In this dissertation, I provide an interpretation and defense of Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the primacy of perception, namely, the thesis that all knowledge is founded on perceptual experience. I take as an interpretative and argumentative key Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological conception of motivation. Whereas epistemology has traditionally accepted a dichotomy between reason and natural causality, I show that this dichotomy is not exhaustive of the forms of epistemic grounding. There is a third type of grounding, the one characteristic of the grounding relations found in perception: motivation. I argue that introducing motivation as a form of epistemic grounding allows us to see how Merleau-Ponty's thesis of the primacy of perception avoids both rationalism and empiricism. Whereas empiricism has argued that all the content of our knowledge is grounded in causal interactions between the world and our senses, and rationalism has held that experience does not suffice as a reason for knowledge, thinking of the relation between experience and knowledge in terms of motivation allows us to see how knowledge can be grounded in experience while at the same time transcending it.

The intent of this essay is to shed light on the relevance and meaning of the concept of ”form” in Merleau-Ponty’s phenomenology. Drawing on his early texts as well as on the published notes of his first course held at the Collège de France, we argue that the notion of form essentially carries two meanings in the thought of the philosopher. One epistemological, stating that the perceived always assumes the figure-ground structure (signifying a figurative dimension of form). Another ontological according to which form designates the originary manifestation of the world in the event of expression (signifying a genetic dimension of form). Finally, we argue that the interplay of these two dimension of form lead Merleau-Ponty to an intuitive understanding of rhythm as the sensible manifestation of form, suggesting a potentially fruitful encounter, converging upon this notion, with the thought of Henri Maldiney.

In 2013, the 55th Venice Biennale, the world's oldest bi-annual international contemporary art exhibition, opened under the title The Encyclopedic Palace, organized by Italian curator Massimiliano Gioni. The international exhibition section is always flanked by an amalgamation of distinct national spaces, a dual exhibition model that has been the hallmark of the Biennale since 1998. In 2013, the United States pavilion was devoted to American artist Sarah Sze's work Triple Point and her signature arrangement of everyday objects and materials, such as Q-tips, water bottles, painter's tape, and desk lamps. The title of Sze's multi-room installation, culled from earlier works as well as created from new materials, refers to the thermodynamic equilibrium of any given substance--specifically, a "triple point" is the temperature and pressure at which a substance is solid, liquid and gas at the same time. The quasi-scientific installations provide constantly shifting viewpoints as the viewer circumnavigates the interconnected spaces of the U.S. pavilion, moving amid, around, and through the work, but also focusing on different individual objects before pulling back to catch glimpses of the work as a whole. In this thesis, I apply a phenomenological analysis to Triple Point in order to make sense of its scientific references in conjunction with its complex form. I view Triple Point as a culmination of the ideas that Sze has sustained and explored over the course of her career--such as the investigation of everyday objects in relation to site, space, and viewer--that situates the viewer in an experience caught between empirical order and individual perception. To examine Triple Point using the idea of "embodied perception," I formally analyze the work in relation to its scientific meanings as suggested by its titles of individual works--Gleaner, Planetarium, Eclipse, Scale, Orrery, Pendulum, Observatory, and Compass. I then trace the discourse surrounding phenomenology and the rise of installation art through the writings of art historians Michael Fried, Rosalind Krauss, and Claire Bishop, before finally situating French philosopher Maurice Merleau-Ponty's phenomenology as an apt theory for analyzing this work. In embracing both the scientific objectivity implied by Sze's installations without sacrificing the import of physical perception, I contend that Triple Point invites the viewer to look at--but also beyond--the array of familiar objects, emphasizing a shifting sense of the work that is never exhaustively fixed. Thus, Triple Point does not expose the classic dichotomies between art and science, natural and manufactured, image and object, but instead opens up the moment of their confluence--the paradoxical achievement of an embodied perception as described by Merleau-Ponty. Understood phenomenologically, Triple Point invites viewers to get caught-up in the dynamic experience of "between-ness" invoked by the installation's title and to engage with their everyday experiences of contemporary life in a new way.

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Doctor of Philosophy / People gather. Everywhere. They gather to witness. To tell and to listen to stories. To show what was done, and how what is to be done might best be done. To perform the necessary procedures to make sure the gods are glorified and the world continues to be made as it should. To dance, to heal, to marry, to send away the dead, to entertain, to praise, to order the darkness, to affirm the self. People are gathering. As they always have—everywhere. Doctors, lawyers, bankers and politicians don evening wear to attend performances in which people sing in unearthly voices in languages they do not understand, to sit in rows, silent, and to measure the appropriate length of time they should join with each other in continuing to make light slapping noises by striking the palms of their hands together to show their appreciation at the end of the performance. One hundred thousand people gather on the last Saturday of September every year in a giant stadium in the city of Melbourne, Australia at the “hallowed turf” of the Melbourne Cricket Ground, to watch 36 men kick, punch and catch an oval shaped ball with each other, scoring points by kicking it between long sticks planted in the ground. The gathered multitude wears the same ritual colours as the men playing the game. They cry out, stand and sing anthems. This game is played and understood nowhere else in the world, but in the Melbourne cultural calendar it is the most important day of the year. It is what makes Melbourne Melbourne. Before the whitefella came, aborigines from the clans of the Yiatmathang, Waradjuri Dora Dora, Duduroa, Minjambutta, Pangerang, Kwatt Kwatta—the wombat, kangaroo, possum, Tasmanian tiger, echidna, koala and emu, would gather on the banks of the Murray River, near what is now the twin cities of Albury/Wodonga to organize marriages, perform initiations, to lay down weapons, to dance, to settle debts and disputes, to tell stories, to paint their bodies, and to request permission from the Yiatmathang to cross the river and make the climb to the top of Bogong High Plains in late spring, to feast on the Bogong moths arriving fully grown after their flight from Queensland, ready to be sung, danced and eaten. On the island of Sulawesi, a son of a family bears the responsibility of providing the largest possible number of buffalo to be sacrificed at the funeral of his father. A sacrifice which will condemn the son to a life of debt to pay for the animals which must be slaughtered in sufficient number to affirm the status of his family, provide enough meat to assure the correct distributions are made, and assure that his father has a sufficiently large herd in Puya, the afterworld. Temporary ritual buildings for song and dance must be constructed, effigies made, invitations issued. Months are spent in the preparations. And then the people will arrive, family, friends, colleagues and tourists, in great numbers, from surrounding villages, from Ujung Pandang, from Jakarta, from Australia, from Europe, from the USA, to sing, dance, talk, look and listen. And if the funeral is a success, the son will gain respect, status and honour for himself, and secure a wellprovided journey to the afterlife for his father. In a primary school playground, in an outer suburb of any Australian city, thirty parents sit in a couple of rows of metal and plastic chairs on a spring afternoon to watch their own and each other’s children sing together in hesitant or strident voices, in or out of time and tune versions of well-known popular songs praising simple virtues are applauded; the younger the children, the greater the effort, the longer and louder the applause. Some of these people are the same doctors, bankers and lawyers who had donned evening wear the night before at opera houses, now giving freely of the appreciative palm slapping sound held so precious in that other environment. And they will gather and disperse and regather, at times deemed appropriate, at the times when these gatherings have always occurred, these lawyers, doctors, sons, mothers, sports fans, when and where they can and should and must, to sing, to dance, to tell stories, to watch and listen, to be there with and among each other bearing witness to their faith, their belief, their belonging, their values. But what, in these superficially disparate, culturally diverse and dispersed groups of people, what draws them, what gathers an audience, what gathers in an audience, and what in an audience is salient for the audience members? What gathers, what gathers in an audience?

This paper addresses the aesthetic encounter from the perspective of the writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty on the visible and the invisible. It begins with the premise that from time to time we encounter situations which precipitate a sense of slippage in our experience of the world. The paper proceeds to argue that the arts can provide a point of access to this experience, and that aesthetic theory has, for example, responded to it through the development of the notion of 'the sublime'. The writings of Maurice Merleau-Ponty and, in particular, aspects of his text The Visible and the invisible, are presented with a view to augmenting this aspect of aesthetic theory. Proceeding from a 'Merleau-Pontian' perspective, the paper explores how the arts can serve to disrupt our conventional sense of space and time - creating ripples in the substance Merleau-Ponty names as 'flesh' - so as to expose the chiasm or blind spot in our experience of the world. The methodology adopted is an experiential one, which draws on the writer's interaction with the selected works of various artists as well as her own practice in glass.

<p><p>The aim of this thesis is to investigate the critique Richard Shusterman is raising towards Maurice Merleau-Pontys view on consciousness of bodily sensations and habit. Richard Shusterman critique towards Merleau-Ponty is found to have no other basis than Shusterman own subjective view on what the task of philosophy is.</p></p>

<p>I Logische Untersuchungen formulerade Edmund Husserl sin fenomenologi – ”en filosofi som sträng vetenskap”. Fenomenologin med dess metod, epochén, skall utövas under parollen ”Till sakerna själva!” Genom att ifrågasätta invanda tankesätt skall vi sätta världen inom parentes och därigenom nå objektiv kunskap.</p><p>Denna uppsats behandlar intersubjektivitetsproblemet hos fenomenologin. Genom en studie av Husserls Cartesianische Meditationen, Martin Heideggers Sein und Zeit och Maurice Merleau-Pontys Phénoménologie de la perception närmar jag mig frågan om ”De andra hos Merleau-Ponty”. Hur kan vi förstå den andre och annanheten när fenomenologins epoché är en metodisk solipsism som berövar subjektet dess värld?</p><p>Merleau-Ponty gör oförnuftet, tvetydigheten och slumpen till tema för sitt tänkande. Genom perceptionen varseblir vi världen och subjektet är (i) sin värld genom den levda kroppen. Det finns inget ”inre” utan det är genom världen, och vår verksamhet däri, som vi känner oss själva. Merleau-Pontys subjekt är ”vikt åt världen”.</p> / <p>In Logische Untersuchungen Edmund Husserl defined his phenomenology as a science for finding objectivity. The method of phenomenology, the phenomenological reduction, would provide knowledge on indubitable grounds by going back “to the things themselves”. We must put the world aside if we want to find objective knowledge.</p><p>This essay is a reading of Edmund Husserls Cartesianische Meditationen, Martin Heideggers Sein und Zeit and Maurice Merleau-Pontys Phénoménologie de la perception, and their theories of the others. How can we understand other in our mind when phenomenology in the course of its methodological solipsism, thought the phenomenological reduction, would seem to deprive the subject from the world?</p><p>Merleau-Ponty makes ambiguity and accidental existence a theme for his philosophy. Through perception we apprehend the world, as lived through with our bodies. There is no “inner man”. With some else’s words: ”Your abode is your act itself. Your act is you.”</p>

I Logische Untersuchungen formulerade Edmund Husserl sin fenomenologi – ”en filosofi som sträng vetenskap”. Fenomenologin med dess metod, epochén, skall utövas under parollen ”Till sakerna själva!” Genom att ifrågasätta invanda tankesätt skall vi sätta världen inom parentes och därigenom nå objektiv kunskap. Denna uppsats behandlar intersubjektivitetsproblemet hos fenomenologin. Genom en studie av Husserls Cartesianische Meditationen, Martin Heideggers Sein und Zeit och Maurice Merleau-Pontys Phénoménologie de la perception närmar jag mig frågan om ”De andra hos Merleau-Ponty”. Hur kan vi förstå den andre och annanheten när fenomenologins epoché är en metodisk solipsism som berövar subjektet dess värld? Merleau-Ponty gör oförnuftet, tvetydigheten och slumpen till tema för sitt tänkande. Genom perceptionen varseblir vi världen och subjektet är (i) sin värld genom den levda kroppen. Det finns inget ”inre” utan det är genom världen, och vår verksamhet däri, som vi känner oss själva. Merleau-Pontys subjekt är ”vikt åt världen”. / In Logische Untersuchungen Edmund Husserl defined his phenomenology as a science for finding objectivity. The method of phenomenology, the phenomenological reduction, would provide knowledge on indubitable grounds by going back “to the things themselves”. We must put the world aside if we want to find objective knowledge. This essay is a reading of Edmund Husserls Cartesianische Meditationen, Martin Heideggers Sein und Zeit and Maurice Merleau-Pontys Phénoménologie de la perception, and their theories of the others. How can we understand other in our mind when phenomenology in the course of its methodological solipsism, thought the phenomenological reduction, would seem to deprive the subject from the world? Merleau-Ponty makes ambiguity and accidental existence a theme for his philosophy. Through perception we apprehend the world, as lived through with our bodies. There is no “inner man”. With some else’s words: ”Your abode is your act itself. Your act is you.”

Depuis son introduction par Descartes, le Cogito a inauguré une philosophie du sujet. Et son libellé, contractant la formule « je pense, je suis, » lie la pensée à l'existence, assurant celle-là d'avoir la possibilité de la révéler. C'est contre cet intellectualisme que Merleau-Ponty s'inscrit en faux, reconnaissant plutôt le primat de la perception. Son oeuvre témoigne de sa puissance révélatrice comme expérience originaire et fondatrice, en articulant les conséquences philosophiques de la Gestalttheorie. Ses écrits font apparaître un Cogito transformé, donc différent, puisqu'il se présente comme une ouverture sur un champ perceptif, une subjectivité sans sujet, dépendante du langage: une parole parlée. On aura reconnu que l'intérêt de ce travail porte sur le Cogito. Notre but est de cerner les objections, les critiques en somme que Merleau-Ponty lève le concernant. Notre hypothèse de départ était que le Cogito pût disparaître, parce qu'il appartient à l'origine à une ontologie séparée et que -dans la mesure où le cartésianisme en fait un point métaphysique -il n'aurait pu être conciliable avec une ontologie moniste assumée par la philosophie contemporaine. Tant s'en faut puisque le phénoménologue le reprend pour lui donner un sens nouveau, le sens d'un rapport. Pour bien comprendre les chemins de pensées de ces deux auteurs, nous les étudions en parallèle, misant sur l'entrelacement des leurs préoccupations communes: la perception et la conscience perceptive: en un mot, la relation au monde; le Cogito et la subjectivité, soit l'émergence de la pensée, non par l'analyse réflexive, mais par l'analyse de l'expression qui du Cogito tacite mène au Cogito véritable. C'est pourquoi on retrouve dans ce mémoire le travail de repérage qui s'applique à cerner dans l'oeuvre merleaupontyenne les références manifestes à Descartes, concernant l'ontologie cartésienne de la vérité, mais surtout le Cogito. ______________________________________________________________________________ MOTS-CLÉS DE L’AUTEUR : Cogito, Conscience perceptive, Cartésianisme, Intellectualisme, Subjectivité.