Contrary to conventional theory, a growing body of evidence suggests that economies with abundant natural resources perform badly in terms of economic growth relative to their resource poor counterparts—the so-called resource curse hypothesis. However, this general hypothesis is not robust. It clearly fails to account for the differing experiences of resource abundant economies. For instance, the theory, applied generally, offers no explanation as to why economies like Botswana and Norway have exceptional growth while Saudi Arabia and Nigeria have stagnated. Prompted by these experiences, the thesis investigates the circumstances under which the curse is more or less likely to exist. In particular, the thesis finds evidence that the major reason for the diverging experiences is the differences in the quality of institutions across countries. The thesis tests the hypothesis that the effect of resources on growth is conditional on the type and quality of institutions, by further building on Boschini, Pettersson, and Roine’s (2007) and Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik’s (2006b) influential works on the role of institutions in mitigating the resource curse. Advances are made by: (a) using a panel of up to 53 countries with different levels of development, institutional quality and natural resource abundance over the period 1984-2003; (b) applying a two-step system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation that accounts for biases associated with omitted variables, endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity that potentially affect existing cross-country Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) growth results; (c) supplementing results of the commonly used International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) institutional performance indicators with those of institutional design indicators–that is, highlighting the role of electoral rules and form of government; (d) using an institutional quality measure that is more related to financial institutions than just economic or political institutions; (e) using a resource abundance indicator that focuses on non-renewable resources alone rather than the ones commonly used in the literature that include renewable resources, which are inappropriate. The key hypothesis that natural resource economies are not destined to be cursed if they have good institutions is confirmed by the empirical results of the thesis. Specifically, the results suggest that (a) adopting a democratic regime is better than a non-democratic one, in terms of generating growth from resource abundance (b) the electoral rules that a country adopts matter, i.e. having a democratic proportional rather than a democratic majority regime increases the growth benefits of resource abundance (c) as far as the form of government adopted is concerned, a democratic parliamentary rather than a democratic presidential regime generates more economic growth from its abundant natural resource (d) a well functioning banking sector induces more (resource abundant generated) growth and capital accumulation. Therefore, the lessons for policy makers who struggle to overcome the impediments to economic development that potentially accompany the “curse of resource abundance” are the need to develop and maintain better institutions and adopt improved management strategies of the financial proceeds forthcoming from such abundance.

Contrary to conventional theory, a growing body of evidence suggests that economies with abundant natural resources perform badly in terms of economic growth relative to their resource poor counterparts—the so-called resource curse hypothesis. However, this general hypothesis is not robust. It clearly fails to account for the differing experiences of resource abundant economies. For instance, the theory, applied generally, offers no explanation as to why economies like Botswana and Norway have exceptional growth while Saudi Arabia and Nigeria have stagnated. Prompted by these experiences, the thesis investigates the circumstances under which the curse is more or less likely to exist. In particular, the thesis finds evidence that the major reason for the diverging experiences is the differences in the quality of institutions across countries. The thesis tests the hypothesis that the effect of resources on growth is conditional on the type and quality of institutions, by further building on Boschini, Pettersson, and Roine’s (2007) and Mehlum, Moene, and Torvik’s (2006b) influential works on the role of institutions in mitigating the resource curse. Advances are made by: (a) using a panel of up to 53 countries with different levels of development, institutional quality and natural resource abundance over the period 1984-2003; (b) applying a two-step system Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimation that accounts for biases associated with omitted variables, endogeneity and unobserved heterogeneity that potentially affect existing cross-country Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) growth results; (c) supplementing results of the commonly used International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) institutional performance indicators with those of institutional design indicators–that is, highlighting the role of electoral rules and form of government; (d) using an institutional quality measure that is more related to financial institutions than just economic or political institutions; (e) using a resource abundance indicator that focuses on non-renewable resources alone rather than the ones commonly used in the literature that include renewable resources, which are inappropriate. The key hypothesis that natural resource economies are not destined to be cursed if they have good institutions is confirmed by the empirical results of the thesis. Specifically, the results suggest that (a) adopting a democratic regime is better than a non-democratic one, in terms of generating growth from resource abundance (b) the electoral rules that a country adopts matter, i.e. having a democratic proportional rather than a democratic majority regime increases the growth benefits of resource abundance (c) as far as the form of government adopted is concerned, a democratic parliamentary rather than a democratic presidential regime generates more economic growth from its abundant natural resource (d) a well functioning banking sector induces more (resource abundant generated) growth and capital accumulation. Therefore, the lessons for policy makers who struggle to overcome the impediments to economic development that potentially accompany the “curse of resource abundance” are the need to develop and maintain better institutions and adopt improved management strategies of the financial proceeds forthcoming from such abundance.

The discovery of commercial quantities of oil and gas resources in the Gulf of Guinea and parts of East Africa has once again raised expectations that sustained development will emerge in one of the world’s poorest regions. At the same time there is great concern that Africa’s new resource-rich countries will succumb to the so-called resource curse phenomenon because of their generally weak governance institutions. In response to this challenge, the international community has intensified its efforts to promote good governance mechanisms in such countries, focused on transparency and accountability, and informed by a dominant institutionalist literature which argues that the differences in resource governance outcomes can be explained by the differences in institutional design and performance. A recent turn to politics in both the development and resource curse literature has begun to move the research agenda beyond the primacy of institutions to look at the politics that underpin the emergence and performance of institutions. This is particularly evidenced in the emerging literature on political settlements that emphasise the distribution of power amongst social groups in society and how these power relations shape institutions and in turn development outcomes. This new political lens is helping to deepen analysis of how and why resource-rich countries prevent or succumb to the resource curse and provides an opportunity to interrogate the inclusive development prospects of Africa’s new oil-rich countries. In this thesis, I apply and extend the political settlement approaches by incorporating ideational and spatial dynamics, to analyse the prospect of inclusive development outcomes in Ghana where oil and gas resources were discovered in 2007. Focusing on the power relations between and amongst national elites and elites in the oil producing Western Region, I interrogate the ways in which the spatial dynamics of Ghana’s prevailing competitive clientelist political settlement is shaping the governance of the oil sector, and the implications it has for inclusive development. I find that at the onset of a resource boom, the dynamics of local politics, and the dominant incentives and ideas generated by the political settlement has strongly shaped the content and enforcement of Ghana’s foundation institutions to manage the oil sector, in ways that reinforces the pre-oil settlement around the governance of natural resources and undermines the long-term prospects for inclusive development. At the same time, the oil boom has also been accompanied by the increased use of formal institutions and suggests that Ghana may be moving away from personalised to more programmatic forms of clientelism.

As oil bearing country, the issue of development in Nigeria has been a complex one that has attracted attention of both the government and scholars because oil politics appears to shape resource management and the development process. While academic focus has been on the analysis of national development, there is a paucity of academic studies on the internal dynamics at the regional level that shape the development process. This study therefore aims to: “examine the effect of oil resources on Nigeria’s development and the South-South compared with the situation in the South-West”, with an explicit focus on the complex nexus between oil, politics and regional development in Nigeria. The thesis adopts both methodological and theoretical triangulation to generate data to test the main and supporting hypothesis adopted for the study: “the oil industry has had an adverse impact on the development of Nigeria, and, in particular, the Niger Delta region in which it is concentrated”. In so doing, it explores the failure of oil politics to mix effectively to engender both national and regional development; leading to a regional development disparity. The study concludes that oil wealth failed to fuel development in Nigeria but instead, led to leadership failure. This failure is particularly found to have given vent to the negative impact of oil wealth on elite behaviour that is shaped by corruption, made worse by a dis-functional federal system where those with links major ethnic groups, get resource allocation and development advantage. The study consequently recommends that elite induced oil politics and attendant corruption, be tackled to pave way for both national and regional development in Nigeria. The study also recommend replication of this study in a larger scale in other oil bearing developing nations to further explore the relationship between management of resource wealth and regional development.

Submitted to the University of the Witwatersrand’s Faculty of Humanities in partial fulfilment of the degree of Master of Arts in International Relations International Relations Department University of the Witwatersrand March 2015 / Extractive natural resources have always been associated with negative outcomes in sub- Saharan countries. However, it is essential to investigate the extent to which domestic political conditions influence ownership structures, which may or may not subsequently result in adverse outcomes. Through a comparative analysis between the cases of Angola and Botswana, this study finds that, political contestation influences ownership models as hypothesized to an extent. In Angola, the post-independence civil war pitting the ruling MPLA against UNITA resulted in Sonangol being managed as a wholly owned state enterprise, albeit serving the interests of the MPLA elite instead of broad-based developmental interests. In Botswana, however, Debswana was managed as a public-private entity located within a democratic political system, and this ownership structure was more a result of rational policy planning than political contestation. Nevertheless, the cases’ history of colonial rule and political institutions established upon the attainment of political independence are substantially influential factors as well. Non-settler colonialism and non-militarized political transitions to independence facilitated the growth of “organic” political and economic institutions and public-private ownership structures in Botswana, while settler colonialism and pre-independence militarization influenced the growth of centralized post-colonial state structures internal strife in Angola. The timing of resource extraction was also important, with pre-independence oil extraction influencing militarized rivalry in Angola, while postindependence extraction of diamonds in Botswana was a causal factor in the development of strong state institutions. External factors, particularly the Cold War influenced militarised outcomes in Angola, while the nature of the global diamond market had a contributory factor to the establishment of the public-private ownership model in Botswana.

The thesis deals with the existence or absence of a curse of mineral resource (more closely specified in the form of so-called curse of natural resources) namely on the most important mining regions of the selected group of developing countries with significant mining sector. The aim is to capture the regional benefits of mining, or its negative impact with the help of indicator of the relative position of the quality of life of the mining region (relativized to the other regions of watched country). You can see the greatest benefits of the work in this approach of monitoring the impacts of a possible curse (or benefit) of mineral resources at the regional level, as the majority of similar thesis is devoted to the comparison of countries, or the individual studies. The reader finds an overview of the basic mechanisms and factors affecting the use, benefit or a curse of mineral resources, as well as partial specifically aimed analyzes watched mining countries, including the determination of mining regions and finally a summary of reclaimed pieces of knowledgee, including the attempt of interpretation. The thesis also specifies the factors and mechanisms that underlie the curse, or the benefits of mineral resources among the group of countries and their mining regions. Key Words: Nature Resource...

A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Commerce, Law and Management, University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg, in Ful llment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Economics 15 July, 2015 / The thesis focuses on the sources of macroeconomic uctuations in ten (10) selected African economies over the period 1990-2011. Data for the study were obtained from the International Financial statistics (IFS), the World Bank, and Central Bank database of the selected countries. We formulate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model for the thesis. We estimate the model using quarterly time series data. Due to data availability, the sample size di¤ers from one country to the other. First, we investigate the relative contributions of internal and external shocks to economic uc- tuations in African economies. Second, we evaluate the signi cance of the balance sheet channel in African economies. Third, we investigate the ef- fectiveness of sovereign wealth funds in reducing macroeconomic volatility caused by commodity price shocks. The thesis has 5 chapters. Chapter 1 is the general introduction. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 are stand-alone related papers on macroeconomic uctuations. Chapter 5 is the conclusion. Chapter 1 introduces the study. We discuss the research problem, the moti- vation, the objectives, and the research questions. We also explain both our theoretical and empirical contributions to the literature. Moreover, we high- light the signi cance and the key ndings of the study. Finally, we conclude the chapter with a brief outline on the organisation of the study. Chapter 2 investigates the relative contributions of internal and external shocks to macroeconomic uctuations in African economies. We formulate and estimate a monetary DSGE model to examine the sources of economic uctuations in ten African countries. The model is estimated with the Bayesian technique using twelve macroeconomic variables. Generally, the ndings indicate that both the internal and external shocks signi cantly in- uence output uctuations in African countries. Over a four quarter horizon, internal shocks are dominant while over eight to sixteen quarter horizons, the external shocks are dominant. Among the external shocks, external debt, ex- change rate, foreign interest rate and commodity price shocks account for a large part of output variations in African economies. Money supply and productivity shocks are the most important internal shocks contributing to output uctuations in African countries. To ensure macroeconomic stability, African countries need to formulate appropriate exchange rate and exter- nal debt management policies, diversify the economies, and create sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) or use hedging instruments. Chapter 3 evaluates the quantitative signi cance of the balance sheet chan- nel in African economies. We construct an open economy monetary DSGE model where entrepreneurs nance investment by issuing foreign currency- denominated debt. The model is estimated with Bayesian technique. The evidence suggests that the balance sheet e¤ects are empirically important in African economies. The marginal likelihood results clearly favour the model with nancial frictions. Moreover, the ndings indicate that the balance sheet e¤ect reduces the e¤ectiveness of monetary policy, raises the sensitiv- ity of the risk premium to external debt, and contracts output. This indi- cates that exchange rate depreciation is contractionary in African economies. We conclude that African countries should reduce their exposure to foreign currency-denominated debt and also deepen their domestic bond markets. Chapter 4 investigates the e¤ectiveness of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) in reducing macroeconomic volatility in commodity exporting African countries. We formulate and simulate a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model that features SWFs. The simulation results suggest that the creation of SWFs can reduce macroeconomic volatility in commodity exporting coun- tries. Particularly, SWFs can reduce government expenditure, real exchange rate, and external debt volatility. Since these are the channels through which commodity price shocks are transmitted to the African economies, we rec- ommend that African countries should create SWFs to sterilize the in ow of commodity revenue and to prevent the resource curse problem. Chapter 5 concludes the study. We summarize the key ndings in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. We highlight the policy implications of our ndings. Finally, we suggest areas for further research.

This thesis explores the institutional choices available to Timor-Leste to manage their natural resource wealth wisely and avoid the resource curse. Timor-Leste is a poor country and its challenge is to use its large per capita resource wealth to alleviate poverty and enable sustainable development. This research examines the Petroleum Fund Law, and other mechanisms to manage petroleum revenue that the Government of Timor-Leste has established. These mechanisms appear to be resilient, but remain untested. Based on field interviews in Timor-Leste, the study offers insights into the opinions of East Timorese and foreign advisers about how Timor-Leste´s petroleum revenue should be managed, and how a poor country can raise the living standards of its people.¶A framework that identifies human and social capital as essential to the quality of institutions is developed in this research, which proposes that the pre-condition of institutions affects the management of natural resource revenue. As a result of history (not its natural resource wealth) Timor-Leste´s productive institutions are weak and destructive institutions, such as corruption, are strong. The preferences of the research participants, identified using semi-structured interviews and multi-criteria decision analysis, revealed that what petroleum revenue is spent on is the most important petroleum revenue management decision. Further, health and education were regarded the highest spending priorities. Petroleum revenue management decisions that may affect Timor-Leste´s economic, social and political independence were also important to participants.¶Timor-Leste´s sustainable development depends on continued assistance in the form of foreign advisers to address its lack of human capital. A commitment to transparency should counteract the lack of trust between government and civil society. Timor-Leste will also need to invest more in people, and recognise that the wise management of its petroleum revenue depends as much on good governance as the mechanisms designed to manage it. The people of Timor-Leste´s fierce determination to overcome the challenges they face, against all odds, may help Timor-Leste to avoid the resource curse.¶