Abstract The thesis deals with the US foreign policy under Richard Nixon. More specifically, it examines the US rapprochement with Communist China (PRC) and the triangular diplomatic relations between the US, USSR, and PRC. The thesis draws from the realist theories, particularly the offensive and defensive branches of neorealism represented by John Mearsheimer and Kenneth Waltz. The thesis applies the theoretical concept of wedging strategies as power-balancing tools on the selected US foreign policy. The thesis conducts a qualitative case study using the process-tracing method. A causal mechanism derived from the concept of wedging strategies is theorized and further applied in the analysis. The analysis of the US foreign policy towards China examines the individual traces in the theorized mechanisms. The results of the study show that the US broke the Sino-Soviet alliance using a defensive wedging strategy by exploiting the Sino-Soviet split, resulting in PRC's dealignment with the USSR. The US reapproached the PRC and swayed the Chinese leadership with strategic guarantees tacitly aimed against the USSR. These guarantees were ultimately projected into the Shanghai Communique of 1972.