Thesis (M.A.). / Written for the Dept. of Italian. Title from title page of PDF (viewed 2008/08/04). Includes bibliographical references.

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M.A. / Please refer to full text to view abstract

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Although the utilitarian character of modern architecture has been widely recognized, the relationship between Utilitarianism and architectural practice has not been adequately discussed. This thesis intends to contribute to this area with a historical study of the interaction of Utilitarianism and architectural practice in the social reforms of 18th and 19th century Britain. Edinburgh is used as an example to illuminate this historical process in more detail. From three angles: prison, poor relief and elementary education, this thesis discusses how Utilitarians influenced the reform process and how architecture was used as significant instruments to promote the reform schemes designed by Bentham and his followers. In prison reform, Bentham created the architectural model of the Panopticon to build a new punishment system based on disciplined prisons which could harmoniously align individual interest and public interest. He later introduced the same ideology and the Panopticon model into poor relief reform. Through the works of his followers, especially Edwin Chadwick, these Utilitarian ideas largely shaped the new poor relief system in Britain. Similar steps were later followed in elementary education reform. Together with the establishment of the national systems of poor relief and elementary education, a large volume of institutional buildings such as workhouses and board schools came into being, and many of them are still affecting our modern life. Based on these examples, this thesis ends with a theoretical discussion of the inadequacy of Utilitarianism as a complete ethical theory. Contrary to the optimism of Bentham and his 19th century followers, Utilitarianism is insufficient to be a practical guidance for everyday life. This inadequacy determines that Utilitarianism cannot provide a firm ethical foundation for architecture.

Omnipresent in Western society, the idea of progress is commonly advanced in relation to the development of animal protection law in Great Britain. Essentially, it is argued that the law now recognises that animals are worthy of moral consideration in their own right, that is, that they count or matter morally. From the concept of "animal as object" to that of "animal as person", indeed, the history of Western philosophical thinking bears witness to a progressive acknowledgement of animals (or, at least, of some animals) as full members of the moral community, along with all human beings. However, as political theorist Robert Garner argues in his book Animals, Politics and Morality, public policy is never simply a product of moral principles. Rather, influenced by pressure groups, it is the result of a process based on negotiation and compromise. That being the case, in the present thesis, I ask whether Great Britain has truly been the scene of moral progress through the development of animal protection law and to what extent one may speak of moral progress at all in relation to this area of law. Is animal protection law in Great Britain moving away from the traditional moral position that animals are exclusively means to human ends, thereby granting moral standing and equal moral status to animals The answer to this question lies with identifying the philosophical conception of the relations between humans and animals which is expressed through the body of animal protection law in this country. For animals' moral status within the law ensues directly from it. In the first chapter, following the great influence the position plays in the contemporary debate over our moral treatment of animals, I use Tom Regan's theory of animal rights to assess whether animal protection law in Great Britain reflects a conception of human-animal relations that is consistent with a recognition that animals possess moral rights. In the second chapter, I defend the view that animal protection law in Great Britain does not reflect utilitarianism - a position that has been popularised in animal ethics by moral philosopher Peter Singer. In the third chapter, building on the distinctive features of animal protection law in Great Britain which have emerged from the analysis in Chapters I and II, I contend that the law reflects "group egoism" - a form of consequentialism which falls between ethical egoism and utilitarianism. To be sure, what comes forth as the dominant position underlying animal protection law in Great Britain is that human beings protect animals only to the extent to which benefit is provided to them in return, or, at the very least, to the extent that so doing does not impinge on their interests in animal use. Does this position represent any kind of moral progress In the context of changing human attitudes towards animals and the development of animal protection law, I argue that it does. However, this moral progress carries no recognition that animals are worthy of moral consideration in their own right, that is, that they count or matter morally. Far from doing away with the traditional position that animals are exclusively means to human ends, animal protection law in Great Britain fits in with this way of thinking and grants to animals an instrumental value only.

The main aim of this thesis is to analyse and explore the philosophical justifications for freedom of speech during the nineteenth century and their application as political praxis. In this work, specific types of free speech argument are identified and examined in the light of the ideological stance of those who sought to argue for freedom of speech, primarily from key ideological perspectives of the nineteenth century, utilitarianism, liberalism and socialism. Initially three types of free speech argument are identified: the accountability argument, the liberty argument and the truth argument. However, on an inspection of socialist arguments for freedom of speech, the author suggests that a fourth sufficiently distinct type of free speech argument is present, particularly within the more mature works of socialist radicals and agitators. Though the arguments for freedom of speech overlap within different ideological and historical contexts, a case is made for a relatively distinct type of free speech argument within the socialist political praxis of free speech. Furthermore, in examining key political and philosophical texts, and an analysis of the free speech arguments in nineteenth century political pamphlets and newspapers, the argument is made that in order to gain a thorough understanding of political history and philosophy a holistic approach should be adopted, one which looks at ideas, context, history, artefact, and political praxis.

In this paper I argue that Liam Murphy’s collective consequentialism—emphasizing fairness instead of maximization of value—is not an adequate response to the demandingness objections levied at consequentialism. Especially since Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality,” many have objected that consequentialism is far too demanding, particularly concerning our obligations of assistance to those in extreme poverty. Murphy thinks that the problem is not that consequentialism is necessarily too demanding; it is that, in our nonideal world of partial compliance, consequentialism is too demanding on those who comply with its dictates. I hope to show that Murphy’s theory is unsatisfying. I will not defend any particular version of consequentialism over alternative consequentialist theories, nor will I defend consequentialism over alternative non-consequentialist moral theories. My aim is far narrower: To show that those who accept a broadly consequentialist account of morality have little reason to accept Murphy’s collective consequentialism.

Historically, there have been two moral theories which have dominated the analysis of 'intellectual property': Natural law theory and Utilitarianism. The former argues that authors have an inalienable right to control the products of their minds while the latter argues that the moral status of a law establishing 'intellectual property' is inextricably tied to the attempt to maximize societal well-being. In this thesis I argue that few justifiable natural rights to the products of our minds can be found and, subsequently, the justification of such rights must stem from the latter theory. I argue that Utilitarianism places many strong limitations on the extensiveness of the powers granted to 'intellectual property' right-holders by a moral law. Finally, I argue that independent of a given societal state-of-affairs, we have two moral obligations: to follow the trend set by moral authors, and to lend them our support.