Habilitationsschrift--Wien. / Bibliography: p. 7-12.

Title from title page of PDF (University of Missouri--St. Louis, viewed February 17, 2010). Includes bibliographical references (p. 58-59).

Thesis (Ph. D.)--Columbia University, 1932. / Bibliography: p. 87-90.

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Philosophers who work on time often ignore the implications their doctrines have for the common sense intuition that the past is fixed and the future not. Similarly, those who work on fatalism, and whose arguments often imply an assertion or denial of the common sense intuition, rarely take into account the implicit dependence their arguments have upon specific theories of time. I take the intuition, and its relation to the nature of time, seriously. In Part I of my thesis, I investigate the relations between the dynamic and static theories of time, on the one hand, and the intuition, on the other. I argue that the so called 'pure' forms of these theories, inasmuch as they both posit an ontological temporal symmetry, cannot do justice to the intuition. The 'pure' B-Theory, with its denial of objective temporal becoming, cannot allow for a robust sense in which the future is non-fixed. The 'pure' A-Theory, according to which only the present exists, acknowledges the robustness of the asymmetry, but cannot provide a ground for it. I conclude Part I of my thesis with the claim that only a conception of time according to which the past exists and the future does not, can account for the intuition. In Part II, I discuss those fatalistic arguments which rely upon the determinateness of future truth as their key premise, and argue that these fail either because they rely on an illegitimate modal concept, or because they rely on a key undefended assumption. Finally, in the Epilogue, I provide a more detailed sketch of the account of time posited at the end of Part I, and suggest that it can also provide a more thoroughgoing rejection of the logical fatalistic argument.

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A presente tese de doutorado investiga como, na hipótese cosmológica do eterno retorno do mesmo, ou seja, na possilidade de uma eternidade temporal, Nietzsche julgou encontrar uma nova medida de valor para realizar a transvaloração de todos os valores. Para isso, foi necessário estudarmos a formação da noção de valor em seu pensamento. Por meio dela buscamos compreender que, ao diagnosticar a morte de Deus, sua atenção estava concentrada, fundamentalmente, na perda da medida de valor que determinava todos os valores até então existentes. E se, por um lado, a desvalorização dos valores, e o consequente avanço do niilismo, serão seus alvos de preocupação e crítica, por outro, é o anelo incondicional ao pensamento do eterno retorno, dependente de uma adesão ao amor fati, que forma sua filosofia da afirmação. Considerando que a hipótese cosmológica do eterno retorno trata de uma eternidade no tempo, analisamos inicialmente a relação entre tempo e eternidade no contexto da história da filosofia. O percurso dos gregos antigos até Kant torna possível compreender como a reflexão ocidental passa a orbitar em torno da eternidade atemporal. De outra parte, é somente a fundação e o desenvolvimento da termodinâmica que reacende a discussão, presente já no pensamento grego antigo, sobre se o curso do mundo é ou não cíclico. Uma vez que Nietzsche toma partido neste debate para pensar uma nova medida para os valores, procuramos estudar a gênese da noção de valor nas obras que precedem a anotação realizada sobre o eterno retorno em agosto de 1881. Desenvolvida a partir de uma reflexão que pensa a constituição da moral, a noção de valor atinge uma radicalidade maior do que em Adam Smith no âmbito da economia política. Buscando sustentar que o pensamento do eterno retorno é a condição de possibilidade da transvaloração, investigamos o conjunto dos escritos de Nietzsche compreendidos entre 1881 e 1888. Analisando o modo como o tema se manifesta na obra publicada e nos fragmentos póstumos, procuramos mostrar que a hipótese cosmológica do retorno tanto possibilita a criação de novos valores quanto coloca o problema do eterno retorno do niilismo. Por fim, preocupamo-nos em reconstituir o itinerário da reflexão de Nietzsche para pensar por que, somente no derradeiro ano de sua filosofia, ele leva a termo a tarefa da transvaloração de todos os valores. / This thesis investigates how was it possible for Nietzsche to see in the cosmological hypothesis of eternal return of the same (that is, in the possibility of a temporal eternity) a new value measure by which transvaluation of all values could be achieved. We have investigated how Nietzsche shaped his notion of value and how his diagnosis of Gods death evidenced his concern with the lost of those value-measures which were determinant for all values until his time. Therefore, his affirmative philosophy is constituted by an apparently contradictory pair of concerns. While, on one hand, his critic and philosophical concerns concentrate on the devaluation of values and the spread of Nihilism, on the other hand, his affirmative philosophy springs from his unconditional attachment to the idea of eternal return, an idea that depends on mens adhesion to amor fati. Esteeming that the cosmological hypothesis of the eternal return is concerned with eternity in time, we first analyzed the relation between time and eternity in the context of History of Philosophy. The reassessment of some ideas on this subject from Greek to Kantian philosophy allowed us to understand how a-temporal eternity becomes a pivotal locus in western philosophy. However, the discussion about the cosmic course and on the plausibility of its cyclic nature will have to wait for the emergence and development of thermodynamics in order to reemerge in the western philosophical scenario. Since Nietzsche himself was engaged in this debate and tried to reflect on a new scale for all values, we investigated the genesis of the concept of value in those of his works written before august 1881, when his famous note on eternal return was recorded. Since this notion originates from a reflexion on the genesis of morality, it proves to be even more deep-rooted than the concept by Adam Smith in the scope of political economics. In our attempt to support the idea that the eternal return is the condition of possibility for transvaluation, we investigated Nietzsches works written between 1881 and 1888. After an analysis of how this theme occurred in his works and posthumous papers, we tried to prove that the cosmological hypothesis of the eternal return both enables foundation of new values, and introduces the problem of the eternal return of Nihilism. Finally, we were interested in rebuilding Nietzsches reflexive trajectory in order to understand why only in his last active year as a philosopher his task of transvaluation all values was brought to an end.