No / Analysis of strategic stability in South Asia has been predominantly viewed through the bipolar Cold War prism of US-Soviet relations and has thus been insufficiently cognisant of the specificities of nuclear dynamics in South Asia. This paper argues that security analysis in South Asia needs to give attention to the economic, political and social factors which condition the core politico-military relationship as well as to that relationship itself. It argues further that nuclear dynamics in South Asia, characterised by asymmetries, may not play out as Cold War models would predict and consequently that there is a need for an agenda for the promotion of strategic stability which reflects the distinct dynamics of nuclear rivalry in South Asia (deterrence, command and control and arms control and confidence-building measures).

Great powers have almost exclusively decided the destiny of international relations. The birth, life, and death of an order have been regulated by those actors with the largest military, strategic, economic, and other capabilities. Conceptually building upon the premises of structural realism, the thesis claims that the Chinese nuclear rise is the decisive factor for the disappearance of the incumbent international system and the consequent rise of the new one, labeled as asymmetric triangular nuclear competition. This critically affects the notion of strategic stability, adjusting its characteristics for a different strategic environment. The research has twofold relevance. First, in the academic sense, it deepens a scantly treated debate on the interconnection between the management of nuclear weapons arsenal and the overall outlook of the international system. Second, in the practical sense, the study of the behavior of great powers provides an excellent foundation for policy analysis. The aforementioned is achieved in the three stages. In the beginning, the Chinese nuclear rise is considered as a set of comprehensive reforms in terms of weapons systems, military apparatus, but also doctrines and strategic concepts. After that, the nuclear rise is put in the context of Chinese silent moves from...

The overarching goal of this study is to conduct an investigation of regional perspectives on the impact of Israel's nuclear monopoly on nuclear decisions in the Middle East. This Dissertation addresses the question as to why regional actors have taken divergent nuclear paths relative to Israel's nuclear posture. The point of departure for this inquiry is whether the 'introduction' of Israel's nuclear weapons has ever played a pivotal role in the nuclear decisions and escalation dynamics in the Middle East. In so doing, this study addresses why Israel has maintained a nuclear monopoly in the Middle East. Within this context, the nuclear decisions are analyzed while employing three specific Independent Variables, namely: conventional balance; alliance reliance; and the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons. The analysis of the Egypt and Iran cases demonstrated layers of common and divergent responses, namely in relation to their perception of conventional, nonconventional, and nuclear deterrence. The dissertation addressed how both countries perceived and reacted to the underlying principles that underpinned Israel's nuclear posture. The main findings of this dissertation serve the logic of comparison between Egypt and Iran. These findings are addressed in terms of: a) the essence of reaction whether it applies to the nuclear posture or nuclear capabilities; b) the mere existence of a nuclear decision; c) the perception of the utility of nuclear weapons in terms of deterrence, compellence, and coercion; d) the difference between the official, semi-official and unofficial rhetoric; e) the significance of the legal reaction. / Doctor of Philosophy / This dissertation addressed two comparative reactions to Israel's nuclear posture, namely Egypt's and Iran's divergent nuclear paths. In so doing, it addressed the nuclear decisions of Egypt and Iran from 1955 to 2021. This dissertation made an effort in investigating how a tacit ally, namely the Shah, perceived Israel's nuclear posture. As analyzed, the literature tends to overlook the story of Iran's reaction under the Shah. Therefore, more research is necessary to decipher the puzzle of why allies feel alarmed or concerned by a nuclear ambition of a close regional partner. An important issue that this dissertation addressed while investigating reactions to Israel's nuclear posture was the delicate issue of decoupling Israel's posture from other established nuclear powers or nuclear aspirants. Within this context, it is central that this study underscores the impacts of the Indian, and Pakistani bombs and the impact of Iraq's nuclear ambition and to make a strong and substantiated case as to why Iran's reaction addressed Israel's posture and not Iraq or India. The same analysis applies to Egypt which witnessed the emergence of another nuclear aspirant in the 1980s, namely Iraq. In the final analysis, the main findings of this dissertation support the argument that comparative regional reactions to Israel's nuclear posture help investigate and test the main assumptions that underpinned opacity. Within this context, future researchers might further analyze the trichotomy of conventional; nonconventional, and nuclear deterrence because regional actors might employ the case of monopoly for explicit or tacit bargaining that fulfills the overarching interest of guaranteeing a robust conventional force. The underlying foundation of this research is to address how regional actors perceive and react to asymmetries in power, resolve, and stake.