V této práci je vytvořen model rozhodovací situace v odpadovém hospodářství využívající metody teorie her. Model tvoří nekooperativní hra pro reprezentaci konfliktu zpracovatelů odpadu a kooperativní hra pro reprezentaci konfliktu producentů odpadu. Pro konflikt zpracovatelů odpadu je k nalezení strategií při volbě cen na bráně využit koncept Nashovy rovnováhy, takto nalezené stabilní strategie mohou sloužit jako předpověď budoucí situace. Pro zpřesnění množin strategií jsou určeny dolní a horní meze. Pro konflikt producentů odpadu se uvažuje spolupráce všech producentů a určuje se pro ni přerozdělení nákladů pomocí Shapleyho hodnoty a nucleolu. Pro konflikt více producentů jsou vyvinuty aproximační algoritmy pro Shapleyho hodnotu i nucleolus. Tyto algoritmy jsou založeny na předpokladu, že se vzdálení hráči vzájemně neovlivňují. Model je aplikován na situaci v České republice. Pro konflikt zpracovatelů odpadu je nalezen jeden bod Nashovy rovnováhy. Pro konflikt producentů odpadu jsou určeni někteří producenti s vysokým kooperativním potenciálem.

La coopération entre les réseaux de diffusion classiques et les réseaux mobiles cellulaires pour une distribution commune de la télévision mobile est actuellement l'un des éléments clé discutés dans le cadre des nouvelles technologies de diffusion mobile; surtout l'extension mobile de la deuxième génération de diffusion de la télévision numérique terrestre (DVB-T2 Lite) et son suiveur le DVB-Next Generation Handheld (DVB-NGH).En fait, ces technologies de diffusion visent à coopérer avec la récente technologie de téléphonie mobile, connue sous le nom de Long Term Evolution (LTE) qui permet la diffusion de la TV Mobile grâce au protocole de diffusion des services multimédia dans les réseaux de téléphonie mobile (de nature unicast à priori) et connu sous le nom de enhanced-Multimedia Broadcast and Multicast Service feature (e-MBMS).Bien que la coopération entre les réseaux de diffusion DVB et ceux de téléphonie mobile n'est pas un nouveau sujet et a été étudiée avec l'introduction de la technologie de diffusion mobile précédente, connue sous le nom DVB-Handheld (DVB-H), la plupart des travaux traitants ce sujet ont considéré un scénario avec une zone de couverture commune entre le réseau de diffusion et celui cellulaire et ont évalué cette coopération en terme des gains de capacité apportés par DVB au réseau cellulaire et en terme d'amélioration de la fiabilité de transmission apportée par les réseaux cellulaire au DVB grâce à la possibilité des retransmissions unicast. / The broadcast/cellular cooperation for a common delivery of Mobile TV is at the heart of the emerging mobile broadcast technologies, namely the mobile extension of the second generation digital video broadcasting for terrestrial reception (DVB-T2 Lite) and its follower DVB-Next Generation Handheld (DVB-NGH). These broadcast technologies aim to cooperate with the Long Term Evolution (LTE), as the latter is intended to be the bearer of Mobile TV thanks to its enhanced-Multimedia Broadcast and Multicast Service feature (e-MBMS). Even though the 3GPP/DVB cooperation is not a new topic and was investigated with the introduction of the previous DVB technology, known as DVB-Handheld (DVB-H), most of the works addressing this issue considered a common service area covered by both DVB and cellular systems and focused solely on the impact of such cooperation in terms of capacity gains brought by 3GPP and error repair gains brought by DVB. This strategy was judged to be expensive since a new and very dense DVB network was needed. In order to overcome this problem and decrease as much as possible the need for a new broadcast network, we propose in this thesis a hybrid DVB/LTE network with a coverage extension strategy, where the LTE system, planned for almost a universal coverage, is used to deliver Mobile TV in areas not covered by recent DVB-T2 Lite (or eventually DVB-NGH) network. In this context, we explore two main issues:1. Mobile TV services have to share LTE resources with other higher priority services such as voice traffic. The dynamicity of the latter will impact the Quality of Service (QoS) of Mobile TV. We propose a new QoS-based planning for the hybrid DVB/LTE so as to guarantee an acceptable watching experience without over-dimensioning the LTE system. We derive using Markov chain analysis and hitting time theory, several QoS metrics pertaining to mobile TV performance, such as interruption frequency and duration.2. A new business model which clarifies the relationships between the different actors of the ecosystem namely DVB and LTE operators as well as the TV channel providers and constructs the service area from an economic point of view is needed. In fact, the absence of a clear and viable economic model that resolves the monetary conflicts between cellular and broadcast operators was one of the main drawbacks behind the failure of the first attempt of mobile TV delivery by cooperating UMTS/DVB-H. We develop in this thesis a profit sharing strategy for the cooperative network, using coalition game concept Shapley value and Nash equilibrium for a self-enforcing strategy. We further develop a new framework using real option theory coupled with coalition games for investment decision in mobile TV networks (whether an operator should enter the mobile TV market and, if yes, when to do so) and show how operators can incorporate the uncertainties related to demand and network operation costs. We propose a bi-level dynamic programming algorithm to solve numerically the developed real option game.

In the past few years, Artificial Intelligence (AI) has evolved into a powerful tool applied in multi-disciplinary fields to resolve sophisticated problems. As AI becomes more powerful and ubiquitous, oftentimes the AI methods also become opaque, which might lead to trust issues for the users of the AI systems as well as fail to meet the legal requirements of AI transparency. In this report, the possibility of making a credit-card fraud detection support system explainable to users is investigated through a quantitative survey. A publicly available credit card dataset was used. Deep Learning and Random Forest were the two Machine Learning (ML) methodsimplemented and applied on the credit card fraud dataset, and the performance of their results was evaluated in terms of their accuracy, recall, sufficiency, and F1 score. After that, two explainable AI (XAI) methods - SHAP (Shapley Additive Explanations) and LIME (Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations) were implemented and applied to the results obtained from these two ML methods. Finally, the XAI results were evaluated through a quantitative survey. The results from the survey revealed that the XAI explanations can slightly increase the users' impression of the system's ability to reason and LIME had a slight advantage over SHAP in terms of explainability. Further investigation of visualizing data pre-processing and the training process is suggested to offer deep explanations for users.

As multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) continues to evolve and find applications in complex real-world systems, the imperative for explainability in these systems becomes increasingly critical. Central to enhancing this explainability is tackling the credit assignment problem, a key challenge in MARL that involves quantifying the individual contributions of agents toward a common goal. In addressing this challenge, this thesis introduces and explores the application of Local and Global Shapley Values (LSV and GSV) within MARL contexts. These novel adaptations of the traditional Shapley value from cooperative game theory are investigated particularly in the context of optimizing remote electrical tilt in telecommunications antennas. Using both predator-prey and remote electrical tilt environments, the study delves into local and global explanations, examining how the Shapley value can illuminate changes in agent contributions over time and across different states, as well as aggregate these insights over multiple episodes. The research findings demonstrate that the use of Shapley values enhances the understanding of individual agent behaviors, offers insights into policy suboptimalities and environmental nuances, and aids in identifying agent redundancies—a feature with potential applications in energy savings in real-world systems. Altogether, this thesis highlights the considerable potential of employing the Shapley value as a tool in explainable MARL. / I takt med utvecklingen och tillämpningen av multi-agent förstärkningsinlärning (MARL) i komplexa verkliga system, blir behovet av förklarbarhet i dessa system allt mer väsentligt. För att förbättra denna förklarbarhet är det viktigt att lösa problemet med belöningstilldelning, en nyckelutmaning i MARL som innefattar att kvantifiera de enskilda bidragen från agenter mot ett gemensamt mål. I denna uppsats introduceras och utforskas tillämpningen av lokala och globala Shapley-värden (LSV och GSV) inom MARL-sammanhang. Dessa nya anpassningar av det traditionella Shapley-värdet från samarbetsbaserad spelteori undersöks särskilt i sammanhanget av att optimera fjärrstyrda elektriska lutningar i telekommunikationsantenner. Genom att använda både rovdjur-byte och fjärrstyrda elektriska lutningsmiljöer fördjupar studien sig i lokala och globala förklaringar, och undersöker hur Shapley-värdet kan belysa förändringar i agenters bidrag över tid och över olika tillstånd, samt sammanfatta dessa insikter över flera episoder. Resultaten visar att användningen av Shapley-värden förbättrar förståelsen för individuella agentbeteenden, erbjuder insikter i policybrister och miljönyanser, och hjälper till att identifiera agentredundanser – en egenskap med potentiella tillämpningar för energibesparingar i verkliga system. Sammanfattningsvis belyser denna uppsats den betydande potentialen av att använda Shapley-värdet som ett verktyg i förklaringsbar MARL.

With increasing demand for social network based activities, it is very important to understand not only the structural properties of social networks but also how social networks form, to better exploit their promise and potential. We believe the existing methods and tools for social network analysis have a major inadequacy: they do not capture the behavior (such as rationality and intelligence) of individuals nor do they model the strategic interactions that occur among these individuals. Game theory is a natural tool to overcome this inadequacy since it provides rigorous mathematical models of strategic interaction among autonomous, intelligent, and rational agents. This thesis brings out how a game theoretic approach helps analyze social networks better. In particular, we study three contemporary and pertinent problems in social networks using a game theoretic approach: determining influential individuals for viral marketing, community detection, and social network formation. The first problem deals with determining influential nodes in social networks for diffusion of information. We present an efficient heuristic algorithm (SPIN) to this problem based on cooperative game theoretic techniques. The running time of SPIN is independent of the number of influential nodes to be determined. Moreover, unlike the popular benchmark algorithms, the proposed method works well with both submodular and non-submodular objective functions for diffusion of information. In the second problem, we design a novel game theoretic approach to partition a given undirected, unweighted graph into dense subgraphs (or communities). The approach is based on determining a Nash stable partition which is a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of an appropriately defined strategic form game. In the proposed graph partitioning game, the nodes of the graph are the players and the strategy of a node is to decide to which community it ought to belong. The utility of each node is defined to depend entirely on the node’s local neighborhood. A Nash stable partition (NSP) of this game is a partition consisting of communities such that no node has incentive to defect from its community to any other community. Given any graph, we prove that an NSP always exists and we also derive a lower bound on the fraction of intra-community edges in any NSP. Our approach leads to an efficient heuristic algorithm to detect communities in social networks with the additional feature of automatically determining the number of communities. The focus of the third problem is to understand the patterns behind the evolution of social networks that helps in predicting the likely topologies of social networks. The topology of social networks plays a crucial role in determining the outcomes in several social and economic situations such as trading networks, recommendation networks. We approach the problem of topology prediction in networks by defining a game theoretic model, which we call value function -allocation rule model, that considers four determinants of network formation. This model uses techniques from both cooperative game theory and non-cooperative game theory. We characterize the topologies of networks that are in equilibrium and/or socially efficient. Finally, we study the tradeoffs between equilibrium networks and efficient networks.

In this thesis a known heuristic for decreasing a node's centrality scores while maintaining influence, called ROAM, is compared to a modified version specifically designed to decrease eigenvector centrality. The performances of these heuristics are also tested against the Shapley values of a cooperative game played over the considered network, where the game is such that influential nodes receive higher Shapley values. The modified heuristic performed at least as good as the original ROAM, and in some instances even better (especially when the terrorist network behind the World Trade Center attacks was considered). Both heuristics increased the influence score for a given targeted node when applied consecutively on the WTC network, and consequently the Shapley values increased as well. Therefore the Shapley value of the game considered in this thesis seems to be well suited for discovering individuals that are assumed to actively trying to evade social network analysis.

Articial intelligence has had a large impact on many industries and transformed some domains quite radically. There is tremendous potential in applying AI to the eld of medical diagnostics. A major issue with applying these techniques to some domains is an inability for AI models to provide an explanation or justication for their predictions. This creates a problem wherein a user may not trust an AI prediction, or there are legal requirements for justifying decisions that are not met. This thesis overviews how two explainable AI techniques (Shapley Additive Explanations and Local Interpretable Model-Agnostic Explanations) can establish a degree of trust for the user in the medical diagnostics eld. These techniques are evaluated through a user study. User study results suggest that supplementing classications or predictions with a post-hoc visualization increases interpretability by a small margin. Further investigation and research utilizing a user study surveyor interview is suggested to increase interpretability and explainability of machine learning results.

[pt] A consideração dos custos de transmissão associados a cada projeto é fundamental para que as comparações econômicas dos custos totais de geração entre tecnologia sejam realizadas corretamente. Os custos de transmissão tendem a ser elevados para usinas distantes dos centros de carga; ou reduzidos para usinas próximas dos centros de carga. O custo de transmissão de cada agente é calculado a partir de uma tarifa, cujo valor depende do ponto de conexão e deveria refletir o sinal locacional da parcela da rede efetivamente utilizada. As metodologias existentes têm limitações que atenuam consideravelmente o sinal locacional, e, consequentemente, necessitam de fatores de ajuste conhecidos como selo, que podem ser bastante significativos quando comparados com a parcela locacional. Uma limitação importante das metodologias existentes é não considerar múltiplos cenários de despacho, sobretudo em países com forte presença de hidrelétricas, podendo influenciar bastante a alocação e criar um problema de recuperação de custos. Outro tema abordado é o cálculo da tarifa de transmissão diferenciada por patamar de carga, cujo benefício é possibilitar que os consumidores respondam ao sinal econômico da tarifa de transmissão, aumentando a eficiência econômica. Esta dissertação apresenta uma nova metodologia com base no esquema Aumann Shapley (AS) que incorpora o tema dos múltiplos cenários de despacho e cálculo da tarifa de transmissão diferenciada por patamar de carga. Para ilustrar a aplicação da metodologia proposta foi utilizado um sistema teste de 3 barras e o sistema elétrico da Bolívia. A metodologia proposta é comparada com as seguintes metodologias: (i) Participações Médias; (ii) Metodologia Nodal ou Custo Marginal de Longo Prazo (CMLP); e (iii) AS Original. Os resultados mostraram que a utilização da metodologia proposta melhorou significativamente o sinal locacional, reduzindo a necessidade complementação com a parcela selo da tarifa de transmissão. / [en] The consideration of transmission costs is essential for an isonomic economic valuation of generation projects due to the competition among different sources. The transmission costs tend to be greater for power plants located far from the load centers than for those that are closer. The transmission cost of each agent is calculated through a tariff, whose value depends on the point of connection and might reflect a locational signal of the transmission network s portion effectively used. The existing methodologies have limitations that greatly hinders the locational signal, therefore, is required a complementary charge known as postage stamp that can be quite significant when compared with the locational portion. The existing methodologies do not consider the multiple dispatch scenarios for allocation of the transmission costs, which is a very important issue and can greatly influence the allocation and create a cost recovery problem, especially in countries with a strong presence of hydroelectric plants. Another important issue to be considered in methodologies for allocation of transmission costs is the calculation of the transmission tariff varying in accordance with the load blocks, whose benefit is enable the consumers to respond to the transmission tariff s economic signal, increasing economic efficiency. This thesis presents a new methodology based on the AS scheme that incorporates the multiple dispatch scenarios and provides the calculation of the transmission tariff per load block. To illustrate the application of the proposed methodology, it was used a 3 bus test system and the Bolivian power system. The proposed methodology is compared with the following methods: (i) Average Participation Factors (APF); (ii) Long Run Marginal Cost (LRMC) and (iii) Original AS. The results showed that the use of the proposed methodology significantly improved the locational signal, reducing the need of the postage stamp portion of the transmission tariff.

This dissertation consists of three papers. In the first paper, I study firms' capital raising decisions in a two-stage signaling game. In the model, firms can issue debt or equity to finance sequentially arriving investment projects. Management is assumed to have an initial information advantage over investors. However, when a firm's decision in the first stage can change investors' beliefs and, consequently, impact the security issuance in the second stage, its optimal choice differs significantly from the strict debt-equity preference in a comparable one-stage model. In equilibrium, a dynamic pecking order arises, suggesting that the information friction can solely explain various aspects of observed corporate financing behavior. The second paper is coauthored with Hans Haller. In this paper, we model how different wealth constraints among investors affect an entrepreneur's way of raising capital, his share of project NPV, and his ownership of the new firm. Combining cooperative and noncooperative approaches, we develop and analyze a bargaining framework and demonstrate cases in which a fair division cannot be achieved when sharing of cost and sharing of return are jointly considered. Our results cover conditions on how the entrepreneur can strategically achieve larger net wealth accumulation, and when he can obtain control of the firm. We further discuss the entrepreneur's preferences on the firm's ownership dispersion level under public financing. The third paper argues that although innovation is costlier than imitation, the incumbent firm is endowed with an advantage of enhancing its product ahead of potential competitors. In a model that connects consumers' utility with firms' production, I show that the incumbent's product enhancement decision can foster the creation of a better product, improve consumers' utility, and deter entrance from competitors. The pace of creative activities is determined by the incumbent's potential of improving its product quality and the nature of product differentiation in the industry. Thus, creative destruction may not manifest itself as new firms replacing the incumbent, but as the incumbent constantly renovating its product. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation consists of three papers. In the first paper I study the adverse selection problem faced by firms in a dynamic information environment, the difference between incentives provided by debt and equity securities, and how different contracts and model settings affect the equilibrium outcome, investment efficiency, and social welfare. The premise of the first paper is that dynamic elements of information asymmetry are key to better understanding how firms raise capital. This study aims to provide a more complete description and improve our understanding of the role of information in capital markets and how asymmetric information might interact with other market frictions. In the second paper I study the origin of the firm and the bargaining problem between entrepreneurs and investors. This second paper intends to provide one possible answer for the question why firms do exist. The main point in the paper is that even when we abstract away from standard frictions like adverse selection or moral hazard, an entrepreneur still has to bargain with investors to raise the required amount of capital. The firm has to be established to enforce the bargaining outcome, which takes the form of an ownership contract, because there is a time gap between conducting the investment and when the proceed can be realized. Another purpose of this second study is to investigate fairness instead of efficiency. Finally, in the third paper, I address the question how and when an incumbent monopolist can deter entry by means of investment in product quality enhancement. In some industries, creative destruction can be frequently observed: Incumbent firms are replaced by new firms that offer slightly different but better products. On the other hand, in a number of industries incumbent firms are at the forefront of innovation and stay ahead of potential entrants. I consider a model that allows for the latter fact combined with another frequent fact: that potential entrants more or less copy the incumbent's prior product, regardless of existence and enforcement of intellectual property rights. This third paper offers predictions on product innovation and market failure across firms and industries.

International cooperation and foreign investment issues are two important components of an international economy. The various aspects of research related to such international cooperation and foreign investment decisions are fraught with various complex factors. In this thesis, we consider two specific issues in the arena of international technological cooperation and foreign investments, by using established Operations Research techniques of game theory and multiple criteria decision making. We first analyze regional technological cooperation mechanisms using classical game theory. A concept of regional technological cooperation is developed based on a cooperative game theoretic model, in which a plan of payoff distributions induces an agreement that is acceptable to each participant. Under certain conditions, the underlying game is shown to be convex, and hence to have a nonempty core with the Shapley value allocations belonging to the core. A compensation scheme is devised based on the Shapley value allocations, whereby participants who enjoy a greater payoff with respect to the technological cooperation compensate the participants who receive a relatively lesser payoff via cooperation. In this manner, regional technological cooperation can bring overall benefits to all the involved players in the game. Some insightful examples are provided to illustrate the methodological concept. Next, we discuss a model for analyzing foreign direct investment opportunities and for evaluating related projects based on the International Investment Attracting Force Theory and the technology of fuzzy evaluation. This model is applied to assess the industrial investment projects that were proposed in the â â 95 China's Tumen River Area International Investment and Business Forumâ funded by the United Nations Industrial Development Organization. Accordingly, the projects are classified into groups based on their potential to attract foreign investors. Furthermore, we simulate the actual forming process whereby projects are sequenced and selected for funding by foreign investors based on a sequential update of their effect on the local economy. The results provide a scientific basis for formulating related decisions and policy recommendations regarding the various proposed projects. / Master of Science