This dissertation deals with the evolution of national identification and the rise of nationalism in the Soviet Union. The result was the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the establishment of 15 new successor states in 1991. This dissertation begins with some reflections on the theories of nationalism and Sovietology, and an account of the national components of the Russian Empire before October Revolution in 1917. The collapse of the Russian Empire and its eventual restoration under Bolshevik¡¦s rule in the form of the Soviet Union are examined. Having recaptured most of the territory of the Empire they inherited, the Communist rulers were forced to face the complicated task of ethnic issues. I examine the interactionary between Marxist¡¦s theories on the management of ethnic and national problems and the reality the rulers had to face. It was the decentralizing economic reform of 1957, which adopted the territorial principle and led to pro-nationalist localism. In the absence of market, this affected the system¡¦s cohesion and the maintenance of central power. In Brezhnev¡¦s era, a compromise was made with indigenous elites. They were able to consolidate their control and put down roots in the process of modernization. Thus, corruption, the ¡¥shadow economy¡¦, and ¡¥national interests¡¦ arose as indigenous elites modifying the impact of the recentralized system. Gorbachev¡¦s reforms included three things: Marketization led to the collapse of the command economy; glasnost eliminated the privileged position of Marxism-Leninism within a few years and the rewriting of Soviet history destroyed the legitimacy of Stalin and the institution he built; democratization undermined all forms of authority, especially that of the political center. Gorbachev¡¦s reforms caused grievance and resentments break out. Many decades of communist rule had destroyed civil society in the multinational state implied that the cooperation was most likely to be achieved by means of nation solidarity. Nationalist identity then became the principal vehicle of political mobilization. In conclusion, this author proposes a developmental model of nationalism in Soviet years. The role of nationalism was a precondition for the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which changed the direction of political agenda. The rise of Soviet nationalism could be characterized as a top-down case. They were constantly being shaped and constructed by the state-initiated transformation. This dissertation has demonstrated that nation identifications were deeply embedded in those nations¡¦ understanding of their past, and their growth by and large were the results of Moscow¡¦s policies.

Henry Kissinger has often been depicted as a disciple of Continental realism, and a rarity among American Cold War diplomats. According to this interpretation, Kissinger did not concern himself with domestic politics, public opinion, and economic issues in his diplomacy toward the Soviet Union, and was focused solely on primary high-policy issues such as ending the Vietnam War. However, his later actions as National Security Advisor and Secretary of State under Presidents Nixon and Ford were decidedly inconsistent with Continental realism. This thesis argues that Kissinger gradually incorporated economic issues as part of his ―diplomatic arsenal,‖ in which the context of East-West trade facilitated a transition away from Continental realism toward a ―naturalized‖ realism inclusive of more traditional American foreign policy elements. These elements include economic issues, domestic politics, and the relationship between the statesman and the American public. / Dr. Werner Lippert Dr. Sharon Franklin-Rahkonen Dr. Steven Schroeder Dr. Thomas Alan Schwartz

Proefschrift--Utrecht. / "Stellingen" ([2] p.) inserted. Bibliography: p. 241-244.

Thesis (B.A.)--Haverford College, Dept. of History, 2003. / Includes bibliographical references.

Thesis (M.A.)--Kutztown State College. / Source: Masters Abstracts International, Volume: 45-06, page: 2925. Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves [284]-291).

Recent literature on gender and migration demonstrates that gender plays an important role in human mobility. Men and women hold different positions in households and communities, and gender norms both shape migration decisions and are shaped by the migration process. The literature on gender aspects of migration has remained largely separate from the literature that identifies socioeconomic conditions and human capital characteristics that predict migration, leaving open questions of how gender norms and gender ideology in origin countries might interact with socioeconomic conditions to shape migration patterns. I seek to integrate these two areas, clarifying the ways in which performances of gender can influence migration and destination decisions, and providing a better understanding of which contexts are more conducive to men’s migration and which to women’s. My dissertation incorporates both semi-structured interviews and nationally representative survey data. The mixed methods approach is valuable because the interviews allow for a more detailed analysis of gender norms than would be possible with survey data, while the survey data allow for a systematic comparison of migrants and non-migrants and help to contextualize and generalize the findings from the interviews. I use survey data to test associations between human capital, socioeconomic status, family status, patriarchal gender ideology, and migration. As migration theories predict, measures of human capital and relative deprivation are strongly associated with men’s migration. For women, socioeconomic status and human capital matter, but family status is also strongly associated with migration. Patriarchal gender ideology is positively associated with men’s migration, and negatively with women’s. Survey data also show strong gender and demographic differences in destination patterns among Georgian migrants. Qualitative data complement and expand these findings. Migrants’ narratives show that women’s ability to migrate is limited by their primary responsibility for care giving and domestic work. In more strongly traditional, male-headed households, women’s migration may be further constrained by unwillingness of male relatives to allow women to migrate. On the other hand, the growing popularity of Turkey, Greece, and other European destinations encourages women’s migration, as many Georgians believe that the labor markets in these countries are more open to female migrants. / text

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This thesis describes the establishment of the Commissariat of Education (Narkompros), the formation of its policies and their implementation. The study has two purposes. The first is to present an institutional history of the formation of a Soviet commissariat. The second is to examine the policies and organizational approaches of Narkompros towards education and the arts, as a major factor i# the establishment of relations between the Soviet government and the Russian intelligentsia. The original materials on which the thesis is based are the Narkompros files of the Central State Archives (TSGAOR and TSGA RSPSR) in Moscow. These consist largely of minutes and protocols of the collegium of Narkompros and some of its subordinate departments. Prom these materials, it is possible to reconstruct both the internal workings of Narkompros - its .organizational complexity and confusion, its financial difficulties, the relations between its members - and, to a considerable extent, its relations with other government and Party institutions. One of the problems interesting the author is the relationship of Narkompros with its superiors (VTSIK, Sovnarkom, the Central Committee, the Politburo), and the way in which these bodies influenced its policies and activities. It appears that interference from above was slight, except in times of crisis; and that at all times the proliferation of 'higher instances' made it relatively easy to evade unwelcome instructions from any one of them. In its relations with other commissariats and Vesenkha, Narkompros engaged in a series of demarcation disputes. These were often won on paper and according to the decision of Sovnarkom, but lost in practice because of Narkompros' weak economic position and lack of political influence. None of the leaders of Narkompros - Lunacharsky, Pokrovsky, Krupskaya and later Litkens - held influential positions in the Party. Narkompros 1 greatest political asset was Lenin's support, which (except on some artistic questions) was almost always given. The interest of other Party leaders in education and Narkompros was intermittent and, as regards Narkompros, not usually benevolent. Zinoviev, Kamenev, Stalin and Preobrazhensky all, on occasion, attacked or opposed Narkompros - a relevant factor in the case of Zinoviev and Kamenev being that both had wives working in Narkompros (Lilina and Kameneva) who were at odds with the Narkompros leadership. Dzerzhinsky made one major intervention in educational affairs, when he removed a whole sphere of Narkompros activity (child welfare) to the effective control of the GPU. VTSIK, of which Lunacharsky was a member throughout this period, was normally sympathetic to Narkompros; but its support of Narkompros projects rarely yielded substantial results, because other bodies disregarded its recommendations. The same was true, although to a lesser extent, of Sovnarkom resolutions on Narkompros 1 behalf. The Central Committee of the Party considered educational questions less frequently than VTSIK or Sovnarkom, and intervened usually to chastise Narkompros. Narkompros was in name, and indeed in fact, the commissariat of enlightenment. Its educational policies were solidly "based on the most enlightened and progressive educational theories of the time. But the execution of these policies was enormously hindered by the hostility of the intelligentsia and the ignorance of the masses. They foundered in the confusion of the Civil War and economic crisis. The leaders of Narkompros believed in encouraging local, popular initiative in the organization of education. They made little attempt to create a strong centralized administration of education. For this reason, among others, few of Narkompros' educational policies were satisfactorily realized in practice. In dealing with cultural and educational institutions - the universities, the Academy of Sciences, the theatres, Proletkult - Narkompros found itself in something of a dilemma of principle. It was ready to give independence and administrative autonomy, "but only in return for some show of cooperation and sympathy with the Soviet government. The universities, though very anxious for autonomy, were overtly hostile to Narkompros and the government. The Academy of Sciences approached Narkompros courteously (although without any declarations of political loyalty), and retained a degree of autonomy which the universities were denied. Proletkult was at first allowed "both autonomy and government subsidy by Narkompros; but, in 1920, Lunacharsky was rebuked for overlooking the political dangers of Proletkult's independence. Lunacharsky was always insensitive to nuances of political relations between revolutionary socialist groups, and this brought him into conflict with Lenin on the Proletkult issue. In the sphere of literature and the arts, Narkompros - and Lunacharsky in particular - acted as intermediary between the government and the intelligentsia. It was an ungrateful task. Narkompros and Lunacharsky were frequently criticized in government and Party circles for 'softness' towards the intelligentsia. They approached the intelligentsia in a conciliatory spirit which was rarely reciprocated: the organized' intelligentsia in the universities, Union of the arts and Teachers' Union responded belligerently, -and with a certain undertone of contempt. In spite of this, Lunacharsky had some success in opening channels of communication between the arts and the government. This, rather than the organization of an 'administration' of the arts, - involving subordination to government control of persons and institutions which had been or wished to be independent of it - was his intention. His policy towards the arts was to tolerate and subsidize all groups showing a minimum of cooperation with Narkompros, and to avoid at all costs sponsoring any sort of artistic monopoly or 'official' art. This was a policy which would have appealed to the artistic left in the 1930s, but in this period it was greatly resented. The futurists and 'proletarian' artists, particularly those who were Communists or Communist sympathizers (including Mayakovsky and Meyerhold), did not want toleration but monopoly, and loudly reproached Lunacharsky for withholding it from them. Lunacharsky defended the principle of individual creative freedom; one of his opponents on the left (Kerzhentsev) suggested in reply that Communist writers and artists should be brought under 'Party discipline' in their work. In 1920-21, the leaders and policies of Narkompros suffered heavy criticism and were partially discredited. By the end of 1921, the achievements of Narkompros in the educational sphere had been largely destroyed "by the economic crisis and by the New Economic Policy, which removed the greater part of educational financing from the central budget. This double defeat of Narkompros raises the question of whether its policies and ideals were fundamentally incompatible with the general policies of the Party and the institutions of Soviet government. The thesis concludes that the economic situation contributed overwhelmingly to Narkompros' defeat; and that the educational system which Narkompros had tried to create was beyond the financial and organizational capacity of the Soviet republic to sustain. The political explanation of Narkompros' defeat is accepted in part. On the one hand, many influential members of the Party and government regarded the leaders of Narkompros with suspicion as, in Stalin's phrase, 'old literati' of the revolution. Narkompros remained civilian in outlook and permissively democratic in method, resistant to the enthusiasm for strict centralization and military discipline which had been generated by the Civil War.

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<p>In Russia today women use traditional forms of birth control at unusually high rates, whereas, conversely their use of modern contraceptives is unusually low. During the Soviet period, women&rsquo;s access to modern contraceptive methods may have been limited. However, one would postulate that after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the nature of the new reforms that developed would have lent itself to an increase in modern contraception usage on par with other countries. In Russia today there is not a lack of availability of modern contraceptives. Yet, women are still not using modern contraception at a rate that is congruent with an increase in availability. What then is influencing Russian women&rsquo;s decisions? The contraceptive acceptance of Russian women today is shaped by cultural legacies of the Soviet Union surrounding both contraceptives themselves and sex and sex education. </p>