Proxy conflict seems to be on the rise as the contemporary form of armed conflict, particularly manifesting itself in the Middle East and North Africa. While proxy conflicts enjoy increased attention in academia, little research has focused on the type of support a sponsor provides to its proxy. This thesis contributes to the literature by asking under what circumstances does sponsor provide soft power support to proxies in proxy conflict? I employ a qualitative most-similar case design of Iran’ssupport to the Supreme Council for Islamic Revolution (SCIRI) and its military wing the Badr organization in Iraq, as well as United Arab Emirates’ (UAE) support to General Haftar and the Libyan National Army (LNA) in Libya. The theoretical argument posits that mobilized sectarian bonds between sponsor and proxy facilitate a trust that induces the sponsor to provide soft power support in addition to the baseline support of hard power. The empirical findings give mixed support for the argument, as both sponsors provided soft power support, albeit at somewhat various degrees. Notably, Iran mobilized deeper and broader amongst the organizational structure of the proxy and its followers, while UAE arguably only engaged with Haftar as a strong leader but less so with NLA as an organization and its followers. Therefore, there seems to a difference in how the two sponsors penetrated their mobilization of proxies.

This thesis applies the concept of religious (national) identity to the cases of Saudi Arabia, Iran and their proxy allies - state and non-state actors - in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen. The aim was to show that in the Middle East, Sunni and Shiite affiliations matter in the relationship between the regional powers and respective proxies, as opposing to realist statement that alliances, conflicts and political developments are only governed by pragmatic power interests. Additionally, the work examines whether religious national identities have impact on the dynamics of proxy conflicts. Overall, the objective was to establish comprehensive image of how ideational/constructivist and pragmatic/realist factors work in combination to influence alliances, enmities and conflicts in the Middle East. Using qualitative methods of research, religious (national) identities of Saudi Arabia, Iran and their allies in Lebanon, Syria and Yemen were constructed so as to create ideational and realist points of departure, and then interlinked to show how convergence of religious identities helps in creating durable alliances if used in targeted manner as a strategic tool which can help safeguard national interests. The work shows notable differences in the use of this tool between Saudi Arabia and Iran, suggesting that it...

Private Military Companies (PMCs) have increased significantly since the end of the Cold War, primarily hailing from the Western countries and South Africa, and notably employed in the War on Terror. In recent years, the Russian group generically known as ‘Wagner PMC’ has been deployed in Ukraine, the Middle East and Africa. While often referred to as Russian ‘proxies’, the Wagner group has not previously been analysed through the lens of proxy theory, and academics are divided on whether PMCs may be considered proxies at all.  Russia’s intervention in the Central African Republic through Wagner provides an important case to study this new development. Employing a theoretical framework combining elements from both proxy and PMC literature, this thesis contributes to both fields by suggesting key analytical elements through which a PMC may be considered a proxy and explains how this alters the dynamics between the intervener and its proxy. Moreover, this permits a novel analysis of Russian strategies to expand its influence in Africa, suggesting that intervention through Wagner may serve as a model for interventions in other weak countries requiring security support.

Dans les dernières années, on remarque un regain des guerres par procuration comme outil de compétition entre les États. Ces conflits sont généralement pensés comme une façon peu coûteuse d’intervenir et de compétitionner, permettent aux puissances de s’affronter sans assumer les coûts politiques, militaires et humains engendrés par une intervention dans un conflit. Toutefois, les guerres par procuration impliquent des désavantages importants pour le commanditaire. Les mandataires se révèlent généralement difficiles, voire impossibles, à contrôler ou à orienter vers des objectifs précis. De plus, les doctrines et la conduite militaire moderne font en sorte que les mandataires ont souvent des capacités insuffisantes pour réellement compétitionner. L’objectif de ce mémoire est de comprendre pourquoi les États mènent des guerres par procuration, alors qu’à d’autres moments ils choisissent d’intervenir directement dans un conflit. Pour ce faire nous explorons le passage entre l’intervention indirecte puis directe de la Russie et de l’Iran dans 4 conflits régionaux afin de comprendre les motivations derrière chacune d’elles. Au travers de l’étude de ces cas, ce mémoire fera l’argument que les guerres par procuration servent davantage des objectifs défensifs pour le commanditaire, alors que les interventions directes servent davantage des objectifs offensifs. / In recent years, there has been a resurgence of proxy wars as a tool of competition between states. These conflicts describe as a low-paying way of intervening and competing allow powers to confront each other without assuming the political, military and human costs caused by intervention in a conflict. However, proxy wars involve significant disadvantages for the sponsor. Proxies are generally difficult, if not impossible, to control or steer toward specific goals. Additionally, modern military doctrines and conduct mean that proxies often have insufficient capabilities to truly compete. The objective of this thesis is to understand why States wage wars by proxy, while other times they choose to intervene directly in a conflict. To do this, we explore the transition between the indirect then direct intervention of Russia and Iran in 4 regional conflicts in order to understand the motivations behind each of them. Through the study of these cases, this thesis will argue that proxy wars serve more defensive objectives for the sponsor, while direct interventions serve more offensive objectives.

Many civil wars are illustrative of wider international tensions and connections that transcend state borders. States often intervene to influence the trajectory and outcome of civil conflicts by providing external support to warring parties. This assistance ranges from direct military intervention to the provision of weapons, training, funds, safe havens, intelligence, logistics and other critical resources. This dissertation contains four individual essays that each seeks to advance our knowledge of state support to rebel movements. The first essays (I and II) add to our understanding of how external state support influences conflict dynamics while the latter (III and IV) begin to unpack the political decision-making process behind decisions that alter the original support commitment. Essay I evaluates whether state support to rebels increases the probability of civil war negotiations being initiated. The findings question a widespread belief among policymakers that support can foster negotiations. Essay II explores if external support influences the risk of conflict recurrence. It finds that state support to rebels can increase the risk of conflict recurrence in the short-term while there is no equivalent effect of support provided to governments. Essay III is the first global analysis of support termination and it thereby opens up an entirely new research field. The results suggest that the causes related to the initiation of support and its termination are largely distinct while the transition from the Cold War and the absence of ethnic kinship ties offer some insights into when states are more likely to terminate support. Essay IV unpacks the political decision-making process of the United States’ support to the armed opposition in Nicaragua in the 1980s and in Syria in the 2010s. The results indicate that adverse feedback functions as a trigger for increasing previous commitments as long as policy failure can be attributed to external actors, while reduced support is often a result of attributing failure to the state sponsor’s own actions. Taken together, the essays make significant contributions to advance our understanding of biased third-party interventions, conflict recurrence, civil war negotiations, foreign policy decision-making and state sponsorship of terrorism.

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