked by; in the family relations that are established, marked by a limiting overprotection and by the dependence in relation to other persons’ care; and in the experiences with the extra-family social environment, which arouse shame and the urge to get isolated. As to family members, their experience is mainly guided by the effort to offer a care that favors the ill person’s well-being. However, caregivers bear an intense burden of preoccupations and fears that lead to a sometimes overprotective attitude. Furthermore, the brain tumor patient’s family members also experience personal losses and great physical and emotional wear. Some elements in Merleau-Ponty’s philosophy made it possible to elaborate and enrich the comprehensions highlighted above. We are a body that is continuously directed at the world and this body we are is not the body discussed in the field of biomedical knowledge, but a phenomenal body, the lived body. Consequently, in the gravest cases of brain tumor, the person’s movement towards the world can be seriously impaired. Another notion that stands out is the fact that attitudes are constructed towards the sickening, that is, movements of the being in the world that are ruled by an existential structure that essentially contains the limiting organic event. Finally, the idea was explored that any attitude towards the disease mobilizes all dimensions of the being, more specifically temporality and being with the other in the experience of this study’s collaborators.

Esta tese se divide em duas partes. Na primeira parte serão expostas as escolas e teorias mais importantes para o conceito de sentido. Na segunda parte será exposto o conceito de sentido espectral. A primeira seção é monográfica e trata de investigar o conceito de sentido em quatro diferentes campos das ciências humanas: a lógica, a linguagem, a fenomenologia e a teoria dos sistemas. A segunda traz a proposição teórica do conceito de sentido espectral e o discute em função de diagramas de comunicação e sentido. Com isso, a discussão da primeira parte deste trabalho deverá introduzir as dimensões do conceito de sentido que, por sua vez, serão relacionados com certo padrão de difusão e consumo da informação. Essa relação entre os modos de produção das matrizes de media e um determinado conceito de sentido é explorada ao longo de todo o trabalho. Espectral, com isso, é uma metáfora para a particular produção de sentido do ambiente digital. Esse campo do sentido eletrônico será descrito e delineado em contraposição às metáforas não-espaciais de difusão do ciberespaço, que sugerem um campo aberto de aceleração e expansão não comensurável. Desse modo, o conceito de sentido espectral apresentará dois blocos de elementos complementares cuja finalidade é vincular as metáforas não-espaciais, exteriores e difusas do ciberespaço, com uma descrição dos mecanismos interiores desse sentido digital. Esses mecanismos serão descritos teórica e graficamente por meio de cinco componentes: serialização, aglutinação, seleção, nódulos e disrupção. Essas operações, por sua vez, percorrem uma superfície cujos movimentos são simultaneamente concêntricos e arborescentes. A descrição desse movimento será feita por meio de três circuitos: círculos interiores, círculos exteriores e círculos crescentes. A superfície, por sua vez, será descrita com o conceito de anéis de cebola. A vinculação entre as camadas concêntricas e a superfície do ciberespaço conforma o próprio conceito de sentido espectral. / This thesis is divided in two parts. The first part discusses the most influential schools and theories regarding the concept of meaning. The second part presents the concept of spectral meaning. This first section is monographic and consists in an investigation into the concept of meaning within four different fields of human sciences: logics, language, phenomenology and social systems theory. The second section presents the theoretical thesis concerning the concept of spectral meaning and discusses it in the light of communication and meaning diagrams. Therefore, the first part of this work introduces the varied understandings of the concept of meaning which, in a second phase, will be related to specific patterns of information and communication. This relationship between modes of production across different media matrices and a given concept of meaning is continually explored throughout the thesis. Spectral is, therefore, a metaphor for the specific production of sense in the digital environment. This field of electronic meaning will be described and portrayed in opposition to the non-spatial metaphors of diffusion that haunt the cyberspace, regularly depicting it as an open and incommensurable field of acceleration and expansion. Accordingly, the concept of spectral meaning will present two sets of paired elements in order to connect the non-spatial, diffusive and exterior metaphors of the cyberspace with a representation of the electronic meaning and its internal mechanisms. These mechanisms will be described theoretically and graphically along five main components: serialization, netclustering, gatekeeping, nodes and breakthrough. These operations, on the other hand, go through a surface whose activity is both concentric and arborescent. The description of this movement will be target along three cycles: inner circles, outer circles and growing circles. The surface itself, conversely, will be described with the concept of onion rings. The connection between the concentric layers and the cyberspace surface comprehends the concept of spectral meaning itself.

Com o objetivo de realizar um estudo sobre a dança com pessoas em sofrimento psíquico e produzir reflexões sobre a arte em um campo de ações em saúde mental, realizou-se intervenções em um Centro de Atenção Psicossocial (CAPS) na cidade de São Paulo. Pelo caráter qualitativo do trabalho, optou-se pela pesquisa-ação que permitiu o planejamento, a organização da intervenção em conjunto com as necessidades de atendimento dos participantes e das diretrizes da atenção em saúde mental do CAPS, e as transformações do processo investigado durante seu desenvolvimento. Para a abordagem das especificidades do processo de criação em dança vivenciado, elegeu-se os princípios teóricos de Rudolf Laban sobre o movimento humano e aspectos da fenomenologia da percepção abordados por Merleau-Ponty. No decorrer das intervenções, percepções e reflexões tomaram corpo e visibilidade com o surgimento de expressões corporais e de outras linguagens nas atividades realizadas. No percurso do trabalho percebeu-se que a essência da experiência encontrava-se no processo de criação em dança. A proposta produziu intervenções que promoveram novas formas corporais e relacionais e constituiu aos participantes uma experiência como atores em processos coletivos em espaços comunitários. Como prática estética, sensível, a pesquisa apresentou-se como uma ação interdisciplinar situada na interface da arte e da saúde mental. / With the objective to conduct a study about dancing with people in psychological distress and producing reflections about art in a field of mental health actions, we made interventions in a Psychosocial Care Center in the city of Sao Paulo. By the qualitative characteristic that the work has, we chose action-research that allowed the planning, organization and transformation process that was investigated during its development. Approaching the specificities of the process of creation lived on dance, we elected the theoretical principles of Rudolf Laban about the human movement and aspects of the phenomenology of perception approached by Merleau-Ponty. During our interventions, perceptions and reflections took shape and visibility with the emergence of body expressions and other expressive languages in the activities practiced together. Throughout the work, it was realized that the essence of the experience was in the process of dance creation. The proposal produced interventions that promoted new body and relational forms and constituted for the participants an experience as actors in collective processes in community. As a esthetic practice, sensitive, this experience was presented as a proposal interdisciplinary interface of art and mental health.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-04T18:27:36Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 Andre R R Torres.pdf: 385259 bytes, checksum: 277369ce3198a3a1ec7ebd8df1dcd50b (MD5) Previous issue date: 2008-02-15 / It s possible to identify important phenomena to be approached regarding the Feeling of Inadequacy (FI), characterized for the feeling of being unequal or different from other people or diverse situations. For this, the present work keeps its attention directed toward the relation between subject and sociocultural context, with the objective of understanding the phenomenon of feeling inadequate and how one configures one s self according to the possible psychological consequences of the situation. The research was qualitative in nature and developed itself based on the phenomenological method style of Merleau-Ponty. The work initiated of theoretical form, through the analysis of popular literature, diagnostic manuals and indexed scientific bibliography. The second stage started from the descriptive-speculative analysis of opened and participative interviews with three adults. Each one described in their own way the presence of the FI in their lives. Notwithstanding the details of the phenomenon, three basic psychological responses have been identified: 1) the Levelling of Subjectivity (LS), characterized by self-questioning, isolation, solitude and, mainly, by the attempt to modify one s self in regards towards the sociocultural context; 2) the Levelling of the Objectivity (LO), in which are identified higher levels of aggressiveness, questioning of the sociocultural context and the possible attempt to modify it, which difficults, on the other hand, contact with subjective aspects; 3) the Sense of Inadequacy (SsI), position in which the subject assimilates the FI of reflexive and creative form, evidencing the importance of the playful character of the existence. The study revealed a possibility of transit between LS and LO, inverting the focus of the leveling, but not necessarily indicating any development of significant insights on the subject s part. / ? poss?vel identificar fen?menos importantes a serem abordados no que diz respeito ao Sentimento de Inadequa??o (SI), caracterizado pelo sentimento de desigualdade ou diferen?a em rela??o a outras pessoas ou situa??es diversas. Para isso, o presente trabalho mant?m sua aten??o voltada para a rela??o entre sujeito e contexto sociocultural, com o objetivo de compreender o fen?meno de sentir-se inadequado e de como se configuram os poss?veis desdobramentos psicol?gicos dessa situa??o. A pesquisa, de car?ter qualitativo, se embasa no m?todo fenomenol?gico segundo o estilo de Merleau-Ponty. O trabalho se iniciou de forma te?rica, atrav?s da an?lise de literatura popular, manuais diagn?sticos e bibliografia cient?fica indexada. A segunda etapa ocorreu a partir da an?lise descritivo-especulativa de entrevistas participativas abertas realizadas com tr?s adultos. Todos descreveram ao seu modo a presen?a do SI em suas vidas. Al?m de detalhes sobre o fen?meno, foram identificados tr?s desdobramentos psicol?gicos b?sicos: 1) o Aplainamento da Subjetividade (AS), caracterizado pelo autoquestionamento, isolamento, solid?o e, principalmente, pela tentativa de o sujeito de se modificar em fun??o do contexto sociocultural; 2) o Aplainamento da Objetividade (AO), no qual se identificam n?veis de agressividade, questionamento do contexto sociocultural e a poss?vel tentativa de modific?-lo, dificultando, por outro lado, o contato com aspectos subjetivos; 3) o Senso de Inadequa??o (SsI), postura na qual o sujeito assimila o SI de forma reflexiva e criativa, evidenciando a import?ncia do car?ter l?dico da exist?ncia. Percebeu-se a possibilidade de tr?nsito entre o AS e o AO, invertendo o foco do aplainamento sem que necessariamente se desenvolvam reflex?es significativas.

Procuramos mostrar como a primeira das teses doutorais de Merleau-Ponty, A Estrutura do Comportamento, torna possível o retorno ao problema clássico da união do corpo e da alma, uma vez que, ao mesmo tempo em que faz a crítica do empirismo mecanicista que embasa as tentativas científicas (da neurofisiologia e da psicologia) de dar conta da vida orgânica e do comportamento, descobre nas descrições destes fenômenos um meio original em relação ao para-si suposto pelo criticismo como explicação e fundamentação última do conhecimento e limite para o que se pode dizer sobre o ser. Procuramos ademais sugerir as limitações do quadro conceitual em que o corpo e suas realizações, dentre as quais especialmente a percepção, podem voltar a desempenhar um papel decisivo na interrogação filosófica, em especial pela ênfase, a nosso ver excessiva, que o autor faz recair sobre a articulação entre símbolo e verdade e pela falta de descrição positiva da articulação entre as formas chamadas inferiores do comportamento ligadas ao instinto, à vida orgânica e a uma temporalidade circular - e o nível simbólico remetido à verdade, à liberdade e à História / We try to show how Merleau-Ponty\'s first doctoral thesis, The Structure of Behavior, allows for a comeback of the classical problem of the union of body and soul, once it criticizes the mechanicist empirism founding the scientific attempts (from neurophysiology and psychology) to explain the organic life and behavior, while unearthing in those fenomena a milieu that differs from the transcendental self embedded in criticism as a final explanation and foundation of knowledge, and as the limit to what one can say about being. We also try to point out to the limits of such conceptual framework, in which body and its performances, specially perception, may again play a crucial role in philosophical investigation, in particular because of excessive emphasis placed upon the connection between symbol and truth, and for a lack of positive description of the articulation between the so-called inferior forms of behavior connected to instincts, organic life and circular time and the symbolic level related to truth, freedom and History

Wonder has had a rich and diverse history in the western philosophical tradition. Both Plato and Aristotle claim that philosophy begins in wonder, while Descartes marks it as the first of the passions and Heidegger uses it as a signpost for a new trajectory of philosophy away from idealism and nihilism. Despite such a rich history, wonder is almost always thought to be exhausted by the acquisition of knowledge. That is, wonder is thought of almost exclusively in epistemological terms and is discarded as soon as knowledge has been achieved. In this dissertation, I argue for an ontological reorientation of wonder that values wonder beyond its epistemic uses. To do this, I read the phenomenological and ontological work of Maurice Merleau-Ponty through recent developments in object-oriented ontology and new materialism. Much of Merleau-Ponty's work is directed toward dissolving the distinction between subject and object. His insights regarding the mutual constitution of the world lead to the possibility of an operative wonder that occurs between subject and object. Both object-oriented ontology and new materialism radicalize these insights by articulating them in terms of a vibrant or quasi-agential material world. Objects and assemblages of objects are capable of performing the becoming of the world that includes human activity, but is not reduced to it. As such, the world is capable of both self-organization and practice. Ultimately I use the philosophy-physics of Karen Barad to argue that operative wonder acts like a kind of superposition of relations between objects, and thereby accounts for a concept of wonder that is both ontologically significant and acutely generative.

Entre la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale et le début des années 1960, les représentants les plus importants du courant phénoménologique en France, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty et Trân Duc Thào, estiment non seulement qu'il est nécessaire de se confronter au marxisme, mais également que l'articulation entre phénoménologie et marxisme constitue l'un des enjeux essentiels de la philosophie dans le monde contemporain. L'objet de notre recherche est de comprendre la spécificité du travail philosophique que chacun de ces auteurs opère sur ces deux courants en apparence si opposés afin de rendre possible leur synthèse. Ce travail montre notamment comment le projet initial de 1944 est progressivement mis en question et reconfiguré au contact des évolutions historiques et politiques, des débats philosophiques et du développement des sciences humaines. Nous entendons ainsi restituer les enjeux et inventions conceptuelles de ce qui restera l'un des moments les plus féconds et originaux de la philosophie française contemporaine. / Between the end of the Second World War and the beginning of the 1960s, the chief representatives of the phenomenological school in France, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty and Tran Duc Thao, not only considered that they had to confront Marxism in their works : they deemed the endeavour to combine Marxism with phenomenology one of the major tasks of philosophy in the modern world. The object of our research is to understand the specificity of the philosophical work each performed on these two apparently incompatible schools of thought, in order to make their synthesis possible. Our work traces the way in which the initial project of 1944 was progressively questioned and reworked in the wake of political and historical change, philosophical debates and the development of human sciences. Thus we hope to bring to light the underlying stakes and conceptual innovations of what remains one of the most fertile and original moments in contemporary French philosophy.