The purpose of this thesis is to evaluate the level of economic and trade cooperation between the EU and Azerbaijan starting from the beginning of its formation. I have used SWOT analysis tool to show different aspects which influence current level and further possibilities for cooperation. The study finds that, the EU is presently a major investor and trade partner of Azerbaijan. Up to latest time, the main factor of cooperation was the country's energy resources. However, later Azerbaijan has enlarged its participation by enrollment in the EU Eastern Partnership agreement and European Neighborhood Policy (ENP) and is currently closely working with the EU in a number of areas. Azerbaijan is seeking for the membership in the WTO which can potentially facilitate trade flows between the two parties and bring the country closer to the European market.

The diploma thesis on the subject: "WTO positions to deal with the international financial and economic crisis" makes an attempt to get a complex view of the role of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in relation to the recent and so far not totally overcome world economic crisis. The point of departure of the dissertation is a brief analysis of the main functions of the WTO in the context of its history including the ongoing negotiations of the so called Doha Development Agenda (DDA). The dissertation analyses further the main causes of the recent crisis and compares it with the Great Depression of the thirties in the XX century. Special attention is thereat given to the role of the international trade and the impact of both crises on it. It states that in both cases the trade was not a cause of the crisis but rather its victim. The differences are seen in the fact that in this crisis the states in principle managed to resist protectionist tendencies. This was also thanks to the role of the WTO and its effect, through its monitoring mechanism as well as the existence of the system of binding rules. It takes notice of different forms of today's protectionism and is warning against its development. In the conclusion the thesis indicates some of the possible directions of the next development of the WTO activities.

South Africa is a developing country. It has been an active participant in the multilateral trading system since the creation of the new democratic government in May 1994. However, the country's role in the history of the multilateral trading system before this was very different. South Africa was a founding member of the GATT in 1947. The apartheid regime positioned itself within the organisation as a developed country and behaved as such. This study examines over 800 GATT documents on the country's participation in the GATT from 1947 to 1994. These documents have not been examined or studied before in any comprehensive manner. Although there is a vast literature on the history of the GATT, much of this is written from an orthodox standpoint, especially on the role of developing countries (Bhagwati, 2002; Srinivasan, 1998; Hoekman and Kostecki, 1995; Martin and Messerlin, 2007). More recently, there has been some revisionist academic literature on the GATT (Wilkinson, 2006, 2014; Wilkinson and Scott, 2008). This empirical study contributes to the work of the revisionists. An examination of the GATT documentation raises three main questions that this study sets out to examine. First, why did Apartheid South Africa project itself as a developed country in the GATT from its formation in 1947? Second, how was South Africa able to implement its domestic protectionist and discriminatory policies and still adhere to the ideas and principles of the GATT? And third, why did the major players in the GATT reflect a tendency to deviate from the main ideas and principles of the GATT in their trade practices vis-a-vis South Africa?John Ruggie's work on ideas and multilateralism and his concept of 'embedded liberalism' to describe the post-war multilateral economic institutions, including the GATT, is utilised to analyse the above questions. This study argues that while Ruggie's work is helpful in setting out the main ideas that drove the creation of the GATT and that became the core principles of the organisation, this analytical work on the multilateral trading system is incomplete and will need to be extended by other theoretical work. The GATT documentation reveals that there was a gap between the ideals of the multilateral trading system and the practice of both South Africa and the developed countries within the organisation. While they both professed their commitment to the GATT ideas of liberalisation, non-discrimination and reciprocity, their practices often tended towards protectionism, discrimination and the exclusion of developing countries. To explain this contradictory behaviour this study has drawn on the revisionist history of the GATT. This extended analytical framework is utilised to analyse the GATT documentation on South Africa.

The East African Community (EAC) states recently adopted a policy on utilising the WTO-TRIPS flexibilities on public health. The policy spells out a number of flexibilities and the minimum standards thereof to be enacted in domestic legislation. This study critically reviews this policy. In doing this, the study notes that the EAC member states, like most developing states, have very low per capita income levels. The people are too poor to afford expensive medicines. At the same time, these countries are faced with peculiar, region-specific diseases, the so-called ‘African diseases.’ Already, these diseases have been neglected by foreign pharmaceuticals reluctant to invest in developing medicines for poor markets. There are no established pharmaceuticals in the EAC states. It is against this background that this research makes an argument against the aforementioned policy. It will be demonstrated that the policy is biased towards ensuring access to medicines through price-reduction, at the expense of patent protection. This approach is inappropriate because: first, given the absence of market incentives to invest in developing medicines for African diseases, the policy will only worsen the already bad situation since it undermines the strongest alternative incentive (patent protection); and second, such a policy will not only discourage foreign pharmaceuticals further but also suppress domestic pharmaceutical activity, which is undoubtedly necessary in view of the growing neglect of African diseases by foreign pharmaceuticals. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2014 / gm2015 / Centre for Human Rights / LLM / Unrestricted

This dissertation analyzes the obstacles against further cooperation in international economic relations. The first essay explains the gradual nature of trade liberalization. I show that existence of asymmetric information between governments provides a sufficient reason for gradualism to exist. Governments prefer starting small to reduce the cost of partner’s betrayal when there is sufficient degree of information asymmetry regarding the partner’s type. Learning about partner’s incentive structure enhances expectations, encouraging governments to increase their current level of cooperation. Specifically, the uninformed government’s subjective belief for the trading partner being good is improved as the partner acts cooperatively. This updated belief, in turn, lowers the subjective probability of future betrayal, enabling further progress in cooperation. The second essay analyzes the relationship between two countries facing two policy dilemmas in an environment with two way goods and capital flows. When issues are independent and countries are symmetric, signing separate agreements for tariffs (Free Trade Agreements-FTA) and for taxes (Tax Treaties-TT) provides the identical level of enforcement as signing a linked agreement. However, linkage can still improve the joint welfare by transferring the slack enforcement power in a case of asymmetric issues or countries. I report non-results in two cases where the policy issues are interconnected due to technological spillover effect of FDI. Moreover, I show that linking the agreements actually reduces enforcement when agreements are linked under a limited punishment rule and policy variables are strategic substitutes. The third essay investigates the welfare/enforcement consequences of linking trade and environmental agreements. In the standard literature, linking the agreements generate non-trivial results only when there is structural relation between the issues. I focus on institutional design of the linkage and show that even if environmental aspects of international trade are negligible linking the agreements might still have some interesting welfare implications under current GATT Rules. Specifically, when traded goods are substitutes in consumption, linking the environmental agreement with trade agreement under the Withdrawal of Equivalent Concession Rule (Article XXVIII) will reduce the enforcement. However, enforcement in environmental issue increases when the same rule is implemented in the absence of linkage.

The proliferation of private voluntary standards (private standards) in international food trade has precipitated a surge of inter-disciplinary discourse on the topic. Conceptual premises have been diverse, but a common thread through the discourse has been their practical impact on developing-country producers (particularly small to medium scale ones). The present paper contributes to legal analyses of private standards. It builds upon existing discourse on rules-based responses to private standards, from the conceptual premise of the rule of law. The perspective of the paper is that private standards are creating conditions wherein the rule of law in international food trade is being placed under strain. With that, the utility of the rules-based system of international food governance has begun to diminish. The viewpoint in this paper is that, from the perspective of the WTO, responses to private standards should be underlain by considerations of safeguarding the rule of law. Underscoring this is that a rule of law approach is the most ideal, in the long-term, for the WTO system and for low income Members themselves. The paper concludes that this will entail a necessarily multipronged strategy towards the challenges presented by private standards – one which incorporates rules-based responses, other interventions from within the WTO, and responses from outside of the WTO. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2012. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

At the inception of the World trade organization (WTO) in 1995, the organization's provisions for a formal dispute settlement mechanism under the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes (DSU) stood out as state of the “art”, “crown” and “jewels” of the WTO. Fifteen years later on, an assessment of the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB)’s judicial records shows that the system has indeed reduced the role of international diplomacy, while strengthening the rule of law in dispute settlement. The WTO-DSU’s independent Appellate Body, strict deadlines within which to settle disputes and binding panel recommendations certainly supersede the 1947 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) dispute settlement system. To date, 400 disputes have been lodged before the Dispute Settlement Body leading to establishment of over 140 panels and adoption of 218 panel/Appellate Body reports. However, what these statistics fail to show is the fact that the DSM is dominated by leading industrialized countries, notably the European Communities and the United States, at the expense of developing countries. The European communities and the United States in particular are said to be employing the DSU to achieve their aspirations in international trade. This arises from their retaliatory capacity to threaten weaker respondents from pursuing disputes against them among other reasons. It follows that despite of the uniqueness and widely recognized efficacy, the WTO Dispute Settlement Mechanism has largely failed to address the needs of developing/ least developed countries, especially in Africa. The system’s lack of meaningful remedies, lack of transparency and general insensitivity to the development concerns of African countries have worked to alienate African states from the dispute settlement process. The said shortcomings in the pattern and structure of the DSU have also been noted from all corners of WTO membership including the original architects of the System like India, Brazil and Australia. In light of the above, this research paper analyzes the process of dispute settlement at the WTO, with special emphasis on the nature of remedies available to parties under the DSU. The research identifies pertinent areas for reform in the DSU and the DSB as a whole. The research arrives at practical measures/alternatives that African countries could adopt in order to enhance participation in dispute settlement at the WTO. The research points out that WTO law is tailored through interpretation of covered agreements and precedents and that participation in the WTO dispute settlement system is therefore crucial to the shaping of WTO law in the long run. In the end, African countries (forming a large percentage of WTO Membership) have not made use of the dispute settlement mechanism despite their trade being affected by the protectionist trade policies of their developed counterparts. If the majority of WTO membership cannot access the DSM, then the WTO objective of enhancing security and predictability of the multilateral trading system remains fictitious. This research therefore adds to the voice of many that the amendment of the DSU is long overdue. / Dissertation (LLM)--University of Pretoria, 2010. / Centre for Human Rights / unrestricted

Les investisseurs étrangers dans les secteurs de services occupent une position particulière dans le droit économique international : ils sont couverts par des accords internationaux d'investissement ainsi que par des disciplines multilatérales sur le commerce des services. Contrairement à ce que la pratique actuelle suggère, les deux principales composantes du droit économique international, à savoir le droit commercial et le droit des investissements, fusionnent. Ils partagent non seulement des principes et des règles essentiellement équivalents, mais leurs disciplines s'appliquent également aux mêmes sujets et situations. Les accords internationaux d'investissement et les règles de l’OMC sur le commerce des services (disciplines de l'AGCS), bien que de nature très différente, présentent des principes communs qui favorisent l'investissement international dans les secteurs de services. En particulier, les deux ensembles d'accords consacrent des obligations de non-discrimination entre les investisseurs étrangers et nationaux dans les secteurs de services. Dans cette situation, les investisseurs étrangers profitent également des obligations que les deux ensembles d'instruments imposent aux États contractants. Ces instruments prévoient de solides mécanismes de règlement des différends en cas de violation de leurs obligations. Les investisseurs étrangers dans les secteurs de services peuvent donc avoir recours à deux mécanismes alternatifs de règlement des différends pour contester les mesures de leurs pays hôtes qui enfreignent les obligations internationales.L’OMC, contrairement au CIRDI, est beaucoup plus qu’un simple système de règlement des différends : l’OMC possède un élément institutionnel important qui a la capacité de fournir et d’appliquer les valeurs systémiques. Cette différence fondamentale entre le système de règlement des différends de l’OMC et d’arbitrage du CIRDI fournit une perspective analytique à travers laquelle l’étude évalue et compare la portée précise du chevauchement entre les disciplines du commerce et de l'investissement, ainsi que la capacité des parties privées à recourir à ces mécanismes de règlement des différends.Du point de vue méthodologique, deux approches sont concevables. Une analyse comparative et contextuelle : l'accent est mis sur les accords internationaux accordant la qualité pour les parties privées dans les procédures internationales de règlement des différends. L'attention est attirée sur le droit international du commerce et d'investissement, en comparant les principes, les règles et les mécanismes de règlement des différends du cadre de l'investissement international (y compris les accords qui définissent les relations d'investissement internationales) et le cadre d'investissement assez limité de l'OMC, principalement les dispositions pertinentes de l'AGCS. Une approche inductive, la jurisprudence est également pertinente. Un examen approfondi de la jurisprudence existante sur chaque sujet, afin de clarifier le sens de règles par ailleurs vagues et ambiguës et de répondre finalement à la question de savoir si les procédures de règlement des différends de l'OMC pourraient constituer une alternative valable pour le règlement des différends entre l'investisseur dans le secteur de services et l'État. / Foreign investors in services occupy a special position in international economic law: they are covered by international investment agreements as well as by multilateral disciplines on trade in services. Contrary to current practice, the two main components of international economic law, namely, trade law and investment law, merge. They share not only the principles and rules essentially equivalent, but their disciplines also apply to the same subjects and situations. International investment agreements and WTO rules on trade in services (GATS disciplines), although of a very different nature, present common principles that promote international investment in the services sector. In particular, the two sets of agreements devote obligations of non-discrimination between foreign and domestic investors in the services sector. In this situation, foreign investors also benefit from the obligations that both sets of instruments impose on the contracting States. These instruments provide for strong dispute settlement mechanisms in case of violation of their obligations. Foreign investors in the services sector can therefore use two alternative dispute settlement mechanisms to challenge the actions of their host countries that violate international obligations.The WTO, unlike ICSID, is much more than a simple dispute settlement system: the WTO has an important institutional element that has the capacity to provide and apply systemic values. This fundamental difference between the WTO dispute settlement system and ICSID arbitration provides an analytical perspective through which the study evaluates and compares the precise extent of overlap between the trade and investment disciplines, as well as the ability of private parties to use these dispute settlement mechanisms.From a methodological point of view, two approaches are conceivable. A comparative and contextual analysis: the focus is on the international agreements granting standing for private parties in international dispute settlement procedures. Attention is drawn to the International Trade and Investment Law, comparing the principles, rules and dispute settlement mechanisms of the international investment framework (including agreements that define international investment relations) and the rather limited investment framework of the WTO, mainly the relevant provisions of the GATS. An inductive approach, jurisprudence is also relevant. An extensive exploration of existing case law on each subject, in order to clarify the meaning of otherwise vague and ambiguous rules and ultimately to answer the question of whether WTO dispute settlement procedures could become a valid alternative for the settlement of disputes between the investor in service and the State.

The World Trade Organization’s agreements contain a national security exception, that allows WTO members to circumvent their international trade obligations under the organization if they find it necessary to protect their essential security interests. The exception embodies the complex and difficultly navigated line between national security and free trade. National sovereignty is a matter that is widely considered to go beyond the interests of trade, a notion from which the need of a security exception spawns, while circumvention of the WTO obligations for any other reason than honest and real intent to uphold security clearly undermines the system.  To date, two WTO panels have interpreted a subparagraph of the national security exception, namely the case where a member may adopt measures they find necessary for the protection of their essential security interests in times of war or other emergency in international relations. To satisfy the requirements under this provision, a member must adhere to the principle of good faith by articulating its essential security interest, and elucidate the link between these interests and the trade restrictive measures adopted. However, the panels failed to properly scrutinize the existence of good faith. Instead, fulfillment of these requirements was determined by how close the emergency in international relation lied to the hard core of armed conflict. In this essay, it is argued that the failure to properly review good faith leaves a legal loophole that enables abuse of the exception for purely economic reasons. Previously, the atmosphere of the trading system allowed security and economic matters to more easily be kept apart. However, recent developments of national trade policies and the rise of new economic powers have changed the balance of the geoeconomic order.  Because uncodified powers no longer efficiently suppress security disputes from entering the WTO, this essay concludes that the security exception might have to be clarified to prevent abuse. Considering the changes to the trading regime’s state of play, the main discussion held is on whether an evolutionary interpretation of the term “emergency in international relations” could help remedy the loophole in the national security exception. As the multilateral trading system is facing challenges much different from the post-war environment in which the exception was drafted, the security exception must be interpreted in a dynamic manner to ensure compliance with the intention of its drafting parties.

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