O setor elétrico brasileiro é composto, majoritariamente, por usinas hidrelétricas, cuja operação é realizada de forma centralizada pelo Operador Nacional do Sistema (ONS). Devido às características do setor, foi criado durante a década de 1990 o Mecanismo de Realocação de Energia (MRE) com o intuito de compartilhar o risco hidrológico entre as usinas participantes deste mecanismo, o qual é medido pelo Generation Scaling Factor (GSF). Entre os anos de 2014 e 2015, o Brasil enfrentou um período de escassez hídrica que impactou negativamente o caixa dos geradores hídricos. Estes, insatisfeitos com o cenário, articularam-se junto à Agência Nacional de Energia Elétrica (ANEEL) e ao Ministério de Minas e Energia (MME) para que o risco hidrológico fosse transferido para os consumidores. A agência reguladora posicionou-se contrária ao pleito dos geradores na primeira fase da Audiência Pública 32/2015, que tratou do tema em questão, entretanto o governo editou a Medida Provisória 688/2015 que possibilitou a repactuação do risco hidrológico mediante um pagamento de prêmio de risco pelos geradores hídricos. Neste contexto, esta dissertação foi desenvolvida com o objetivo principal de avaliar o processo de repactuação do risco hidrológico, a partir dos estudos sobre a evolução da Teoria da Regulação, com foco na atuação dos grupos de interesse. Os resultados indicam possibilidade em aplicar os pressupostos da Teoria dos Grupos de Interesse, principalmente a abordagem de Pelztman (1976), no processo de repactuação do risco hidrológico, demonstrando que: (i) a regulação surge como demanda dos grupos de interesse; (ii) a regulação tende a beneficiar os grupos de interesse que forem mais ativos politicamente; (iii) os agentes envolvidos no processo de regulação atuam para maximizar sua própria utilidade; e (iv) a regulação tende a beneficiar grupos de interesse cujo benefício per capita seja maior. / The Brazilian Power sector consists of hydroelectric plants, whose operation is performed centrally by the mainly National System Operator. Due to the system characteristics, during the 1990s, was created the Energy Reallocation Mechanism in order to share hydrological risk among mechanism\'s participating, which is measured by the Generation Scaling Factor (GSF). Between 2014 and 2015, Brazil faced a water scarcity period that negatively affected the hydropower generators revenue. The generators unsatisfied with this situation have started seek to influence the electricity regulatory agency and the Ministry of Mines and Energy in order to transferred the hydrologic risk to consumers. The regulatory agency has positioned itself against the claim of the generators in the first phase of the Public Hearing 32/2015, but the government has published Interim Measure 688/2015 which allowed the renegotiation of the hydrological risk through a premium risk payment by hydropower generators. In this context, this work was developed with the main objective of analysing the renegotiation process of hydrological risk, such analysis was based on the evolution of regulation theory studies, focusing on the role of interest groups. The results indicate the possibility of applying the assumptions of Theory of Economics Regulation, mainly the Pelztman (1976) approach, on the renegotiation of the hydrological risk process demonstrating that: (i) regulation is supplied in reponse to the interest groups demand for regulation; (ii) regulation is most likely to benefit the interest groups that are more active politically; (iii) agents involved in the regulatory process act to maximize their own utility; and (iv) regulation trends to benefit interest groups which highest per capita benefit.

The regulation of hedge funds has been at the centre of a global policy debate for much of the past decade. Several factors feature in this debate including the magnitude of current global investments in hedge funds and the potential of hedge funds to both generate wealth and destabilise financial markets. The first part of the thesis describes the nature of hedge funds and locates the work in relation to four elements in existing theory including regulatory competition theory, the concept of differential mobility as identified by Musgrave, Kane’s concept of the regulatory dialectic between regulators and regulatees, and the concept of unique sets of trust and confidence factors that individual jurisdictions convey to the market. It also identifies a series of questions that de-limit the scope of the present work. These include whether there is evidence that regulatory competition occurs in the context of the provision of domicile for hedge funds, what are the factors which account for the current global distribution of hedge fund domicile, what latitude for regulatory competition is available to jurisdictions competing to provide the domicile for hedge funds, how is such latitude shaped by factors intrinsic and extrinsic to the competing jurisdictions, and why do the more powerful onshore jurisdictions competing to provide the domicile for hedge funds not shut down their smaller and weaker competitors? The second part of the thesis examines the regulatory environment for hedge funds in three so-called offshore jurisdictions, specifically the Cayman Islands, Bermuda and the British Virgin Islands, as well as two onshore jurisdictions, specifically the United Kingdom and the United States. The final section presents a series of conclusions and their implications for both regulatory competition theory and policy.

科学研究費補助金 研究種目:総合研究(A) 課題番号:04301070 研究代表者:山田 鋭夫 研究期間:1992-1993年度