Dans Literal Meaning, François Recanati cherche à montrer que ce qui est dit lorsqu’une phrase est prononcée correspond à un contenu fondamentalement pragmatique. À cet effet, il propose deux arguments généraux qui consistent à faire valoir que ce qui est dit est indéterminé si l'on s'en tient aux règles de la sémantique. Le premier de ces deux arguments tente d’établir que dans bien des cas, le contenu sémantique supposément associé à une phrase ne correspond pas à ce qui est dit. Le second est plutôt une élaboration de la thèse wittgensteinienne suivant laquelle la signification des types linguistiques est indéterminée. Pour ma part, je soutiens que si nous adoptons effectivement une conception wittgensteinienne de la signification, certains des exemples supposés illustrer le premier de ces deux arguments peuvent et doivent être critiqués. / In Literal Meaning, François Recanati argues that what is said when a sentence is uttered corresponds to a content that is fundamentally pragmatic. To this end, he proposes two general arguments according to which what is said will be indeterminate if we stick to the rules of semantics. The first of these two arguments tries to establish that in many cases, the semantic content supposedly associated with a sentence does not correspond to what is said. The second one is rather an elaboration of Wittgenstein’s thesis to the effect that the meaning of linguistic types is indeterminate. As for me, I claim that if we indeed adopt a wittgensteinian conception of meaning, some of the examples that are supposed to illustrate the first of these two arguments can and should be criticized.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-06-02T20:13:05Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 0 Previous issue date: 2006-09-27 / Universidade Federal de Sao Carlos / This work intends to offer a different reading of Carl Gustav Jung writings of the ones that conceive the terms archetype and collective unconscious as explicit references to the transcendent domain, "spiritualistic" readings that would do the Analytical Psychology methodology result in a dogmatic proceeding. In order to understand the notion of "individual" that has place in the Jungian meta-psychology , it becomes important to understand Jung's way to mean and to interpret the psychopathological facts and dreams that him observed in his clinical experience. Every moment the analytical psychology threatens to relapse in an irrationalism if we restrict ourselves in the denotative consideration of the language used to represent the psychic reality. We put emphasis, in our reading, on the representative and symbolic use of the language of psychological communication that intends to express the individual being, in order to investigate the question of the dogmatism that permeates countless critical readings concerning Jung's work. After all, in which paradigm the Analytical Psychology intends to sustain itself as a science? We will show that is the material-reductionism paradigm from the sciences of the nature the responsible for guiding the comprehension of a (transcendent) origin of the collective unconscious archetypes, but these are only enunciated by Jung in order to refer to the (figurative) appearance of the dreamlike fantasies for the psychic (immanent) existence. The causal factor stops being predominant in the interpretation of the archetype concept to give up place to the adaptation purpose of the psychic manifestation of the image. The notion of normality is faced, and crosses the domains of the disease in which takes place the eighty century medicine; if this natural paradigm becomes unable to guide the analytical psychology point of view, that intends to be a science of the man, which new paradigm would be more appropriated in a reading of Jung's work that do not intends to aim in a dogmatic interpretation - what would invalidate it's scientific legitimacy? To understand the pretense connection of the Jungian work to the mystic's domain it is necessary to understand the notion that the history of the philosophical thought checked to the term "dogmatism ". At last, could the Analytical Psychology be understood as a Science, or does it approach more to the Art, that intends to turn the part (finite) the representation of the essence of the "whole" (infinite)? / Este trabalho pretende oferecer uma leitura da obra de Carl Gustav Jung diversa das que concebem os termos arquétipo e inconsciente coletivo como referências explícitas ao domínio transcendente, leituras espiritualistas que fariam com que a metodologia da Psicologia Analítica resultasse num proceder dogmático. A fim de compreender a noção de indivíduo que tem lugar na metapsicologia junguiana, torna-se premente entender o modo de Jung significar e interpretar os fatos psicopatológicos e oníricos por ele observados na experiência clínica. A psicologia analítica ameaça recair a cada instante num irracionalismo caso nos restrinjamos à consideração denotativa da linguagem por ela utilizada para representar a realidade psíquica. Colocamos ênfase, em nossa leitura, no uso representativo e simbólico da linguagem da comunicação psicológica que pretende expressar o individual , a fim de perscrutar a questão do dogmatismo que permeia inúmeras leituras críticas realizadas acerca da obra de Jung. Afinal de contas, qual paradigma em que a Psicologia Analítica pretende se sustentar como uma ciência? Mostraremos que é o paradigma material-reducionista das ciências da natureza o responsável por orientar a questão da origem (transcendente) dos arquétipos do inconsciente coletivo, mas estes são unicamente enunciados por Jung com vistas a esclarecer o motivo (figurativo) das fantasias oníricas para a vivência psíquica (imanente). O fator causal deixa de ser predominante na interpretação do conceito arquetípico para ceder lugar à finalidade adaptativa da manifestação psíquica da imagem. Está em jogo, aqui, a própria noção de normalidade, que ultrapassa os domínios da doença onde se insere a medicina oitocentista; se o paradigma naturalista se torna incapaz de orientar a visão de mundo da psicologia analítica, que pretende ser uma ciência do homem, qual seria o paradigma no qual ela pretende se inserir e qual o sentido permitido a uma leitura da obra de Jung que não pretenda recair numa interpretação dogmática - que invalidaria sua legitimidade científica? Para situarmos esta pretensa vinculação da obra junguiana ao domínio do místico, é necessário compreendermos a noção que a história do pensamento filosófico conferiu ao termo dogmatismo . Em último termo, a Psicologia Analítica poderia ser entendida como uma Ciência, ou ela se aproxima mais da Arte, que pretende tornar a parte (finito) o representante da essência do todo (infinito)?

The prevailing discourse of “resistance vs. acceptance” in IT implementation research mostly personalizes the issue as “users” versus IT implementers (e.g., managers, CIOs, CMIOs, etc.). This kind of discourse has created an IT-implementer-centric attitude among IS scholars and practitioners. The IT-implementer-centric attitude, while embraces “acceptance” as a desirable reaction almost unconditionally, frequently holds for minimizing or more conservatively suppressing “resistance” to IT implementation. In other words, the mainstream IT implementation research, almost completely, treats “users” as passive recipients whose choices, as they face pre-developed/pre-designed/pre-rolled-out technology being implemented, can only be defined on a spectrum from “acceptance” to “resistance.” The current research study, however, offers an alternative perspective that views the “resistance vs. acceptance” duality “from the other side,” i.e., from the perspective of the supposed “resistors” or “acceptors” themselves. Through a review of the literature, this study first identifies major drawbacks of the extant theories and models of IT implementation research. Next, drawing on an interpretive paradigm of research (more specifically, phenomenological sociology), this study investigates a real world case of healthcare IT implementation. The results of the aforementioned literature review and case investigation subsequently form the basis for the study’s proposed theoretical account, which provides an unprecedented understanding and explanation of how actors representing different stakeholder groups, among which people who are routinely called “users” are but one group, experience IT implementation as they live their everyday lives. The proposed theoretical account is lastly used as a guide for crafting both practical and research prescriptions with respect to managing IT-involved change occasions.

Made available in DSpace on 2016-04-27T17:27:13Z (GMT). No. of bitstreams: 1 John Stuart Mill e o psicologismo.pdf: 586444 bytes, checksum: 4f8cde60a2889debc936f6d16408307e (MD5) Previous issue date: 2006-05-15 / Coordenação de Aperfeiçoamento de Pessoal de Nível Superior / This work presents the logic and semantic of John Stuart Mill relating them, on the one hand, to the psychological nominalist tradition represented by John Locke´s theory of ideas, and, on the other hand, to the forthcoming logic semantic discussions of XIX century, mainly from Frege´s philosophy. According to our hypothesis, in opposition to an established interpretative tradition, Mill was responsible for significant theses, among others, in favor of the logicist efforts and anti-psychologists who marked most of the later discussions on the nature of logic. On the one hand, Mill´s criticism to the thesis according to which the significance of language terms are ideas (what he calls conceptualism), in addition to his clear view in distinguishing mental processes in the reasoning act of objective reasons involved in the inferences correction, constituted, according to our conclusions, important positive influence sources, not just to Frege´s philosophy, but to a whole philosophycal tradition that came to contemporary analytical philosophy. The work is divided in three chapters. In the first chapter, important elements of Mill´s logic and semantics are presented, such as: the definition of logic as a proof science, the relationship between logic and language, theory of connotation and some propositions. The second chapter deals with Mill´s criticism of the psychological semantic model represented by, among others, Locke. The third chapter aims to the question whether, from the point of view of Fregean logicism, Mill can be considered a psychologist / Este trabalho apresenta a lógica e a semântica de John Stuart Mill relacionando-as, por um lado, à tradição psicológio-nominalista representada pela teoria das idéias de John Locke e, por outro, aos desdobramentos das discussões lógico-semânticas do século XIX, sobretudo a partir da filosofia de Frege. De acordo com nossa hipótese, ao contrário do que toda uma tradição interpretativa estabeleceu, Mill, como que por detrás de algumas posturas ultrapassadas, foi responsável por teses significativas, entre outras coisas, em favor dos esforços logicistas e antipsicologistas que marcaram boa parte das discussões posteriores acerca da natureza da lógica. A crítica que Mill realiza à tese segundo a qual o significados dos termos da linguagem são idéias (o que ele chama de conceitualismo), aliada à sua clareza em distinguir processos mentais envolvidos no ato do raciocínio, das razões objetivas envolvidas na correção das inferências, constituíram, de acordo com nossas conclusões, importantes fontes de influência positiva, não só para a filosofia de Frege, mas para toda uma tradição filosófica que veio a desembocar na filosofia analítica contemporânea. O trabalho é dividido em três capítulos. No primeiro, são apresentados alguns elementos importantes da lógica e da semântica millianas, tais como: definição de lógica enquanto ciência da prova, relação entre lógica e linguagem, teoria da conotação e proposições meramente verbais. O segundo, trata da crítica de Mill ao modelo semântico psicológico representado, entre outros, por Locke. O terceiro, busca responder se, a partir do ponto de vista do logicismo fregeano, Mill pode ser considerado um psicologista

本論文欲陳述現象學經驗的產生來由，因此首當從經驗的實質意涵入手，藉由經驗意向本質的揭露來指陳其發生原因。所以，相關於經驗是什麼，我們也就進一步探討經驗和被經驗所掌握的對象間之關係。於是我們問，這是一種「實在」關係，一一對應的關係嗎，還是可以被經驗豐富詮釋的關係？是一種基礎論的知識類型？若是，什麼意義下的基礎論，若否，又是側重什麼問題意識呢？心理活動和被經驗對象之間的關係為何？經驗如何客觀地掌握對象，對象在哪裡被掌握，知識是什麼？是心理經驗法則的結果嗎，這會造成什麼樣的認識論困局呢？相較於分析哲學從語言分析的途徑入手來解釋客觀知識如何獲得的問題，胡賽爾又如何從現象之為現象的分析描述中來揭露我們和世界之間所發生的種種事端呢？這些問題在本論文將有進一步說明。

Cette étude constitue une interprétation de la philosophie de la logique de W. V. Quine à l’aune de ce que nous considérons comme étant un problème fondamental qui la gouverne et dont on peut considérer qu’elle en constitue une réponse. Ce problème a trait à la compatibilité entre logique et paroissial. Il admet la formulation condensée suivante : soit il y a un sens à dire que la logique est paroissiale, mais alors le paroissial se trouve être une restriction et est en droit éliminable ; soit le paroissial n’est pas une restriction et est inéliminable, mais alors il n’y a aucun sens à dire que la logique est paroissiale. Le problème se nourrit de ce que la qualification de la logique comme paroissiale fait l’objet d’une revendication explicite et délibérée par Quine, i.e. n’est ni de l’ordre d’une concession, ni de l’ordre d’un moment argumentatif dialectiquement résorbable. En d’autres termes, Quine revendique et cherche à se donner les moyens de revendiquer ce contre quoi une conception « universaliste » de la logique comme celle de Frege lutte, ordonnée qu’elle est à un présupposé ou une prémisse anti-paroissialiste d’unicité de la logique. Affirmer que Quine cherche à se donner les moyens de revendiquer la paroissialité de la logique, c’est dire qu’il prit tout à fait au sérieux les arguments anti-psychologistes de Frege contre toute conception paroissiale de la logique. Plus généralement,cette étude et la lecture de la conception quinienne de la logique que nous y proposons sont organisées par le principe d’une lecture frégéenne de Quine : si nous voulons comprendre ce que signifie de dire que la logique est paroissiale chez Quine, alors il faut revenir à Frege, que ce soit par la manière dont Quine s’y oppose ou par la manière dont il s’approprie certains thèmes et principes fondamentaux de la conception frégéenne de la logique. Cette étude consiste alors à mettre au jour et à examiner les raisons et les modalités de la revendication par Quine d’une paroissialité de la logique. Tout en étant ordonnés au traitement du problème de l’incompatibilité apparente du paroissial et de la logique, les cinq chapitres qui la composent parcourent successivement la critique de « Truth by Convention » du projet syntaxique de Carnap et de son principe de tolérance (chapitre 1), la philosophie de la notation logique de Quine (chapitre 2), le point de vue anthropologique en matière de logique que Quine fait sien (chapitre 3), le critère d’engagement ontologique (chapitre 4) et, enfin, la définition substitutionnelle de la vérité logique (chapitre 5). / This study is an interpretation of W.V. Quine’s philosophy of logic taken as an answer to what we consider to be a fundamental problem. This problem has to do with the compatibility between logic and parochial. It can be briefly expressed in the following manner: either that there is sense in saying that logic is parochial, but the parochial therefore happens to be a restriction and could be eliminated, or that the parochial is not a restriction and could not be eliminated, but that there is thus no sense in saying that logic is parochial. The problem is fueled by the fact that Quine explicitly and deliberately claims logic to be parochial. Such a qualification is neither a concession nor an argumentative moment that could be dialectically reduced. In other words, what Quine claims – and is seeking means to claim – is precisely that which a “universalist” conception of logic like Frege’s challenges, since it assumes an anti-parochial premise concerning the uniqueness of logic. Quine seeks means to claim the parochiality of logic in the sense that he seriously considered Frege’s anti-psychologist arguments against all parochial conceptions of logic. More generally, this study – and the understanding of Quine's conception of logic that it promotes – follows the principle of a Fregean reading of Quine: if one wants to understand what it means to say that logic is parochial in Quine, one has to go back to Frege, either through Quine’s opposition to him or through his appropriation of certain themes and fundamental principles of the Fregean conception of logic. Connected to the problem of the apparent incompatibility of logic and the parochial, the five chapters contained within this study successively explore the criticism of Carnap’s syntaxical project and of its principle of tolerance found in “Truth by Convention” (chapter 1); Quine’s philosophy of logical notation (chapter 2); the anthropological point of view in logic that Quine makes his own (chapter 3); the criterion of ontological commitment (chapter 4) and the substitutional definition of logical truth (chapter 5).

Author´s research has led to the processing of psychologism theory as a tool to detect the methodological procedure of doctrine of Jehova´s Witnesses, The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, The Bahai Faith, Haifan Bahaism from movement management, through the movement medium to the seeker and to what extent can these doctrines manipulate the seeker. The thesis attempts to extract the thinking core within new religious movements, as a prerequisite for the detection of intentions of the mentioned movements, and also it tries to extract analogous statements about how these movements may develop in the future stages of their existence. The basic tool of academic study and view: comparison, psychology of religion.

The main aspiration of this thesis is to illustrate on several selected examples (or almost "cases" of clinical kind) from French, Russian, Polish, Italian (and in the second plan also German or English) writtings of the 19th and early 20th century the methods of application and presentation of the Withdrawnnes-motif in literature. And on the basis of them (after attempting to mapping out the network of their possible mutual influences, consequences, concurrency or filiations, in the interpretative part of the thesis, so on the II. to VI. chapter) try to define its final characteristics, periodisation, classification and his general definition. … and, moreover, or on the way to this purpose, perhaps to provide the reader a few other - perhaps more useful, or more interesting - information. Keywords: Autostylisation, Confusion of the dream and the reality, Decadence, Dreaming, Extreme mental states of mind, fin de siècle, Individualism, Literary motives, Modernism, Psychologism, Psychic naturalism, Solipsism, Transposition of identity, Withdrawnnes