Orientador: José Carlos de Oliveira / Resumo: A Região Metropolitana de Ribeirão Preto está constituída por 34 municípios, marcada pela diversidade entre eles, especialmente sob a ótica demográfica, geográfica, cultural e social. O espaço metropolitano requer um planejamento coordenado a fim de dar viabilidade às funções públicas que ora se apresentam com o status de interesse comum. Dentre essas funções, não há dúvida sobre o protagonismo dos serviços públicos de saneamento básico. Contudo, a ausência de regulação desses serviços fez nascer a inquietação sobre o modelo mais adequado para esta recente região metropolitana. Este trabalho buscou compreender as políticas públicas que circulam os serviços públicos de saneamento básico. A partir de algumas respostas, buscou-se evidenciar os principais modelos de regulação setorial, apontando-se como foco principal o modelo intermunicipal. Com base no paradigma da ARES-PCJ, demonstrou-se que a criação de uma agência reguladora intermunicipal, especificamente para os serviços públicos de saneamento básico, se mostra como o modelo ideal para a Região Metropolitana de Ribeirão Preto. Portanto, qualquer alternativa individual para a necessária adequação a Lei n. 11.445/2007 se mostra em descompasso com os princípios e diretrizes previstos no Estatuto da Metrópole, em especial quanto à prevalência do interesse comum sobre o local e da necessidade de gestão compartilhada das funções públicas – federalismo de cooperação. / Abstract: The metropolitan region of Ribeirão Preto is consisted of 34 municipalities marked by the diversity among them, especially from the perspective of population, geographical, cultural and social. The metropolitan area requires a coordinated planning in order to give the public functions viability that appear with the status of common interest. Among functions, there is no doubt about the importance the role of public sanitation services. However, the absence of regulation of these services gave birth to the concern about the most appropriate model for this recent Metropolitan region. This study sought to understand public policy, driven to public sanitations services. From some answers, sought to highlight the main models of sectoral regulation, pointing as its main focus the intermunicipal model. Based on the paradigm of ARES-JCP, it was demonstrated that the creation of a regulatory agency, specifically for public sanitation services, shown as the ideal model for the metropolitan region of Ribeirao Preto. Therefore, any individual alternative to the requires fitness for law No. 11.445/2007 shown mismatch with the principles and guidelines laid down by the Statute of the metropolis in particular with regard to the prevalence of common interest on the location and the need for shared management of public functions – cooperative federalism. / Mestre

L’ouverture à la concurrence des marchés de l’électricité et du gaz peine à aboutir aux effets escomptés. Si les directives issues du troisième « paquet » ont été en grande partie transposées au sein des États membres, les obstacles à la réalisation effective d’une Europe de l’énergie demeurent nombreux. Dans ce contexte nébuleux, une surveillance aux yeux d’Argus a émergé. En effet, comme pour forcer le processus de libéralisation, les autorités de concurrence et les autorités de régulation sectorielle redoublent d’efforts pour achever rapidement le marché intérieur de l’énergie, quitte à aller parfois, semble-t-il, à contre-courant de leur mission originelle. D’un côté, les autorités de concurrence semblent de plus en plus enclines à se comporter en « constructeurs » des marchés de l’énergie, agissant davantage sur la structure de ces derniers que sur les comportements dommageables. À l’inverse, les autorités de régulation sectorielle, dont les pouvoirs ne cessent d’être renforcés, sont de plus en plus incitées à détecter les entraves à la concurrence et à les sanctionner. De ce contrôle bicéphale résulte une confusion des rôles qui n’est pas totalement atténuée par la mise en place des « passerelles » entre les deux types de régulateurs. Au demeurant, face à cet enchevêtrement de compétences, les opérateurs évoluent sur des marchés peu propices au jeu de la concurrence et dans un cadre réglementaire aussi complexe qu’instable, sclérosant les investissements nécessaires pour dynamiser ces marchés. Toutefois, le système mis en place, que beaucoup aimeraient voir clarifié, peut être amélioré. Alors qu’une partie de la doctrine appelle à la fusion des autorités, hypothèse pourtant peu réaliste, la voie du réaménagement du cadre de surveillance, basée sur un renforcement de l’interrégulation, mais également sur l’établissement d’une véritable régulation européenne, ne semble pas avoir été suffisamment explorée. / The opening to competition of the markets in gas and electricity has hardly produced the desired impact. To a large extent, the directives flowing from the third package have been transposed amongst the Member States. However, the effective implementation of a European energy is still facing several challenges ahead. With this nebulous background, supervision has become all-seeing, Argus-like. In fact, while competitions authorities and sectoral regulators are significantly stepping up theirs efforts so as to push forward the liberalization process towards the swift completion of the internal energy market, they seem, at times, to work against the grain of their original assignment. On the one hand, competition authorities appear to be increasingly willing to act as « builders » for the energy markets as they tackle market structures rather than harmful behaviours. Conversely, sectoral regulators, with their ever-strengthening powers, are more and more incited to track down and take sanctions against barriers to competition. Such bicephalous management has resulted in a confusion of roles which has not been alleviated by the « bridges »built between both types of regulators. At any rate, in the face of such a tangled web of competences, operators find themselves in markets that are not very conducive to competition and in a regulatory framework which is both volatile and complex, thereby paralysing the investments required to render such markets more dynamic. The system as it stands may still be improved and many would like to see it clarified. Although the prospect is not very realistic, some commentators have called for the merger of authorities. It appears nonetheless that reworking the supervision framework with a view to strengthening inter-regulation but also implementing actual European regulations is a route that has not yet been sufficiently explored.