Wang, Yang. / Thesis (M.Phil.)--Chinese University of Hong Kong, 2011. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 72-74). / Abstracts in English and Chinese. / Chapter 1 --- Literature Review and Model Description --- p.1 / Chapter 1.1 --- Portfolio theory under mean-variance framework --- p.2 / Chapter 1.2 --- Portfolio theory under utility-maximizing framework --- p.5 / Chapter 1.3 --- Model Description --- p.11 / Chapter 2 --- Parameterized optimal rebalancing strategy --- p.14 / Chapter 2.1 --- An open-loop policy of the T-horizon model --- p.16 / Chapter 2.2 --- A closed-loop policy of the T-horizon model --- p.24 / Chapter 2.3 --- Illustrative numerical example --- p.36 / Chapter 3 --- Non-parameterized optimal rebalancing model --- p.46 / Chapter 3.1 --- T=2 period problem --- p.47 / Chapter 3.2 --- T=3 period problem --- p.55 / Chapter 4 --- s-S type policy --- p.59 / Chapter 4.1 --- Exponential K-convex function --- p.60 / Chapter 4.2 --- Revised multiperiod portfolio selection model --- p.62 / Chapter 5 --- Conclusion and summary of work --- p.70 / Bibliography --- p.71

As negociações na fase pré-contratual permitem às partes determinarem de que forma certa operação econômica será concretizada e cumprida por cada um dos particulares, materializando-se como importante ferramenta para as partes estabelecerem, consensual e racionalmente, as melhores alternativas em termos de eficiência que estão à disposição. Inexistem rigidez e regramento específico no processo negocial, estando seu desenvolvimento submetido aos interesses e às pretensões de cada um dos negociantes, e o seu resultado varia de acordo com o tipo de negociação, as estratégias adotadas e o poder de barganha individual. Não obstante, há outros fatores que também condicionam o desenrolar e o desfecho deste processo, mas em geral impedindo a obtenção de resultados tão benéficos quanto os que poderiam ser alcançados em um paralelo livre de ineficiências. Em um mundo factual as partes precisam lidar com as adversidades existentes nas negociações se desejarem concluir o contrato e dele se beneficiar, seja por meio de medidas particulares ou por intermédio de soluções regulatórias, as quais têm a missão de fornecerem adequados incentivos para sua aplicação tornar-se socialmente desejável. Além disso, em virtude de as negociações serem norteadas pela autonomia de vontade e liberdade contratual, sem deveres de vinculação, os atos de exercício destes direitos devem ser medidos para que não produzam lesões ao patrimônio jurídico dos demais envolvidos nas tratativas. Tal controle é exercido pela incidência da boa-fé objetiva na fase pré-contratual, a qual impõe deveres de conduta aos particulares durante as negociações. Também é a regra da boa-fé o supedâneo da responsabilidade civil para recomposição dos prejuízos advindos de situações que malfiram a confiança gerada ao longo das tratativas, daí que o conteúdo da indenização nestas hipóteses deve considerar as justas expectativas criadas pelas partes e ser balizado para que o lesado não acabe em situação melhor do que estaria se o eventual contrato tivesse sido concluído e integralmente cumprido. / Negotiations in the pre-contractual stage allow the parties to determine how a certain economic operation will be carried out and fulfilled by each of the individuals, and is an important tool for the parties to establish, in a consensual and rational manner, the best alternatives available in terms of efficiency. There is no rigidity or specific regulation in the negotiation process, in such way that its development is submitted to the interests and the pretensions of each one of the traders, and its result varies according to the type of negotiation, strategies adopted and individual bargaining power. There are other factors that also condition the unfolding and outcome of this process, but generally preventing the achievement of results as beneficial as those that could be achieved in an inefficiency-free parallel. In a factual world, the parties need to deal with the adversities in the negotiations if they wish to conclude the contract and benefit from it, either through particular measures or through regulatory solutions, which have the task of providing adequate incentives so that their implementation is socially desirable. Moreover, because the negotiations are guided by the autonomy of will and contractual freedom, without binding obligations, the exercise of these rights must be measured so that they do not produce damages to the legal patrimony of others involved in the negotiations. Such control is exercised by the incidence of objective good faith in the pre-contractual phase, which imposes conduct duties on individuals during the negotiations. It is also the rule of good faith the foundation of civil liability for the recovery of damages arising from situations that mislead the confidence generated during the negotiations, hence the content of compensation in these cases must consider the fair expectations created by the parties and be restricted so that the injured party does not end up in a better situation than it would have been if the contract had been completed and fully complied with.

The main focus of this thesis is on how cooperatives can minimize both democratic and agency costs. In particular, the thesis examines how differences in the level of heterogeneity and member participation amongst cooperatives affect their management of these costs. The thesis is one of the first studies to empirically examine how cooperatives manage their decision making costs. The relationships amongst the key variables of the study are examined in three studies. First, we develop a measurement of heterogeneity based on a \'grouping\' method, with the aim of showing the presence (absence) of a dominant group and the size of the minority group(s). Cooperatives are ranked from homogenous to more heterogeneous based on both cooperative and member characteristics. Five different types of cooperatives are identified. Based on these results, a model is developed that predicts a non-linear relation between heterogeneity and member participation. Second, we distinguish all conflicts of interests (horizontal, vertical and diagonal) which exist at the different levels of cooperative decision making. By doing so, we are able to obtain a more complete picture of the costs of cooperative decision making. We also examine a broader range of decision making costs than most studies, as both democratic and agency costs are considered. In the present thesis, we have contributed to the literature by developing the concept of democratic costs. We distinguish between both direct and opportunity costs for both types of decision making costs. In doing so, we draw attention to the fact that the mechanisms used to increase member participation are not without costs. Frequently, studies focus mainly on the benefits of increased member participation, thereby disregarding some of the costs associated with it. Moreover, the thesis indicates that there are differences in the relative importance of direct and opportunity agency costs: direct agency cost should be a smaller concern for cooperatives compared to exposure to high opportunity agency costs. With regard to opportunity costs, a further distinction is made between costs associated with over-and underrepresentation of member groups in the board of directors. We show that the relation between member participation in the board of directors and democratic costs is more complex than is often assumed in the literature. Compared to previous studies, we focus not only on board size, but also on board composition; i.e., which member groups the board represents. Finally, we show the difficulties cooperative face in minimizing (balancing) both democratic and agency costs. / O principal foco desta tese é sobre como cooperativas podem minimizar tanto custos de tomada de decisões democráticas quanto de agência. Em particular, a tese examina como diferenças nos níveis de heterogeneidade e de participação dos membros afetam estes custos e o controle dos mesmos. Esta tese é um dos primeiros estudos que se propõem a examinar empiricamente como as cooperativas controlam seus custos de tomada de decisões. Os relacionamentos entre as variáveis-chave da tese são examinados em três estudos. Primeiramente, nós desenvolvemos um modelo de mensuração de heterogeneidade baseado em categorização, o qual leva em consideração a presença (ausência) de um grupo dominante e o tamanho do(s) grupo(s) minoritário(s). O modelo classifica cooperativas desde homogêneas até mais heterogêneas, com base em características tanto dos membros quanto da cooperativa. Cinco níveis de heterogeneidade são identificados. Com base nestes resultados, nós desenvolvemos um modelo que prevê um relacionamento não-linear entre heterogeneidade e nível de participação dos membros no processo de tomada de decisões da cooperativa. Em segundo lugar, este trabalho distingue os conflitos de interesse que existem em todos os níveis (horizontais, diagonais e verticais) do processo de tomada de decisões da cooperativa. Isto possibilitou o entendimento de todos os custos advindos destes conflitos. Em relação a estudos anteriores sobre custos de tomada de decisões, nós examinamos uma gama maior de custos de tomada de decisões, a qual inclui tanto os custos de tomada de decisões democráticas quanto custos de agência. Além disso, a presente tese contribui com a literatura existente, quando desenvolve o conceito de custos democráticos. Este trabalho, ainda, distingue estes custos em termos de custos diretos e custos de oportunidade. Em fazer isto, nós demonstramos que o processo de fornecer incentivos para membros para participar na governança da cooperativa envolve substanciais custos. Freqüentemente, estudos neste assunto focam principalmente nos benefícios advindos da participação dos membros na governança, porém ignoram os custos associados ao processo de fornecer incentivos. Mais do que isto, nós demonstramos que custos diretos de agência e custos de oportunidade de agência têm, relativamente, diferente importância, sendo custos diretos provavelmente menos onerosos quando comparados com o risco de exposição a custos de oportunidade. Com relação a custos de oportunidade, nós os distinguimos, ainda, em relação à sub e super representação com relação à participação dos membros no conselho de administração. Nós demonstramos também que a relação entre participação dos membros no conselho de administração e custos democráticos é mais complexa do que a freqüentemente apontada pela literatura. Isto é possível uma vez que nós temos focado nosso estudo não somente no tamanho, mas também na composição (representatividade) do conselho. Finalmente, nós demonstramos as dificuldades que as cooperativas enfrentam em tentar minimizar custos de tomada de decisões (democráticos e de agência).

We theoretically and empirically study portfolio optimization under transaction costs and establish a link between turnover penalization and covariance shrinkage with the penalization governed by transaction costs. We show how the ex ante incorporation of transaction costs shifts optimal portfolios towards regularized versions of efficient allocations. The regulatory effect of transaction costs is studied in an econometric setting incorporating parameter uncertainty and optimally combining predictive distributions resulting from high-frequency and low-frequency data. In an extensive empirical study, we illustrate that turnover penalization is more effective than commonly employed shrinkage methods and is crucial in order to construct empirically well-performing portfolios.

Since the late 1970s, the world has experienced a wave of microeconomic reform that has resulted in the privatisation of many previously State-owned assets, as well as other reforms directed at improving the efficiency of government business enterprises. This dissertation focuses on one important instrument of reform: outsourcing of public-sector service provision. Despite the prevalence of outsourcing, there has been relatively little empirical work analysing the effects of outsourcing at the contract level. This dissertation addresses three important empirical issues related to outsourcing. First, analysis of the magnitude and sources of cost savings associated with outsourcing was undertaken using a present value costing framework. Unlike other studies, this study includes transaction costs and considers how costs change over the life of the contract. The results indicate that savings of 37 per cent were achieved in the first year of contract operation ?savings that were achieved through a combination of reductions in pay and conditions, labour-saving technological change and reductions in inefficiency. Secondly, the dissertation considered why the level of savings achieved fell to 24 per cent following contract variations at the end of year 1. Some evidence indicated that this may have been due to opportunistic behaviour or hold-up: that the contract service provider may have taken advantage of contractual incompleteness and increased its price during the course of contract renegotiations. Although hold-up is an important theme in the literature on contracts, little empirical work has been undertaken in verifying its existence. Thirdly, the impact of contract design on the efficiency of outsourcing arrangements was analysed. It is well known that contract theory predicts a trade-off between incentives and risk. Using the standard principal-agent framework, a simple model is developed to analyse the effects of demand uncertainty on the risk-incentive trade-off. This model is then tested using data from maintenance services contracts at two corporatised water retailers in Melbourne: an environment that is characterised by high levels of both cost and demand uncertainty. Using a general linear regression model, the results obtained indicate that the moral hazard effect dominated the risk premium effect.

In many areas of India and Australia, groundwater has been and is being withdrawn at rates far beyond the recharge capacity of the aquifer. The resulting depletion of groundwater supplies has a number of adverse social, economic and environmental consequences. These consequences and conflicts have led to a debate over the suitable institutional arrangements to manage common pool groundwater resources in a sustainable manner.

Doctor of Philosophy / The motivation for the research presented in this thesis stems from the recent availability of high frequency limit order book data, relative scarcity of studies employing such data, economic significance of transaction costs management, and a perceived potential of data mining for uncovering patterns and relationships not identified by the traditional top-down modelling approach. We analyse and build computational models for order submissions on the Australian Stock Exchange, an order-driven market with a public electronic limit order book. The focus of the thesis is on the trade implementation problem faced by a trader who wants to transact a buy or sell order of a certain size. We use two approaches to build our models, top-down and bottom-up. The traditional, top-down approach is applied to develop an optimal order submission plan for an order which is too large to be traded immediately without a prohibitive price impact. We present an optimisation framework and some solutions for non-stationary and non-linear price impact and price impact risk. We find that our proposed transaction costs model produces fairly good forecasts of the variance of the execution shortfall. The second, bottom-up, or data mining, approach is employed for trade sign inference, where trade sign is defined as the side which initiates both a trade and the market order that triggered the trade. We are interested in an endogenous component of the order flow, as evidenced by the predictable relationship between trade sign and the variables used to infer it. We want to discover the rules which govern the trade sign, and establish a connection between them and two empirically observed regularities in market order submissions, competition for order execution and transaction cost minimisation. To achieve the above aims we first use exploratory analysis of trade and limit order book data. In particular, we conduct unsupervised clustering with the self-organising map technique. The visualisation of the transformed data reveals that buyer-initiated and seller-initiated trades form two distinct clusters. We then propose a local non-parametric trade sign inference model based on the k-nearest-neighbour classifier. The best k-nearest-neighbour classifier constructed by us requires only three predictor variables and achieves an average out-of-sample accuracy of 71.40% (SD=4.01%)1, across all of the tested stocks. The best set of predictor variables found for the non-parametric model is subsequently used to develop a piecewise linear trade sign model. That model proves superior to the k-nearest-neighbour classifier, and achieves an average out-of-sample classification accuracy of 74.38% (SD=4.25%). The result is statistically significant, after adjusting for multiple comparisons. The overall classification performance of the piecewise linear model indicates a strong dependence between trade sign and the three predictor variables, and provides evidence for the endogenous component in the order flow. Moreover, the rules for trade sign classification derived from the structure of the piecewise linear model reflect the two regularities observed in market order submissions, competition for order execution and transaction cost minimisation, and offer new insights into the relationship between them. The obtained results confirm the applicability and relevance of data mining for the analysis and modelling of stock market order submissions.

Bakgrund: Forskningen kring projekt har under senare år ökat i omfattning. En anledning är att projektorganiseringen utgör ett sätt att samla ett antal specialister för att få dem att samverka mot ett gemensamt mål. Utöver de interna relationer som uppstår i projekt förekommer det även involvering av interorganisatoriska partners i samarbetet vilket är speciellt vanligt i byggprojekt som karaktäriseras av en hög grad av interorganisatorisk specialisering. Problemformuleringar: Den utpräglade specialiseringen inom byggprojekt fordrar som all annan typ av specialisering, samordning och koordinering av resurser med den skillnaden att det här handlar om samordning över de organisatoriska gränserna. Det som denna studie behandlar är därför de relationer byggföretag har till sina underentreprenörer i samband medbyggprojekt. Fokus ligger på hur företag kan samverka vertikalt i förädlingskedjan för att på detta sätt uppnå konkurrensfördelar. Syfte: Syftet med denna magisteruppsats är att utforska styrning och kontraktering av interorganisatoriska relationer för projektbaserad byggverksamhet. Utöver detta är syftet att specificera en optimala relationen mellan byggherre och underentreprenör för de fall som studien omfattar. Avgränsningar: Studien har avgränsats till att endast innefatta relationen mellan byggherre och underentreprenör. Genomförande: Studien har genomförts med grund i kontraktsansatsen genom intervjuer på två byggföretag med olika strategi, storlek och geografisk placering. Resultat: Resultatet visar att en optimal relation mellan byggherre och underentreprenör är avhängigt av i vilken grad samverkan kan ledan till utveckling hos de båda parterna. Alltför omfattande outsourcing av tjänster kan vara negativt precis som alltför täta relationer. Därför är situationen helt avgörande. Ger även stöd åt- samt utvecklar Alvesson&Lindkvists teori om ekonomisk kooperativa klaner. / Background: Business research focusing on different aspects of project work has recently increased. One reason is that project teams can be used as an effec- tive means of getting specialists from different parts of a business to work to- wards a common goal. In addition to the internal project relations that charac- terize project work, some businesses have also shown evidence of involving ex- ternal parties in projects. This is particularly common for construction projects where a large number of firms enter a project in order to achieve a high degree of interorganizational specialisation. Purpose: The high extent of specialization within the construction industry in- creases the need for coordination of resources among participating firms. This thesis relates to this coordination with special regard to the relation between contractor and sub-contractor and the involvement of subcontractorsin the verti-cal dimension of the supply chain. Hence, the purpose of this study is to explore the procurement phases related to the involvement of subcontractors in con-struction projects. Further, the study aims at specifying the optimal relations between main- and sub contractor for the construction firms researched. D elimitation: This thesis is solely focusing on the relations between main con- tractor and sub-contractor and is not dealing with other parties involved in con-struction projects. Realization: The research material for this thesis has been obtained through in- terviews with employees of two Swedish construction firms that differ in strat- egy, size and geographical location. Conclusion: The concluding remarks of the study indicate that the optimal rela- tion between main- and sub contractor is highly dependent on in what ways the relations may lead to long-term development for the parties. A high extent of outsourcing from the main contractor as well as too extensive partnering rela- tions may lead to substantial disadvantages in development for both firms. Therefore the environment in which the main contractor is operating is of great importance to the decision on how to handle subcontractor relations. The study also gives insights into the clan literature and supports and extends the theory of economic cooperative clans, developed by Mats Alvesson&Lars Lindkvist.

The organic wheat supply chain in Canada operates in a relatively new sector for which there is very little public information to aid in price discovery. Organic wheat producers must use available information in order to decide when to sell their wheat and whom to sell to. The relatively low degree of market information, especially for producers, suggests a problem of information asymmetry, which may have ramifications for efficiency and the distribution of rents in the organic wheat supply chain. The literature on Transaction Cost Economics, Agency Theory and the Economics of Information is used in the thesis to theorize differences between methods of selling organic wheat that vary in terms of vertical coordination. The analysis involves a comparison of selling to large and small grain companies, selling through Producer-Owned Firms (POFs) and selling directly to processors. The theory predicts that producers gain from using a POF because of savings in transaction costs and higher prices. These theorized differences in transaction costs and price are due to increased sharing of information between the producer and the marketing agent, enhanced producer control over the marketer, and incentive for the marketer to provide producers with a high price. These benefits can also be realized by selling directly to a processor, but only if the producer can effectively and efficiently perform his or her own marketing functions. Average cost, price and profit margins are used as a metric for comparing each of the four governance structures. A survey of organic wheat producers in Saskatchewan was undertaken in order to collect data on organic Hard Red Spring Wheat (HRSW) transactions. The results indicate that governance structure has a statistically significant effect on organic HRSW prices and on producer transaction costs. The analysis concludes that the producer receives the greatest profit margin from selling through the vertically coordinated POF, while a marketer receives the greatest profit margin if it operates as a large grain company and purchases HRSW on the spot market. The results also suggest that organic producers that eliminate the middleman and sell directly to processors cannot market as efficiently and effectively compared with producers that use a POF. The results of this thesis emphasize that increased coordination between producer and marketer through a POF can be advantageous for the producer, but not necessarily for the marketer, due to the difference in the distribution of rents.

As one of the oldest and most innovative financial institutions, a clearinghouse efficiently clears and settles payments for equity transactions as well as other securities. However, this paper will only be concerned with common and preferred equity securities. The purpose of a clearinghouse is to reduce counterparty risk. It acts as an intermediary between two parties, so that the risk of one party failing to honor its contractual obligation is diminished. It reduces settlement risk through netting, the process of eliminating offsetting transactions, thus decreasing the amount of cash flow. I examine the impact of the New York Stock Exchange Clearinghouse upon its establishment in May 1892. Specifically, I analyze the clearinghouse’s effect on trading costs for different equity securities, scrutinizing the effects on bid-ask spreads. I find that once a firm joined the NYSE clearinghouse, both its relative and absolute bid-ask spreads are narrowed, representing an overall reduction in spreads of 5.28 percent.