This dissertation is composed of three papers that shed light on the stock-market participation puzzle. The first article studies different aspects of the participation of Spanish households in the stock market. I start by analyzing the determinants of stockholding in a reduced form setting, quantifying the importance of different socioeconomic variables on the decision to hold stock. This is complemented by a comparison with US stocking-holding behavior, especially that of highly sophisticated households who might be expected to participate fully in the market. The second article develops and estimates a full consumption and portfolio-choice life-cycle model to help explain the behavior uncovered in the first article. This model includes a fixed cost for participation in the stock and produces empirically sensible simulations of households' stock-holding patterns by age. It shows the powerful effect that the fixed cost has in explaining the non-participation issue. Moreover, using data from Spanish households I estimate this fixed cost. The third article, co-authored with Michael Ehrmann, breaks away from classic models and delves into the importance of considering more behavioural or psychological issues to explain this puzzle. In particular, we look at the effect of past macroeconomic experiences on the households' portfolio choice and risk-taking behaviour. We find that the average stock market return experienced by a household through its life time has a significant effect on its decision to hold stock. Moreover, disastrous events such as stock market crashes remain in people's minds and deter them from investing for a long period after the event happened.

The corporate governance is the extensive framework which applies to reach enterprise business goal in the recent years. Due to the south-eastern Asia financial crisis in 1997, it indicated the distinct defects of the enterprise system. The government and some institutions had to address the principles of the corporate governance and enhance the efficiency of the corporate governance. The essays we discuss are from the strategic corporate governance viewpoint respectively by chapters. The second chapter briefs the basic content of the corporate governance theories. The third chapter based on the theories of the stakeholder theories, we raise the selection models of the corporate governance structure from the viewpoint of the state-contingent ownership, risk taking and ethics, respectively. Due to the differences in politics, economic and cultures from countries, there would be different corporate governance structure. In the fourth chapter, based on the principal-agent theory, we analyze the principal-agent behavior between the owner and the operator under the centralized and dispersal ownership structure conditions, respectively. It gets the Nash equilibrium, which relates with the manager¡¦s rewards, the manager¡¦s punishment and the monitoring cost. The manager¡¦s motivation and rewards should combine with the granting rewards and punitive sanction. The fifth chapter is the example of outsourcing. Based on the transaction cost from the viewpoint of the enterprise core competence, it establishes the outsourcing governance model from the cost of outsourcing and the benefit of the enterprise core competence, and derives the six different outsourcing governance models from the four different conditions. Under the different conditions, it displays the dynamic viewpoint between the internal resources and core competence of the enterprise. In the sixth chapter, it takes the domestic semi-conductor industry as the example to compare the domestic development of the semiconductor industry with Korea¡¦s. There are a lot of differences in politics, economic, culture and the industrial structure between these two countries. My country takes the vertical specialization, but Korean takes the vertical integration. Moreover, TSMC and UMC cases help to elaborate the transaction cost, the development of the corporate governance, and the ownership structure. Management considers the input and the output and stresses on the efficiency of business operation. The governance starts from the ethics and accountability, emphasizes the information transparency and social responsibility, the protection of the stakeholders¡¦ interest. Therefore, the corporate has to adopt the good corporate governance structure under the framework of ethics-thinking, ensure the interest of stakeholder, and create the more business value.

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A presente dissertação versa sobre limites para a intervenção do Estado na economia sob a forma empresarial e os controles a ela aplicáveis. Além de abordar o papel do Estado como acionista de sociedades privadas e a compatibilidade dessa forma de intervenção com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, promove-se uma releitura da doutrina e jurisprudência sobre as sociedades de economia mista e sobre as empresas públicas. Estuda-se as razões que levam o Estado a intervir na economia de uma maneira geral, seja de forma direta ou indireta, a partir das teorias econômicas normativas e descritivas sobre a intervenção estatal na economia. Discorre-se sobre os fundamentos constitucionais à intervenção do Estado na economia e os possíveis motivos para a criação de empresas estatais e participação minoritária em sociedades privadas, bem como sobre os condicionamentos impostos pelo princípio da livre iniciativa à intervenção do Estado na economia, em especial à luz da jurisprudência dos Tribunais Superiores. Foram abordados, ainda, os princípios da eficiência, da livre concorrência e da proporcionalidade, que também constituem fundamentos e limites gerais à intervenção do Estado na economia, além da necessidade de autorização legal. Além de apresentarmos um breve resumo da discussão histórica sobre a criação das empresas estatais no Brasil e os motivos para a escolha de um ou outro tipo de sociedade estatal, analisa-se o regime jurídico aplicável a essas entidades, à luz dos dispositivos constitucionais e da jurisprudência sobre o tema, incluindo-se o estudo do seu regime de pessoal, de bens, tributário, licitações, contratual, responsabilidade civil e falência. Estudaremos, ainda, as formas de controle incidentes sobre essas entidades. Por fim, a dissertação também abrange o estudo da intervenção do Estado como acionista minoritário em sociedades privadas, abordando os motivos para essa participação societária, bem como a natureza dessa intervenção. Trata-se de empresas controladas pela iniciativa privada, mas que têm algum grau de participação estatal em seu capital. São muitos os motivos que podem levar o Poder Público a participar sem poder de controle em empresas privadas. A participação minoritária pode visar a permitir um maior controle do Estado sobre a empresa participada, ou mesmo a tomada de controle gradual de determinada companhia, mas também pode constituir uma forma de parceria entre a iniciativa estatal e a privada, como forma mais eficiente de fomento de atividades consideradas de interesse público ou de compartilhamento de riscos e custos envolvidos em determinada atividade explorada pelo Poder Público e pela iniciativa privada. Aborda-se a relação das sociedades meramente participadas com a Administração pública, bem como os condicionamentos constitucionais à participação minoritária estatal sem controle em sociedades privadas (proporcionalidade, eficiência, necessidade de autorização legal, realização de procedimento licitatório com vista à escolha do parceiro privado, e controle do Tribunal de Contas da União). / This dissertation discusses the limits imposed to State intervention in the economy under corporate form and the respective control enforced. Further, to approach the role played by the State as shareholder on private Companies and the compatibility of this form of intervention with the Brazilian legal order, it promotes a doctrine and jurisprudential rereading over joint capital Companies and public capital Companies. It studies the reasons for a direct or indirect State intervention in the economy, from a normative and descriptive economic perspectives. It also analyses the constitutional fundaments for the economic intervention and possible reasons for the creation of state-owned enterprises and public-private companies without state control. It also approaches the principles of free market, efficiency, competition and proportionality, that constitute fundaments and general limits for the state interventionism on the market, besides the necessity of legal authorization. After a brief introduction about the historical discussion over Brazilian state owned enterprises, it analyzes the applicable law for those entities, according to constitutional jurisprudence over this theme, including the regime of labor, goods, taxes, bidding, contracts, liability and bankruptcy. It also encompasses the study of the forms of control falls on those entities. Finally, this dissertation also reaches the State as a minority shareholder on private Companies, landing reasons for this shareholder intervention. These companies, as not being controlled by the state partner, are not included in private and public joint stock companys definition given by the Decree-law n200/67. Its about corporations controlled by the private initiative, but with some degree of state participation on their capital. There are many reasons that may take the Public Power to participate without control power in private companies. The minority participation may aim to allow a bigger control by the State over the under-taking company, or even the gradual investiture of control on determined company, but may also constitute a way of partnership between public and private initiatives, as a more efficient way of promotion of activities considered of public interest or sharing risks and costs involved in certain activity explored by the Public Power and by the private initiative. This study gives special attention to the constitutional basis and limits for this kind of State intervention on the economy, as well as the incident control over it, with emphasis on the control done by the Brazilian Superior Audit Institution.

A presente dissertação versa sobre limites para a intervenção do Estado na economia sob a forma empresarial e os controles a ela aplicáveis. Além de abordar o papel do Estado como acionista de sociedades privadas e a compatibilidade dessa forma de intervenção com o ordenamento jurídico brasileiro, promove-se uma releitura da doutrina e jurisprudência sobre as sociedades de economia mista e sobre as empresas públicas. Estuda-se as razões que levam o Estado a intervir na economia de uma maneira geral, seja de forma direta ou indireta, a partir das teorias econômicas normativas e descritivas sobre a intervenção estatal na economia. Discorre-se sobre os fundamentos constitucionais à intervenção do Estado na economia e os possíveis motivos para a criação de empresas estatais e participação minoritária em sociedades privadas, bem como sobre os condicionamentos impostos pelo princípio da livre iniciativa à intervenção do Estado na economia, em especial à luz da jurisprudência dos Tribunais Superiores. Foram abordados, ainda, os princípios da eficiência, da livre concorrência e da proporcionalidade, que também constituem fundamentos e limites gerais à intervenção do Estado na economia, além da necessidade de autorização legal. Além de apresentarmos um breve resumo da discussão histórica sobre a criação das empresas estatais no Brasil e os motivos para a escolha de um ou outro tipo de sociedade estatal, analisa-se o regime jurídico aplicável a essas entidades, à luz dos dispositivos constitucionais e da jurisprudência sobre o tema, incluindo-se o estudo do seu regime de pessoal, de bens, tributário, licitações, contratual, responsabilidade civil e falência. Estudaremos, ainda, as formas de controle incidentes sobre essas entidades. Por fim, a dissertação também abrange o estudo da intervenção do Estado como acionista minoritário em sociedades privadas, abordando os motivos para essa participação societária, bem como a natureza dessa intervenção. Trata-se de empresas controladas pela iniciativa privada, mas que têm algum grau de participação estatal em seu capital. São muitos os motivos que podem levar o Poder Público a participar sem poder de controle em empresas privadas. A participação minoritária pode visar a permitir um maior controle do Estado sobre a empresa participada, ou mesmo a tomada de controle gradual de determinada companhia, mas também pode constituir uma forma de parceria entre a iniciativa estatal e a privada, como forma mais eficiente de fomento de atividades consideradas de interesse público ou de compartilhamento de riscos e custos envolvidos em determinada atividade explorada pelo Poder Público e pela iniciativa privada. Aborda-se a relação das sociedades meramente participadas com a Administração pública, bem como os condicionamentos constitucionais à participação minoritária estatal sem controle em sociedades privadas (proporcionalidade, eficiência, necessidade de autorização legal, realização de procedimento licitatório com vista à escolha do parceiro privado, e controle do Tribunal de Contas da União). / This dissertation discusses the limits imposed to State intervention in the economy under corporate form and the respective control enforced. Further, to approach the role played by the State as shareholder on private Companies and the compatibility of this form of intervention with the Brazilian legal order, it promotes a doctrine and jurisprudential rereading over joint capital Companies and public capital Companies. It studies the reasons for a direct or indirect State intervention in the economy, from a normative and descriptive economic perspectives. It also analyses the constitutional fundaments for the economic intervention and possible reasons for the creation of state-owned enterprises and public-private companies without state control. It also approaches the principles of free market, efficiency, competition and proportionality, that constitute fundaments and general limits for the state interventionism on the market, besides the necessity of legal authorization. After a brief introduction about the historical discussion over Brazilian state owned enterprises, it analyzes the applicable law for those entities, according to constitutional jurisprudence over this theme, including the regime of labor, goods, taxes, bidding, contracts, liability and bankruptcy. It also encompasses the study of the forms of control falls on those entities. Finally, this dissertation also reaches the State as a minority shareholder on private Companies, landing reasons for this shareholder intervention. These companies, as not being controlled by the state partner, are not included in private and public joint stock companys definition given by the Decree-law n200/67. Its about corporations controlled by the private initiative, but with some degree of state participation on their capital. There are many reasons that may take the Public Power to participate without control power in private companies. The minority participation may aim to allow a bigger control by the State over the under-taking company, or even the gradual investiture of control on determined company, but may also constitute a way of partnership between public and private initiatives, as a more efficient way of promotion of activities considered of public interest or sharing risks and costs involved in certain activity explored by the Public Power and by the private initiative. This study gives special attention to the constitutional basis and limits for this kind of State intervention on the economy, as well as the incident control over it, with emphasis on the control done by the Brazilian Superior Audit Institution.