Dans cette thèse, nous proposons une modélisation de la réaction à un nudge (basé sur l'annonce de la contribution socialement optimale), dans le cadre de la régulation environnementale. Nous comparons l'efficacité de cet instrument à celle d'une taxe. Nous testons les prédictions théoriques obtenues à l'aide d'une expérience en laboratoire. Nous montrons que la réaction à notre nudge dépend de la sensibilité environnementale des sujets, contrairement à la taxe. Dans une autre expérience, nous testons la persistance des effets de ces instruments sur le long terme. Nous considérons également la mise en place d'un instrument mixte (taxe et nudge), afin de faire prendre conscience aux sujets (à l'aide du nudge) qu'ils sont taxés, car leur comportement n'est pas optimal. Dans le dernier chapitre, nous étendons l'analyse précédente en considérant des agents arrangés dans des réseaux fixes, et nous analysons les conséquences de la mise en place de notre nudge sur les équilibres de contribution. / In this thesis, we propose to mode! individuals' reaction to a nudge, based on the announcement of the socially optimal contribution. We want to compare the efficiency of this incentive, with the efficiency of a tax to improve environmental quality. We test the theoretical predictions we obtained in a laboratory experiment. We show that the reaction to our nudge depends on subjects' environmental sensitivity, contrary to the tax. ln a second experiment, we test the existence of persistent effects of these two instruments in the long term. We also consider a mix tool (tax and nudge), to raise subjects' awareness (with the nudge) that they are taxed because their behaviour is not optimal. ln the last chapter, we extend our analysis considering agents arranged in fixed networks. We analyze how the equilibria are shaped under the implementation of our nudge.

This thesis defines courts as pure public goods. It deals with the inclusion of the courts of the state powers, deals with the courts in terms of performance of the state administration. It draws attention to the problem of the system of courts, which doesn't correspond in terms of the territoral aspect with distribution of land in the Czech Republic and also connects on this research transport service courts. Then examines the issue of provision of services and satisfaction of the courts of such services.

Cette thèse contient trois essais sur la coopération, mesurée à travers les contributions dans le jeu du bien public.Dans le premier chapitre, je propose une revue de la littérature sur l’hétérogénéité dans les jeux de bienpublic linéaires. Je distingue deux types d’hétérogénéité : l’hétérogénéité en dotation et l’hétérogénéité en rendement du bien public (c’est-à-dire en MPCR). Malgré un conflit normatif exacerbé, les agents hétérogènes contribuent autant au bien public que des agents homogènes. Sont-ils en mesure d’utiliser des mécanismes pour atteindre l’efficience (une provision complète du bien public) ? Mes résultats sont nuancés. Les agents hétérogènes en dotation sont capables de "s’autogouverner" et d’atteindre l’efficiencetandis que les agents hétérogènes en MPCR ne parviennent pas parfaitement à surmonter le problème de la sous-provision du bien public.Dans le deuxième chapitre, co-écrit avec Adam Zylbersztejn, nous étudions les effets d’un risque environnemental sur la coopération. Nous appelons risque environnemental une situation dans laquelle le rendement du bien public est risqué au moment de la décision. Nous considérons, dans notre expérience, deux types de risque : un risque individuel (le MPCR est déterminé indépendamment pour chaque membre du groupe) et un risque collectif (le MPCR est le même pour chaque membre du groupe). Nous constatons que le risque n’affecte pas la coopération : les sujets ne contribuent pas différemment au bien public lorsque le MPCR est certain ou lorsqu’il est risqué.Dans le troisième chapitre, j’examine les effets d’un mécanisme fondé sur la compétition intragroupe pour financer des biens publics. Dans mon expérience, les agents sont en compétition pour obtenir un MPCR plus élevé. Le rang dans la compétition - et donc le MPCR - dépend de la façon dont la contribution d’une personne se classe au sein de son groupe. Je trouve que la compétition n’améliore la provision des biens publics que lorsqu’elle ne génère pas d’inégalités trop importantes. / This thesis contains three essays on cooperation, observed through the contributions in the Public Good Game. In the first chapter, I survey the literature on heterogeneity in linear Public Good Games. I distinguish two kinds of heterogeneity: heterogeneity in endowment and heterogeneity in return from the public good (i.e. MPCR). Despite a normative conflict exacerbated, heterogeneous agents contribute as much as homogeneous agents to the public good. Are they able to use mechanisms to reach efficiency (i.e. a full provision of the public good)? I find mixed evidence. Agents heterogeneous in endowment are able to govern themselves and to reach efficiency while agents heterogeneous in MPCR do not perfectly overcome the underprovision problem.In the second chapter, co-written with Adam Zylbersztejn, we investigate the effects of environmental risk on cooperation. We call an environmental risk a situation in which the return of the public good is risky at the time of the decision. We consider, in our experiment, two kinds of risk: an individual one (i.e. the MPCR is determined independently for each group member) and a collective one (i.e. the MPCR is the same for each group member). We find that risk does not affect cooperation: subjects do not contribute to the public good differently when the MPCR is certain or when it is risky.In the third chapter, I investigate the effects of a mechanism based on within-group competition to provide public goods. In my experimental treatments, agents compete for a higher MPCR from the public good. The rank in the competition - and therefore the MPCR - depends on how one’s contribution ranks within the group. I find that competition improves public goods provision only when it does not generate too large inequalities.

Challenges in global politics like climate change, maritime piracy and fighting highly contagious diseases concern global public goods. The related policy decisions are mostly made by teams. In contrast, economic models of global public goods typically assume a single rational decision-maker. We use a laboratory experiment to compare team decisions to decisions of individuals in a finitely repeated public good game with and without a costly punishment option. Teams of three participants coordinate on decisions either by majority or unanimity rule. We find that in absence of a punishment option teams contribute more to the public good than individuals. With a punishment option subsequently to the contribution decision team treatments exhibit a less frequent use of anti-social punishment and lower levels of social as well as anti-social punishment. Extreme preferences for punishment are eliminated by the majority decision rule. Overall, team decisions are closer to the social optimum and teams yield higher net payoffs when compared to individuals.

<p>  </p> <p>Over the past decades, adoption and use of information and communication technologies (ICT) has become an area of interest. The advancement of information and communication technologies in rural areas of developing countries offered opportunities to disseminate timely and accurate for rural development. However, the adoption and use of agricultural market information services (AMIS) remained insignificant among smallholder farmers in the rural areas of developing countries. Therefore, a sound understanding on possible factors associated with the use of mobile phone-based services in support of agricultural supply chain is necessary. This study applied an extended diffusion of innovation model (DOI). The study relied on a convenient sample of 200 smallholder farmers in Bungoma County, Kenya. Data was analyzed using descriptive and multinomial logistic regression (MLR) statistics to identify possible factors associated with the adoption and use of mobile phone-based services in Bungoma County, Kenya. The backward selection analysis confirmed that innovativeness, social influence, and compatibility were statistically significant on the use of mobile phone-based services in the study context. Overall, the results confirmed a positive relationship between the final model and the use of mobile phone-based services (M-services). Therefore, the results of this study may contribute knowledge to the domain of ICT4D in the rural context of developing countries. Further, the findings of this study established knowledge that may be useful for practical implications among smallholder farmers and policy makers in the field of ICT4D. </p>

<p class="MsoNormal" style="">The study shows the financial impacts on costs per student at academic module level, at departmental level, at faculty level, and at institutional level, thereby showing the effects of cross-subsidisation at all levels of management. The reports were developed in termsof the guidelines compiled in terms of Llewellyn's five levels of theorisation.</p> <p class="MsoNormal" style=""><span style="font-family: Garamond / "><o:p></o:p></span></p>

During the past twenty years, the Swedish school systems have slowly changed to becomemore and more performance-driven. Private schools have been growing in general and, likeindependent schools and schools managed by municipalities, they profile themselves. Schoolsare becoming more performance and result-oriented, which has changed the roles of teachersin a dramatic way and is in general, still changing. By profiling students based on theirindividual performance, schools are able to help students identify themselves and their owngoals. The process of profiling is a slow one in which some teachers adapt more quickly thanothers, and one that is critical for other teachers to learn in order to keep up with the demandsof society.Schools, like ordinary businesses, are in constant competition with each other to keep up withthe newest and greatest models of teaching and to rank among the best in high achievements.Perhaps the downside of this modern school structure is that it is often difficult to have aschool where both school management and teachers see eye to eye. School management must heavily focus on the school’s results as a whole. They rely on the teachers to produce theseresults among their students, which at times creates a heavy burden on teachers. The teachersare expected to have a much larger role, often ones that have to do with advertising for theschool in addition to teaching their students. In order to attract more student applications,school management expects that their teachers follow a curriculum that will produce highscores and grades. This study was done with a secondary school in Stockholm, where four teachers and oneprincipal were interviewed in order to have their opinion of the discussion about teachers newposition in the school as they operate today.

Cette thèse a pour objet l'étude de la formation endogène des juridictions et en particulier ses propriétés ségrégatives suite à l'introduction de différents facteurs susceptibles de les intensifier ou de les réduire. Le premier chapitre est consacré à une revue de la littérature sur la formation endogène de juridictions basée sur les intuitions formulées par Tiebout: les ménages choisissent leur commune en fonction de la quantité de bien public disponible et du montant de taxe à y acquitter. Les différentes modélisations de ces hypothèses, les conditions sous lesquelles un équilibre existera, les possibles définitions de la ségrégation et les facteurs pro et anti-ségrégation développés par la littérature sont résumés et confrontés. Le deuxième chapitre étudie l'impact de l'introduction d'un gouvernement central mettant en oeuvre une politique de péréquation fiscale suivant un objectif bien-êtriste. Le gouvernement central peut ainsi taxer les ménages et/ou certaines communes afin de verser des subventions à d'autres communes. Bien que la péréquation fiscale soit susceptible de modifier l'ensemble des structures de juridictions stables, la condition nécessaire et suffisante pour que toute structure de juridictions stable soit ségrégée n'est pas affectée par l'introduction du gouvernement central si celui-ci cherche à maximiser une fonction de bien-être social utilitariste généralisée. La présence d'un marché compétitif du logement et l'existence de plusieurs biens publics locaux sont introduites dans le chapitre 3. Si la condition nécessaire et suffisante à la ségrégation de toute structure de juridictions stable n'est pas affectée par l'introduction du marché du logement, et reste nécessaire s'il existe plusieurs biens publics locaux, une hypothèse sur les préférences doit être ajoutée pour que la condition reste suffisante. Enfin, le quatrième chapitre relaxe l'hypothèse selon laquelle un bien public local ne souffre pas de problèmes de congestion et ne peut être consommé que par les membres de la juridiction qui le produit. Ainsi, s'il semble apparaître que la congestion favorise la ségrégation, alors que l'existence d'externalités positives générées par le bien public d'une juridiction dans les autres juridictions la réduit, la condition nécessaire et suffisante à la ségrégation de toute structure de juridictions stable est robuste à cette généralisation du modèle. / This thesis analyzes the endogenous formation of jurisdictions and in particular its segregative properties after the introduction of several factors that may mitigate or increase them. The first chapter is devoted to a survey of the literature on the endogenous formation of jurisdictions based on Tiebout's intuitions: households choose their place of residence according to a trade-off between the available amount of public good and the tax rate. The different models of these assumptions, the conditions under which an equilibrium exists, the possible definitions of segregation and the factors pro and anti-segregation developed in the literature are summarized and compared. The second chapter examines the impact of the introduction of a welfarist central government implementing a equalization payments policy. The central government can tax the household and/or certain jurisdictions in order to subsidize other jurisdictions. Although the equalization payments policy is likely to modify stable jurisdictions structures, the necessary and sufficient condition to have any stable jurisdiction structure segregated is not affected by the introduction of the central government if it pursues a generalized utilitarian objective. The presence of a competitive housing market and the existence of several local public goods are introduced in Chapter 3. If the necessary and sufficient condition for the segregation of any stable jurisdiction structure is not affected by the introduction of the housing market, and remains necessary if there are several local public goods, an additional assumption on the preference must be made for the condition to remain sufficient. Finally, the fourth chapter relaxes the assumption that a local public good does not suffer from congestion and can be consumed only by the members of the jurisdiction that produces it. Although it seems that the congestion favors segregation, while the existence of positive externalities generated by a jurisdiction's public good in other jurisdictions mitigates them, the necessary and sufficient condition to ensure the segregation of any stable jurisdictions structure is robust to this generalization of the model.

This work statistically analyses hypotheses about the presence of antisocial punishment in study of economic experiments. Analysed data source is author's own ABM simulation of antisocial punishment environment. Tested hypotheses and ABM simulations are evolutionary oriented. This represents natural selection of evolving agents (and their groups) interacting with one another. Work is divided by two independent parts of presumptions. Crucial hypothesis of the first part is evolutional advantage from retaliatory punishment, the second part tests hypotheses of evolutional benefits resulting from group selection. Findings of the analysis allow us to accept these crucial hypothesis, and it may be concluded, that antisocial punishment can be regard as an evolutionary advantage, which directly advantages individuals, as well as whole groups.

This thesis deals with the problem of water consumption in European Union and ways to overcome its excessive abstraction. The aim is to analyze whether the current abstraction in each area is sustainable in the future, and if there is any possible way how to ensure this sustainability. This work is based on the information about the development of abstraction in different sectors, changes in the amount of water that will be caused by global warming and the data on the current technical possibilities of obtaining water. The first section explains the concept of sustainable development and clarifies why the water consumption is excessive. The second chapter deals with the quantity of water and its resources, including alternative resources. The third chapter describes the water abstraction and the potential for savings. The last part focuses on policies and measures to ensure sustainable water abstraction.