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The women of Red Clydeside: women munitions workers in the west of Scotland during the First World War /Baillie, Myra. Rempel, Richard A. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (Ph.D.)--McMaster University , 2002. / Advisor: Richard Rempel. Includes bibliographical references (leaves (308)-320). Also available via World Wide Web.
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Government owned-contractor operated munitions facilities are they appropriate in the age of strict environmental compliance and liability? /Connor, Mark J. January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (LL. M.)--Judge Advocate General's School, United States Army, 1990. / "April 1990." Typescript. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 68-116). Also issued in microfiche.
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The 1977 United States arms embargo against South Africa institution and implementation to 1997 /Van Wyk, Martha Susanna. January 2004 (has links)
Thesis (D Phil (History))--University of Pretoria, 2004. / Includes bibliographical references.
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The proliferation of aerospace weapons technology ballistic missiles and the case of Brazil /Vossen, Terrence John, January 1993 (has links)
Thesis (M.A.)--Carleton University, 1993. / Includes bibliographical references (leaves 128-136).
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The development of Brazil's arms exporting industry and its roots in geopolitical and national security doctrinesSchwam-Baird, David January 1993 (has links)
Thesis (Ph. D.)--Tulane University, 1993. / Vita. Includes bibliographical references (leaves 324-334).
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Aspects économiques de la production de systèmes d'arme dans l'Europe des neufStruys, Wally January 1977 (has links)
Doctorat en sciences sociales, politiques et économiques / info:eu-repo/semantics/nonPublished
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An evaluation of the BAE/SAAB South African Royal Manufacturing project in Virginia, Free State Province : a case study of the implementation of the South African Defence OffsetsWellmann, Gwendolyn January 2010 (has links)
This study is an evaluation of the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium National Industrial Programme project, South African Royal Manufacturers (SARM), which forms part of BAE Systems/SAAB’s National Industrial Participation Programme (NIPP) obligations resulting from their participation in South Africa’s 1998 Strategic Procurement Programme (popularly referred to as the ‘arms deal’). SARM was a gold chain manufacturing plant, located in the Free State mining town of Virginia and which was implemented by the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium in partnership with the Harmony Gold Mining Company. Funding for the business was provided by the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium as part of their industrial participation obligation. This funding was supplemented with a loan obtained from the South African Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) to the value of 40% of the cash funds; while land and buildings, as well as loans in the form of gold granules and bars, were provided by Harmony Gold Company, as part of what they describe as their corporate social responsibility towards the Virginia area where they are the only mining company operating; and also simultaneously as their obligation towards gold beneficiation as required by law. The business failed after less than 12 months of operation amidst allegations of theft of gold and the sudden lay-off of approximately 500 poor black rural women. The company’s liquidation appears to be on the backburner indefinitely. The study was conducted over a period of 18 months, and this thesis written over several more. As part of this evaluation several issues were investigated. These issues are: the push for beneficiation of South African mined metals; the National Industrial Participation Programme; local government development; the BAE Systems/SAAB consortium and other similar companies which are involved in jewellery production for export as part of both the country’s beneficiation drive, as well as the 3 NIPP. These other companies are used in this study as a ‘control’ group against which SARM’s performance can be measured realistically. Different research methods were used during the evaluation, including secondary document reviews, face-to-face and telephonic interviews with key-informants, the use of e-mail to contact key-informants, as well as conducting face-to-face questionnaires with random interviewees, and a focus group discussion with SARM ex-workers. There were several limitations to this study. The primary limitation was the inaccessibility of official and legal documents pertaining to both SARM, and the 1998 arms deal. SARM no longer exists, and thus the evaluation results should be used as lessons learned for similar projects in the future.
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Challenges of arms transfers facing the emerging supplier states in the new international political economyKhwela, Gcwelumusa, Chrysostomus 12 1900 (has links)
Thesis (MMil)--Stellenbosch University, 2003. / ENGLISH ABSTRACT: The fundamental motivation for emerging arms suppliers to produce arms was the desire to overcome
their position of dependence in the system of arms production and transfers. However, their
predicament as late entrants into the system castigated them to fail in this endeavour. This failure is
based on three criteria, which also assist in the identification of emerging suppliers. Firstly, the
weaponry they produce is far below the sophistication characterised by higher levels of technological
advancement. Secondly, they can only produce one or two advanced weapon systems. Finally, they
rely on the leading suppliers for certain sophisticated components of weapon systems which they cannot
produce themselves and as a result, become so dependent that they, with an exception of a few, are
unable to go beyond the simple reproduction or retrofitting of existing weapon systems. The capability
to produce arms was restrictedly extended to certain states in the post-war era, and even those states that
obtained such a capability were confmed to producing small arms and platforms for naval vessels.
Those states that went beyond these capabilities did so with the assistance of other states or specialists,
the initial intention being to meet domestic requirements, and ultimately to dispose surplus Second
World War equipment in the re-transfer market. The emerging supplier states' intention to develop
indigenous arms industries was driven by the political urge to reduce their reliance on the leading
suppliers and to nationalise the arms production process for import substitution in order to meet
domestic security needs. Since the emerging suppliers began the process of defence industrialisation
from the importation of complete weapon systems to import substitution, and ultimately to the
promotion of exports, they mainly relied on technology imported from the leading suppliers. On the one
hand, the leading suppliers attempted to hinder the efforts of emerging suppliers to promote arms
exports so as to protect their oligopolistic share of the arms market through tightening the controls and
regulations on technological supplies. On the other, the emerging suppliers were impelled to promote
their arms exports in order to overcome the saturation of their domestic markets, to utilise effectively
their arms production capacities, and to positively affect their balance of payments through the
procreation of foreign exchange returns.
This study reached the following conclusions and inferences:
1. The arms trade has evolved to be characterised by the transfer of military technology, which did
not feature in the arms transactions of the previous periods.
2. The gap between the leading and emerging suppliers is widening with regard to the
sophistication of technological capabilities, and accordingly the stratification within the arms production
and transfer system is sustainable and reinforced, thus making it hard for the lower tiers to progress
beyond their current status.
3. The emerging suppliers' share of and contribution into the arms market is constricted, and as
such they specialise in specific (often uncomplicated) weapon systems that constitute niches in the
global market.
4. The unfolding arms production and transfer system is characterised by a fiercely competitive
atmosphere, and consequently, only those states that can subsidise or integrate their efforts are enabled
to sustain an advanced arms production faculty.
5. As the emerging suppliers begin to introduce more and more of their wares into the market, the
costs of research and development begin to soar in the same manner as those of the leading suppliers,
thus urging them to become more export-oriented.
6. Participants in the system will be compelled to relinquish their comparative technological
superiority in order to survive, thus narrowing the gap between the capabilities possessed by both the
leading and the emerging suppliers. / AFRIKAANSE OPSOMMING: Die onderliggende motivering van opkomende wapenverskaffers om wapens te produseer word
toegeskryf aan 'n behoefte om hulle relatiewe afhanklikheid in die stelsel van wapenproduksie en -
handel te oorkom. Boonop het die laat toetrede tot die stelsel hierdie opkomende verskaffers se kanse
tot sukses verder belemmer. Die rede vir die onsuksesvolle toetrede word gebasseer op drie kriteria
(wat ook dien as identifiserende eienskappe van opkomende wapenverskaffers). Eerstens, die wapens
wat opkomende verskaffers lewer skiet tekort aan die vereiste gesofistikeerde standaarde van die
gevestigde wapenprodusente. Tweedens, hulle kan slegs een of twee gevorderde wapenstelsels
produseer. Derdens, sekere komponente van wapenstelsels word verkry by die gevestigde verskaffers,
wat lei tot afhanklikheid tot so 'n mate dat die opkomende verskaffer se vermoëns beperk word tot
eenvoudige reprodusering of herinstallasies van bestaande stelsels. Trouens, in die post-oorlog tydperk
is die vermoë om wapens te produseer doelbewus beperk tot sekere state wat 'n afgebakende reeks van
handwapens en uitrusting vir vloot vaartuie kon vervaardig. State wat verby hierdie vermoë beweeg
het, het dit gedoen met behulp van ander state of spesaliste, oorspronklik met die oog op die
huishoudelike behoefte maar ook om ontslae te raak van surplusse uit die Tweede Wêreldoorlog. 'n
Politieke begeerte om in hulle eie sekuriteitsbehoeftes te voorsien deur middel van invoersubstitusie, het
die opkomende verskaffers genoop om ontslae te raak van die afhanklikheid op gevestigde verskaffers
en om die wapenproduseringsproses te nasionaliseer. Hulle het hoofsaaklik gesteun op ingevoerde
tegnologie om die verdedigingsbedryf te industrialiseer. Die proses het so verloop: volledige
wapenstelsels is ingevoer, daarna het invoersubstitusie plaasgevind, en daarna 'n bevordering van
uitvoere. Gevestigde verskaffers het endersyds probeer om (deur middel van strenger kontrole en
regulasies of tegnologiese ware) die opkomende verskaffers te verhoed om hulle oligopolistiese houvas
op die mark te belemmer en andersyds moes opkomende verskaffers noodgedwonge hulle uitvoere
bevorder om te voorkom dat die plaaslike mark versadig word. Die laasgenoemde aspek het ook die
betalingsbalans van opkomende verskaffers positief beinvloed as gevolg van die inkomste uit
buitelandse valuta.
Hierdie studie kom tot die volgende aanames en gevolgtrekkings:
1. Wapenhandel het só ontwikkel dat die oordrag van militêre tegnologie die hoofkenmerk geword
het in die stelsel - 'n ongekende kenmerk tot dusver in die ontwikkelingsgang van internasionale
wapenhandel.
2. Die gaping van tegnologiese vermoëns tussen opkomende en gevestigde wapenverskaffers word
groter en daarmee saam word die stratifikasie in wapenproduksie en -lewering volhoubaar en versterk,
wat lei tot 'n beperking op die vermoë van opkomende verskaffers om vooruitgang te maak.
3. Opkomende verskaffers se aandeel in en bydrae tot wapenmarkte bly beperk en spesialiseer
daarom op spesifieke (meestalongekompliseerde) wapenstelsels wat gemik is op sekere nisse in die
wêreldmark.
4. Die ontluikende wapenproduksie en -handelsisteem is uiters kompeterend, met die gevolg dat
slegs state wat hulle pogings kan subsidieer of integreer in staat is om gevorderde fasiliteite te onderhou.
5. Met die toenemende aanbod vanaf opkomende verskaffers, styg die kostes van navorsing en
ontwikkeling vir beide die opkomende en die gevestigde verskaffer wat weer beide dwing om hulle
uitvoere te beklemtoon.
6. Deelnemers in die stelsel sal gedwing word om hulle vergelykende tegnologiese voorsprong
prys te gee om te oorleef in die stelsel, waarna die gaping tussen die vermoëns van opkomende en
gevestigde verskaffers verminder sal word.
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Das KZ-Aussenlager Genshagen : Struktur und Wahrnehmung der Zwangsarbeit in einem Rüstungsbetrieb 1944/45 /Jegielka, Stephan. January 2005 (has links)
Master's thesis. / Includes bibliographical references (p. 105-109).
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Outsourcing security : the role of private military companies and arms dealers in modern conflicts /Lyons, Clint, January 1900 (has links)
Thesis (M.S.)--Missouri State University, 2009. / "May 2009." Includes bibliographical references (leaves 89-97). Also available online.
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