Thesis (Ph. D.)--Ohio State University, 1970. / Includes vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 143-148). Available online via OhioLINK's ETD Center.

Thesis (doctoral)--Universität Marburg, 1931. / Includes bibliographical references (p. [7-9]).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 1941. / "Preprinted from South Dakota historical collections, vol. XXI, 1942." "References cited": p. 180-184.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Michigan, 1941. / Typewritten copy. "References cited": p. 219-223.

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1914. / Vita. Published also as University of Illinois studies in the social sciences, vol. III, no. 1 and 2. Includes bibliographical references (p. 229-230).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--University of Wisconsin--Madison, 1960. / Typescript. Vita. eContent provider-neutral record in process. Description based on print version record. Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.S.)--University of Nevada, Reno, 2006. / "December, 2006." Includes bibliographical references. Online version available on the World Wide Web.

Property taxation as a means of revenue with which to assist municipalities in their local government commitments has been a method of sustainable financial income since the 17th century. South Africa updated its property taxation after the ANC Government came into power in 1994 with the Municipal Property Rates Act 6 of 2004. The act is formulated to levy property rates on all properties with the view to support local governments in their budgets and financial expenditures. The method of assessing the property taxation is stipulated in Section 45 and 46, and also in Section 16. According to Section 45 property values are assessed by means of Computer-Assisted Mass Appraisal Systems (CAMA), which are specifically designed for mass assessments of properties with similar characteristics and within the same location. The CAMA supported Section 45 (3)(b) by including “predetermined bands of property values and the designation of properties to one of those bands on the basis of minimal market-related data”. Section 46 defined market value as a value related to “open market by a willing seller to a willing buyer” at the time of the sale. Section 16 permitted the Minister of Finance to increase property rates after property assessments have been done in order to meet budget shortfalls. This can be done annually or when it is required by the local municipality/council. The present Municipal Property Rates Act, particularly the above-mentioned sections, did not make allowance for the accommodation of unique property developments such as Midstream Estate. This research examines the Municipal Property Rates Act to find out whether Midstream Estate and similar locations have sufficient reason to request that the present system be amended to address their concerns. A study of relevant literature on the South African property tax assessment system supported the study of the Act. A field study was done to contest the Municipal Property Rates Act. The following keywords were used in the field study: need to participate; owner’s satisfaction; selfassessment; owner’s objection. The study confirmed that the present system was inadequate to assess the unique properties situated in Midstream Estate and that there existed a need for the property owners to participate in their own property assessment process. The research was performed in Midstream Estate by way of a field survey questionnaire that was conducted randomly, on a personal basis. Responses and feedback were analysed by means of quantitative description. The results of the field survey proved the hypothesis of this study.

Property taxes tend to be under-used globally, especially in developing countries. This is particularly true in Pakistan. To explore the reasons, I studied policymaking and administration in relation to the recurrent (annual) property tax in Punjab, Pakistan's most populous and urbanised province. I used a mix of research methods, including extensive field observations of how the lower level tax staff of the Excise and Taxation Department go about their work. I found three major probable explanations for the very low levels of property tax collections: • Especially after a major decentralisation reform in 2001, responsibilities for collecting the property tax and the revenues it produces are both divided in complex ways between three levels of subnational government. Each level has low incentives to perform its tax collection functions. • Each level of subnational government obtains most of its income either from transfers from higher levels of government or from loans. It generally seems easier for them to increase their incomes by putting more effort into tapping these sources, rather than trying to improve their own tax collection performance. The lack of strong political pressures to increase spending has a reinforcing effect. • It has become administratively difficult for senior policymakers to increase property tax revenue collections through mobilising the organisational resources of the Excise and Taxation Department. Property tax collection has become locked into a system that combines (a) a high degree of informality in routine practices, (b) exclusive control of detailed information about tax collection potential and performance by lower level staff and (c) modest rent-taking and responsiveness to local pressures for leniency in tax collection at these lower levels. When higher-level officials in the Department attempt periodically to enforce the achievement of higher tax collection targets, they are mostly frustrated by these informal working practices and relationships.

The relationship between population and residential property taxes is not well understood. This study is an attempt to discern the relationship. The basic questions examined are: How does population affect tax bills? What are the short-run and long-run relationships between population and taxes? What reasons lie behind the answers to the first two questions? Nearly all of a typical residential property tax bill is paid to the three units of local government, counties, cities, and school districts. The equation for determining the tax bill is the same for each unit of government: Total Expenditures minus other non-property tax revenues equals the Levy which divided by the total value of all property in the district equals the tax rate which multiplied by the value of a residence gives that residence's tax bill. The relationships between each of the above variables and population are examined to facilitate understanding of the tax-population relationship. The model chapter provides a logical link between each variable and population and corresponding estimating equations to assess long-run and short-run relationships and the relative effect of population on the separate tax variables. For long-run relationships both simple linear and quadratic functions are used with population as the explanatory variable. For short-run equations, first difference estimates are computed. Elasticities are computed for comparing the relative effect of population on the tax variables. The results obtained show that despite high R2 values the large confidence intervals about the regression lines imply that substantial variation is left unexplained by population variables. Generally, levies appear to be more responsive to population than does the value of all property as a whole resulting in a rate of growth in the levies which exceeds that of property values. Hence, tax rates tend to increase slightly with increases in population. Higher residential property taxes are associated with larger populations. This appears to be due in part to the relatively more elastic response of residential values to population than all property values as a whole. Taxes appear to be shifting toward residential property owners. Finally, short-run changes in taxes and variables composing the tax equation do not appear to be related to short-run changes in population. / Graduation date: 1979