Ne bis in idem est bien défini dans les droits nationaux comme un principe fondamental du procès pénal selon lequel un individu ne peut pas être poursuivi deux fois pour les mêmes faits. Mais, en passant au niveau international, le principe familier se change en objet juridique non identifié. Les cours supranationales qui l'abordent en matière pénale (Cour interaméricaine des droits de l'homme, Cour européenne des droits de l'homme, Cour de justice de l'Union européenne, Cour pénale internationale) interprètent des formulations disparates de ne bis in idem à partir desquelles elles forgent leurs variantes. Si l'identité de ne bis in idem semble alors se déliter, il ne s'agit pas d'une disparition. Modelé par les discours de ces cours qui se croisent, se rencontrent ou s'ignorent, ne bis in idem se métamorphose. Au-delà des variantes il est possible d'identifier des mouvements communs dans la fabrique de ne bis in idem : la recherche de cohérences spatiale et temporelle ainsi que le besoin de répondre à la dialectique du bis et de l'idem. De plus, la métamorphose est tantôt création tantôt déconstruction. Les cours consacrent ne bis in idem autant qu'elles le malmènent en établissant de nouveaux contournements. Par exemple, elles permettent de plus en plus de rejuger pour lutter contre l'impunité après une parodie de procès. Ces mouvements contraires conduisent à interroger la nature ambivalente de ne bis in idem entre facettes garantiste et structurelle et entre règle et principe. Enfin, ne bis in idem étant un catalyseur de leurs échanges, cette étude offre une perspective unique sur le rôle des cours supranationales dans l'internationalisation de la justice pénale. / Ne bis in idem (prohibition of double jeopardy) is well defined in national legal frameworks as a fondamental principle of criminal proceedings according to which an individual cannot be prosecuted twice for the same conduct. But, when moving to the international level, the familiar principle becomes an unidentified legal object. The supranational courts that deal with it in criminal matters (Inter-American Court of Human Rights, European Court of Human Rights, Court of Justice of the European Union and International Criminal Court) interpret disparate ne bis in idem formulations from which they construct their variations. If the identity of ne bis in idem then seems to be diluting, it is not disappearing. Shaped by the discourses of these courts that cross paths, meet or ignore each other, ne bis in idem is metamorphosed. Despite the variants, it is possible to identify common movements in the making of ne bis in idem : the search for spatial and temporal coherency and the need to respond to the dialectics of bis and idem. Moreover, metamorphosis is construction as much as deconstruction. The courts enshrine ne bis in idem as much as they circumvent it by establishing new limits and bypasses. For instance, they allow more and more a second procedure to fight impunity if the first procedure constituted a sham trial. These contrary movements lead to questioning the ambivalent nature of ne bis in idem between its two facets as guarantee and structural element and between rule and principle. Finally, as ne bis in idem is a catalyst for their exchanges, this study offers a unique perspective on the role of supranational courts in the internationalization of criminal justice.

Les questions préjudicielles interrogent l’office du juge administratif qui les formule.Accessoires du procès au principal, elles pourraient être considérées comme des questions annexes etsecondaires. Cette étude de contentieux administratif, fondée sur l’analyse systématique de lajurisprudence administrative, vise à démontrer le contraire. Remarquables tant par leur variété que parleurs incidences sur le procès, les questions préjudicielles restent souvent perçues comme descomplications de procédure inutiles visant à retarder la résolution du litige. Cette étude prend le partid’expliciter comment le juge administratif au principal en vient à construire une question préjudicielle,et quel en est le fondement juridique. De ce point de vue, si les parties au litige jouent bien souvent unrôle essentiel dans le relevé d’une exception, c’est en dernière analyse, le juge au principal qui détientle pouvoir de formulation de la question. Par ailleurs, la mise en oeuvre des questions préjudicielles,traditionnellement présentée comme paralysant l’office du juge, apparaît sous un nouveau jour. Loind’immobiliser l’office du juge au principal, l’étude minutieuse du droit positif révèle les importantspouvoirs que possède encore le juge a quo dans la maîtrise du procès dont il est compétemment saisi.Enfin, la réception par le juge a quo de la décision préjudicielle correspond à un partage de lasouveraineté juridictionnelle impliquant l’édiction d’un acte juridictionnel issu d’un processus decodécision. Cette étude livre un éclairage sur le fonctionnement et la complexité d’un mécanisme icitraité sous l’angle de l’office du juge lorsqu’il se place en situation de juge a quo. Elle permetégalement d’envisager les principales problématiques juridiques relatives à la fonction juridictionnelle. / Preliminary issues challenge the role of the administrative law judge who formulates them.They are regarded as being accessory to the principle case at bar. They may even be perceived assecondary issues. This study of administrative litigation, based on a systematic analysis ofadministrative case law, aims to establish the opposite. Preliminary issues are characterized by theirdiversity as well as by their influence on the lawsuit, however, they are often perceived as useless andcumbersome procedural complications aiming to delay the resolution of the dispute. This study aimsto explicit the process by which the administrative law judge builds a preliminary issue and what is thelegal foundation of such an issue. From this angle, albeit the fact that the parties to the main disputeplay an essential role, it is the judge, who mainly retains the power to formulate the preliminary issue.This analysis challenges the traditional portrayal of preliminary issues as paralyzing the judicial“office”. To the contrary, far from immobilizing the “office of the judge”, an in depth study of positivelaw reveals the extensive powers that the judge a quo possesses with regards to the case at bar.Finally, the reception by the judge a quo of the preliminary ruling corresponds to a sharing of juridicalsovereignty implying the passing of a juridical act emanating from a process of co-decision. Thisstudy aims to shed light on the functioning and the complexity of a mechanism rarely examined fromthis angle. This study equally allows for an exploration of the main legal issues relating to the judicialfunction and the “Office” of the administrative law judge when placed in the situation of judge a quo.

La distinction du fait et du droit est une problématique centrale dansl’organisation des voies de droit. Elle exerce en effet, au-delà d’une variété de formes et designifications, une influence décisive sur l’office du juge ainsi que sur la fonction desautorités soumises à son contrôle. Pour appréhender pleinement la portée qu’elle revêt dansl’équilibre des pouvoirs établi par la Cour de justice de l’Union européenne, il est nécessairede se défaire de toute préconception de la distinction du fait et du droit (notamment auregard des pratiques observées en droit interne), afin de comprendre comment le juge del’Union européenne exerce un pouvoir de détermination à son égard, que ce soit dans lecontrôle de validité des actes juridiques ou dans les voies de recours dirigées contre desactes juridictionnels. Dans cette opération, elle reste toutefois soucieuse d’assurerl’acceptabilité de ses décisions, et prend donc en considération certaines contraintesjuridiques qui se présentent à elle dans son office. Autorité normatrice et ordonnatrice, laCour de justice en tant qu’interprète authentique utilise en réalité la distinction du fait et dudroit comme un instrument de répartition des compétences entre les différents acteursconcernés par la réalisation du droit de l’Union européenne. Elle définit ainsi, à travers ladétermination de la distinction du fait et du droit dans chacune de ses manifestations,l’habilitation que leur confère le système juridique. En ce sens, elle apparaît comme lajuridiction suprême de cet espace normatif. / The distinction between fact and law is central to the organization of remedies.It exerts, through its variety of forms and meanings, a decisive influence on the Court and onthe function of the authorities that the former reviews. In order to fully grasp its significance inthe balance of power that the European Court of Justice has established, one has to discardany preconception related to the distinction between fact and law (especially those present inmunicipal law). This in turn leads to the understanding of the manner in which the EuropeanCourt specifies the distinction, should it concern the review against legal acts or the ways ofchallenging case law. Whilst doing this, the European Court remains wary of the acceptabilityof its decisions, thus taking into account several legal constraints. As a normative authorityand as the authentic interpreter, the European Court of Justice uses the distinction betweenfact and law as a way to divide the competences of the actors concerned with theimplementation of EU law. By performing this specification, it defines the way the legalsystem entitles these actors. In this way, the European Court of Justice emerges as theSupreme Court of this normative space.

<p>Sveriges inträde i EU 1995 har lett till många förändringar i det svenska rättssystemet. Svenska domstolar har därmed fått en ny arbetssituation och nya skyldigheter. Flera förändringar har skett i svensk processrätt, och grundläggande EU-rättsliga principer som de om direkt effekt och EU-rättens företräde framför nationell rätt, har ställt de nationella domstolarna inför flera utmaningar.</p><p>Den mest grundläggande skyldigheten de svenska domstolarna har gentemot EU är förpliktelsen att inhämta förhandsavgörande från EU-domstolen. Sistainstansrätterna är skyldiga att göra detta närhelst de är osäkra på tolkningen och/eller tillämpningen av en EU-rättslig bestämmelse. Detta är en långtgående förpliktelse som endast har två undantag: det första är i de fall EU-domstolen redan dömt i ett identiskt fall (acte éclairé); det andra är då den nationella domstolen anser att den EU-rättsliga bestämmelsen är tillräckligt klar och tydligt för att den självständigt ska kunna tillämpa den (acte clair).</p><p>Dessa skyldigheter har lett till ett flertal problem för de svenska domstolarna. Sverige har fått skarp kritik från Kommissionen för sistainstansrätternas obenägenhet att inhämta förhandsavgörande.</p><p>Huruvida EU borde ta hårdare tag mot medlemsstaternas nationella domstolar eller om kriterierna för när skyldigheten att inhämta förhandsavgörande borde mjukas upp diskuteras flitigt i nuläget. Det finns företeelser som talar för en utveckling åt både det ena och det andra hållet, vilket gör detta till ett väldigt spännande ämne att studera.</p> / <p>Since Sweden joined EU in 1995 many things has changed in the Swedish legal order. This has led to several new obligations for the Swedish courts. There have been a number of changes in Swedish law of procedure, and fundamental principles of law set down by EU, like the principle of direct effect of EU law and its precedence over national law, has presented many challenges before the national courts.</p><p>The most fundamental obligation of the Swedish courts to EU is the duty to make a reference for a preliminary ruling to the European Court of Justice (ECJ). The courts of last instance are obligated to do this in any case where they are insecure of the appropriate application of EU-law. There are only two exceptions to this rule, namely when the ECJ already has ruled in an identical matter (acte éclairé) and in cases where the national court feels that the correct interpretation of the rule of law in question is obvious (acte clair).</p><p>These obligations have lead to a number of problems for the Swedish courts. The Commission has criticized Sweden because of the national courts of last instance unwillingness to request preliminary rulings.</p><p>Whether EU should toughen up and take action against the national courts disobedience or if the criteria for when an obligation to make a reference for a preliminary ruling should get more flexible is constantly discussed at this time. There are several things that speaks for both of these developments and that makes this a very interesting topic to study.</p>

L'àmbit de la Tesi doctoral descansa en l'anàlisi de l'esperit i la praxis del procés prejudicial, centrant-lo en la fase final de l'anomenat procés, els efectes de la sentència del Tribunal de Justícia i la subsegüent aplicació per les jurisdiccions nacionals en la resolució del procés intern.La primera part de la Tesi doctoral (capítols I a III) s'ha centrat en l'estudi dels efectes jurídics de les sentències prejudicials d'interpretació, analitzant els tres principals temes que es susciten, a saber, els seus efectes jurídico-processals, els seus efectes jurídico-materials i la seva dimensió temporal.En la segona part (capítols IV a VII) es va emprendre el tema des del prisma diferent de les posisions de jurisdiccions nacionals davant les sentències perjudicials, el comportament del qual, acatant o incumplint-les, corrobora o nega de manera evident el que s'ha afirmat en els tres primers capítols. / El ámbito de la Tesis doctoral descansa en el análisis del espíritu y la praxis del proceso prejudicial, centrándolo en la fase final de dicho proceso, los efectos de la sentencia del Tribunal de Justicia y su subsiguiente aplicación por las jurisdicciones nacionales en la resolución del proceso interno.La primera parte de la Tesis doctoral (capítulos I a III) se ha centrado en el estudio de los efectos jurídicos de las sentencias prejudiciales de interpretación, analizando los tres principales temas que se suscitan, a saber, sus efectos jurídico-procesales, sus efectos jurídico-materiales y su dimensión temporal.En la segunda parte (capítulos IV a VII) se abordó el tema desde el prisma diferente de las posiciones de jurisdicciones nacionales ante las sentencias prejudiciales, cuyo comportamiento, acatando o incumpliéndolas, corrobora o niega de manera evidente lo afirmado en los tres primeros capítulos. / The Doctorship Thesis lies in the analysis the spirit and the practice of the preliminary process, focusing it in the final stage of such process, the effects of the Court of Justice sentence and their subsequent enforcement by the national jurisdictions in the internal process of the resolution.The first part (chapters I to III) has been focused in the study of the legal effects of the interpretative preliminary rulings, analysing the three main subjects that are issued, i.e., their juridical procedural effects, their juridical material effects and their temporary dimension.In the second part (chapters IV to VII) the issue was laid down from the different point of view, the positions kept by the national jurisdictions, which behaviour, accepting or refusing the preliminary ruling, acknowledges or denies in a clear way what it was assessed in the first three chapters.

Magister Legum - LLM

SANTRAUKA Šiame darbe analizuojama Europos Teisingumo Teismo ir Lietuvos teismų praktika, siekiant identifikuoti prekių ženklų tapatumo ir panašumo nustatymui reikšmingus kriterijus, šių kriterijų taikymo sąlygas bei įtaką vertinant bendrą prekių ženklų įspūdį, taip pat atkreipiamas dėmesys į teorinius ir praktinius probleminius prekių ženklų tapatumo ir panašumo nustatymo klausimus ir siūlomi jų sprendimai. Pirmojoje dalyje labai koncentruotai nurodomas su prekių ženklų tapatumu ir panašumu susijęs teisinis reglamentavimas. Antrojoje dalyje atskleidžiama prekių ženklų tapatumo sąvoka bei prekių ženklų tapatumo vertinimas buvusio Pirmosios Instancijos Teismo, dabartinio Bendrojo Teismo ir ETT praktikoje, taip pat, siekiant tapatumo klausimą išnagrinėti visapusiškai, pasiremiant pavyzdžiais ir iš Vidaus rinkos harmonizavimo tarnybos praktikos. Trečioji darbo dalis skirta aptarti prekių ženklų panašumą bei išnagrinėti jam nustatyti reikšmingus kriterijus. Šioje dalyje Bendrijos ir Lietuvos teismų sprendimų analizė atlikta pagal bendriausius prekių ženklų panašumo nustatymo kriterijus: skiriamuosius ir dominuojančius elementus, vaizdinį, fonetinį bei konceptualų lyginimą. Darbo pabaigoje atskirai aptariama netradicinių prekių ženklų panašumo nustatymo specifika. / SUMMARY Establishment of Identity and Similarity of Trade Marks in the Case Law of the European Court of Justice and Lithuanian Courts This master thesis is dedicated to analyze case law of the European Court of Justice and Lithuanian courts, with the aim to identify criteria significant for establishment of identity and similarity of trade marks, conditions for application of those criteria as well as influence upon evaluation of the general impression created by trade marks. In addition, attention is drawn to theoretical and practical problem issues in establishment of identity and similarity of trade marks and suggestions on their solution are made. In the first part, a list of condensed references is made to laws pertinent to the identity and similarity of trade marks. The second part reveals the concept of identity of trade marks and judgment of identity of trade marks in the case law of the former Court of First Instance, currently the General Court, and the European Court of Justice, supplemented by additional illustrations from the practice of the OHIM, in attempt of painting the full picture of the identity issue. The third part of the thesis focuses on the discussion of the similarity of trade marks and analysis of criteria for establishment of similarity of trade marks. Herein the analysis of case law of the European Court of Justice and Lithuanian courts has been carried out based on general criteria of similarity of trade marks: distinguishing and dominating... [to full text]

Cette recherche aborde la question de l’avis consultatif de la CIJ sur la conformité au droit international de la déclaration unilatérale d’indépendance relative au Kosovo du 22 juillet 2010 et ses possibles incidences sur la question de la sécession du Québec. Plus précisément, ce mémoire traite de la migration des idées constitutionnelles au sujet des questions d’autodétermination dans les cas kosovar et québécois, en effectuant une analyse comparative des deux situations. Le présent mémoire conclut tout d’abord à un respect du droit international public par la CIJ dans son avis, le Kosovo remplissant les conditions de mise en oeuvre de la sécession remède. Néanmoins, notre recherche conduit à affirmer une impossibilité de transposition de solution du cas kosovar à la problématique québécoise, mais à une possible migration des influences, qui assouplirait la position prise ces dernières années par le Canada, notamment avec la Loi sur la clarté. / This research studies the ICJ advisory opinion on the accordance with international law of the unilateral declaration of independence in respect of Kosovo delivered on 22 July 2010 and its probable impacts on the question of Quebec’s secession. Specifically, it examines the migration of constitutional ideas concerning the right to self-determination in the cases of Kosovo and Quebec. A comparative analysis of both situations is thereby undertaken. This thesis concludes to a non-violation of general international law by the ICJ in its opinion, Kosovo being an illustration of remedial secession. Nonetheless, our research leads us to assert an impossibility of transposition of the ICJ solution about the former Serbian province to the Quebec issue. However, the case is not closed as a migration of the spirit of the advisory opinion could take place, which would soften the position adopted by Canada, especially with the Clarity Act.

No description available.

At the United Nations Conference on International Organization in April 1945 South Africa affirmed the principle of respect for human rights in a Preamble it proposed for inclusion in the Charter of the United Nations. The proposal was approved and the Preamble was accorded binding force. While South Africa participated in the earliest attempts of the United Nations to draft a bill of rights, it abstained on the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights because its municipal legislation was incompatible with some articles. Similarly, South Africa did not become a party to the international human rights instruments the declaration inspired, and avoided an active role in their elaboration. Subsidiary organs of the General Assembly undertook several studies on discrimination in the field of human rights. They provided evidence that racial discrimination in South Africa intensified after the National Party came to power in May 1948 on the platform of apartheid and diverged from global trends in humanitarian law. The gap between the Union and the United Nations widened. At the first General Assembly in 1946, India successfully asked that the treatment of persons of Indian origin in South Africa be inscribed on the agenda. The Indian question was later subsumed in the charge that South Africa's racial policies violated the Charter and in 1952 the General Assembly began to discuss apartheid. South Africa protested that these actions contravened Charter Article 2(7), which prohibited intervention in matters of domestic jurisdiction, and were ultra vires. Criticism of the Union increased in intensity, until in 1960 it culminated in calls for economic and diplomatic sanctions. Research shows that South Africa was the main architect of its growing isolation, since it refused to modify domestic policies that alienated even its potential allies. Moreover, it maintained a low profile in United Nations debates on human rights issues, abstaining on all substantive clauses in the two draft covenants on human rights. These actions were interpreted as lack of interest in global humanitarian affairs. South Africa had little influence on the development of customary international law in the field of human rights but was a catalyst in the evolution of international machinery to protect them. / Jurisprudence / (LL.D)