The Peel Watershed Planning Process began in the Yukon and Northwest Territories in 2004. This thesis describes the Peel Watershed Planning Commission and the main interests influencing the planning process. I explore the explanatory potential of several theories draw from urban political economy -- John Logan and Harvey Molotch’s growth machine thesis, Clarence Stone’s regime theory, and Bob Jessop and Neil Brenner’s account of rescaling the state – and suggest that each of these theories can be used to explain certain aspects of Peel Watershed politics. Then I turn to the assimilationist literature on First Nations in Canada – represented by the 1969 White Paper, Tom Flanagan’s First Nations?, Second Thoughts and Frances Widdowson and Albert Howard’s Disrobing the Aboriginal Industry – and contrast it with an alternative literature, represented especially by Paul Nadasdy’s Hunters and Bureaucrats. I argue that these literatures draw attention to aspects of the politics of planning that are neglected in the urban political economy literature, but are of obvious importance in the context of the Peel Watershed. Although questions of community preservation and wealth accumulation are central to the Peel Watershed planning process, worldviews and ways of life are also at stake. This suggests that we have to look at the politics of planning in very broad terms. / Graduate

Global waste generation trends are increasing at an alarming rate. Low- and middle-income countries (or the ‘Global South’) bear an increasing proportion of this burden, as the amount of waste produced in these countries is expected to surge drastically in the coming years. Since cities in the Global South rarely have formal municipal recycling systems, recycling activities are typically performed by waste pickers who are precariously employed and sell their wares in unpredictable, unregulated markets. That is to say, this economic activity is an archetype of what is commonly referred to as that taking place in the ‘informal sector.’ Although waste pickers must often confront exclusionary policies and social marginalization, some countries such as Colombia have begun to recognize the social, economic, and environmental contributions of informal recycling activities and have introduced policies that support waste pickers by trying to improve their working conditions. Bogotá has been recognized internationally as an example of ‘best practice’ in terms of creating inclusive policies aimed towards improving the livelihoods of waste pickers. To this end, the Colombian government has introduced, in 2016, National Decree 596, which recognizes and remunerates waste picker organizations as official providers of municipal recycling services. Although this decree legitimizes these ‘third sector’ organizations and has important implications for ‘alternative’ models of service delivery, it has had contradictory effects: although it successfully recognizes the important role that waste pickers play in the waste management system, it also introduces barriers that impede the formalization of waste picker organizations. For example, the decree sets unattainable requirements for the recognition of waste picker organizations and does little to mitigate the vulnerability that waste pickers experience in the face of competition from large, private (often multinational) companies. Based on one month of fieldwork conducted in Bogotá from November 10th to December 10th, 2017, this thesis explores these contradictions and suggests that these barriers originate from the conflicting neoliberal and rights-based orientations of the 1991 Constitution.

No description available.

De nombreux objets et espaces urbains situés dans les métropoles deviennent des actifs financiers. Bureaux, centres commerciaux, résidences étudiantes, grands équipements sont acquis par des fonds d’investissement et des sociétés cotées qui capitalisent sur les flux de revenus futurs générés par l’usage de ces bâtiments par des entreprises et des habitants. Le redéveloppement urbain à travers l’aménagement de quartiers mixtes se retrouve, par l’entremise des circuits de financement des marchés immobiliers, branché sur les marchés financiers. La thèse se propose d’analyser cette financiarisation du capitalisme urbain à partir de l’articulation des politiques des gouvernements urbains et des stratégies financières des gestionnaires d’actifs immobiliers. Les rapports de pouvoir entre ces deux acteurs et leurs effets socio-spatiaux et matériels sont interrogés à partir d’une comparaison de deux grands projets d’aménagements situés dans le Grand Paris et le Grand Lyon. C’est dans cette perspective que l’enquête porte sur les projets opérationnels, mais aussi sur les salons immobiliers où ils sont présentés, et les stratégies métropolitaines.La recherche montre qu’en dépit d’orientations politiques différentes, la construction d’immobilier tertiaire standardisé, polarisé, et réservé à quelques grandes entreprises conditionne le redéveloppement urbain dans les deux cas. Ces conditions correspondent aux standards d’investissement sélectifs des gestionnaires d’actifs, que les conseils en immobiliers et les promoteurs relayent auprès des gouvernements urbains. Elles résultent de processus dont la conflictualité varie en fonction des agendas locaux. Après d’intenses négociations menées par les promoteurs, la municipalité de Saint-Ouen a renoncé à certains principes structurants du projet des Docks. L’aménagement du Carré de Soie s’est au contraire traduit par un consensus entre promoteurs et le Grand Lyon autour de la réalisation d’un pôle tertiaire. Deux configurations locales sont avancées pour interpréter ce résultat comparatif propice à la financiarisation. La faiblesse de la régulation de la production de bureaux à l’échelle de la métropole parisienne conduit à des négociations localisées au sein du projet, où les objectifs municipaux sont contraints par la hiérarchisation des priorités politiques, les modalités de financement de l’aménagement et la matérialité du foncier. Dans la métropole lyonnaise, l’institutionnalisation d’une politique de l’offre immobilière portée par l’exécutif et les services de développement économique du Grand Lyon organise la circulation des standards d’investissement à l’échelle de l’agglomération et renforce leur poids sur l’aménagement.À partir de ces résultats, la thèse propose une lecture d’économie politique urbaine de la financiarisation de l’environnement urbain alternative à la théorie marxienne, en insistant sur le rôle des gestionnaires d’actifs et soulignant ses médiations. Elle contribue aux théories du pouvoir urbain en montrant le poids limité des agendas locaux sur les effets sélectifs de la financiarisation, et en discutant la formation, à certaines conditions, d’une coalition de croissance financiarisée / Myriads of urban objects and spaces located in city-regions have turned into financial assets. Office buildings, shopping malls, student dwellings, and large utilities are purchased by investment funds and listed property companies, which seek to capitalise on the future income streams based on their use by firms and people. Urban redevelopment and financial markets are thus intertwined through the financing circuits of property markets. By analysing the interactions between the financial strategies of real estate asset managers and the urban development policies of city governments, the thesis sets out to analyse this financialisation of urban capitalism. In order to question their power relationships and their socio-spatial and material outcomes, it develops a comparison between two large-scale, mixed-use urban redevelopment projects located in the Greater Paris and Greater Lyon areas. The comparison is based on the investigation of the projects, commercial real estate fairs where they are showcased to investors, and metropolitan strategies.Despite different local agendas, both projects leads to the production of standardised and spatially clustered commercial real estate buildings whose access is limited to a restricted set of tenants, thus strongly constraining urban redevelopment policies. Such characteristics correspond to the selective expectations of asset managers, whose investment standards are circulated by real estate brokers and developers to city governments. They result from different processes, which involve more or less conflicts according to local agendas. Faced with intense opposition from developers, the city of Saint-Ouen had to back on several key goals of the project, whereas the redevelopment of the Carre de Soie was undertaken on the basis of a strong consensus between local developers and the Greater Lyon metropolitan authority. In order to account for these differences, the thesis identifies two local configurations conducive of financialisation. In Saint-Ouen’s Docklands case, weak regulation at the city-region scale between cities competing to attract businesses contributes to localised power relationships; their results depend in turn from the combination between priority-setting, redevelopment financing and land materiality. In the Carre de Soie case, the institutionalisation of a property-led policy carried out by the metropolitan executive and its economic development staff has organised the circulation of investment standards at the city-region scale, thereby enhancing their impact on urban redevelopment.Based on these results, the thesis offers an urban political economy of the financialisation of urban production which, compared to Marxian theory, highlights the role of real estate asset managers and pays attention to the mediations of such a process. It also contributes to theories of urban power by emphasising the limited explanatory power of local agendas on the selective effects of financialisation. Eventually, it discusses how, under specific circumstances, an urban financialised coalition emerges

O que é governar os serviços de transportes por ônibus? Este trabalho propõe uma abordagem própria capaz de especificar as particularidades do governo da provisão dos serviços de ônibus, da lucratividade na economia política urbana, das políticas públicas de transportes e suas principais transformações nas últimas quatro décadas no município de São Paulo, denominada aqui de circuitos da provisão. Argumento que estes são caracterizados pelo governo e legibilidade de três coisas amplamente interconectadas politicamente e sobrepostas no espaço: receita tarifária, veículos e dados operacionais referentes à coleta de passageiros. A partir destas considerações, defendo a centralidade da compreensão dos efeitos das ferramentas e tecnologias eletrônicas na estruturação de relações de poder, da lucratividade e do controle estatal sobre a prestação do serviços de ônibus. Por decorrência de seus modos de operação e suas passagens obrigatórias, instrumentos de políticas públicas tem organizado relações principal-agente entre Estado, empresas privadas e burocracias do nível de rua e um tipo particular de política da mensuração central na provisão. Estudando as últimas quatro décadas, este trabalho argumenta que este período pode ser caracterizado como um processo histórico de longo prazo da transição do padrão de governança analógica para o eletrônico. Por meio da reinstrumentação das políticas públicas, levadas a cabo, sobretudo, por governos de centro-esquerda, esta transição teve como principal resultado a expansão substantiva das capacidades estatais regulatórias e, em um caso que vai na contramão das teorias sobre o capitalismo regulatório, até mesmo da capacidade estatal de provisão. O que surge deste quadro é que não é possível sugerir relações de captura entre Estado e empresas privadas no município de São Paulo, mas sim de construção mútua. Isto é, de simbiose. / What is to govern the bus services? Through the category of provision circuits, this work proposes a framework of analysis capable of specifying the particularities of the delivery of bus services, profitability in the urban political economy, transportation policies and their main transformations in the last four decades. I argue that these circuits are featured by the governance and legibility of three things politically interconnected and spatially overlapped: ticket revenue, vehicles and passengers data. Based on this framework, I point to the centrality of tools and technologies effects in the structuring of power relations, profitability and state control over provision. By the effects of its operating ways and mandatory passages, policy instruments have organized principal-agent relations between State, private companies, street-level bureaucracies and, to some extent, a politics of mensuration. Studying the past four decades in São Paulo, this work argues that this period can be characterized as a process of long-term historical transition of an analogical governance pattern to an electronic one. By means of reinstrumentation of policies, put forward mainly by centre-left wing governments, this transition had as a main outcome a substantive expansion in both regulatory state capacities and provision capacities, pointing to the opposite direction of regulatory capitalism theories. What emerges from this picture is that is not possible to argue for capture relations between State and private companies, but mutual construction relations, that is, a sort of symbiosis.

O que é governar os serviços de transportes por ônibus? Este trabalho propõe uma abordagem própria capaz de especificar as particularidades do governo da provisão dos serviços de ônibus, da lucratividade na economia política urbana, das políticas públicas de transportes e suas principais transformações nas últimas quatro décadas no município de São Paulo, denominada aqui de circuitos da provisão. Argumento que estes são caracterizados pelo governo e legibilidade de três coisas amplamente interconectadas politicamente e sobrepostas no espaço: receita tarifária, veículos e dados operacionais referentes à coleta de passageiros. A partir destas considerações, defendo a centralidade da compreensão dos efeitos das ferramentas e tecnologias eletrônicas na estruturação de relações de poder, da lucratividade e do controle estatal sobre a prestação do serviços de ônibus. Por decorrência de seus modos de operação e suas passagens obrigatórias, instrumentos de políticas públicas tem organizado relações principal-agente entre Estado, empresas privadas e burocracias do nível de rua e um tipo particular de política da mensuração central na provisão. Estudando as últimas quatro décadas, este trabalho argumenta que este período pode ser caracterizado como um processo histórico de longo prazo da transição do padrão de governança analógica para o eletrônico. Por meio da reinstrumentação das políticas públicas, levadas a cabo, sobretudo, por governos de centro-esquerda, esta transição teve como principal resultado a expansão substantiva das capacidades estatais regulatórias e, em um caso que vai na contramão das teorias sobre o capitalismo regulatório, até mesmo da capacidade estatal de provisão. O que surge deste quadro é que não é possível sugerir relações de captura entre Estado e empresas privadas no município de São Paulo, mas sim de construção mútua. Isto é, de simbiose. / What is to govern the bus services? Through the category of provision circuits, this work proposes a framework of analysis capable of specifying the particularities of the delivery of bus services, profitability in the urban political economy, transportation policies and their main transformations in the last four decades. I argue that these circuits are featured by the governance and legibility of three things politically interconnected and spatially overlapped: ticket revenue, vehicles and passengers data. Based on this framework, I point to the centrality of tools and technologies effects in the structuring of power relations, profitability and state control over provision. By the effects of its operating ways and mandatory passages, policy instruments have organized principal-agent relations between State, private companies, street-level bureaucracies and, to some extent, a politics of mensuration. Studying the past four decades in São Paulo, this work argues that this period can be characterized as a process of long-term historical transition of an analogical governance pattern to an electronic one. By means of reinstrumentation of policies, put forward mainly by centre-left wing governments, this transition had as a main outcome a substantive expansion in both regulatory state capacities and provision capacities, pointing to the opposite direction of regulatory capitalism theories. What emerges from this picture is that is not possible to argue for capture relations between State and private companies, but mutual construction relations, that is, a sort of symbiosis.