Many aspects of economic analysis require judgements to be made about distributions. When agreement on a single criterion for judgement is not possible, it is necessary to examine whether one distribution is better than another from a number of perspectives. The problem of 'distributional dominance', which Part One addresses, is precisely this problem of ordering two distributions in relation to one or more objective functions, via use of a single 'dominance criterion'. Four themes are pursued. It is argued that welfare, poverty and inequality dominance criteria can be fruitfully analyzed within a single framework. The need to approach the problem of distributional dominance as a statistical one is stressed. Estimators and a method of inference are proposed and are themselves tested via a simulation study. The likely effect of aggregation on the attained ordering of distributions is assessed, also via a simulation study. A critical re-appraisal is presented of the most widely-used dominance criterion, second-order stochastic dominance, and alternative criteria are proposed. The usefulness of thinking of dominance criteria in terms of curves within bounds is emphasized. Part Two of the thesis is a study of the distribution of income in urban China in the eighties, using both aggregated, nationwide data and disaggregated data for two provinces. This study is both an application of the methods developed in Part One and a case-study of the dynamics of income distribution in a transitional economy. Evidence is found that cash-income inequality has grown over the decade, and this is linked to the reform process. However, inequality remains exceptionally low by international standards. Moreover, both the system of price subsidies and that of cash compensation introduced to replace the subsidies are shown to have exerted an equalizing influence on the urban distribution of income.

This thesis consists of four self-contained articles which focus on different aspects of citizens' demand for and governments' supply of social policy in Latin American democracies. The underlying questions that link the four papers are a) do social and economic grievances affect citizens' propensity to protest? and, b) do democratic governments in the region use social policy as an instrument to mitigate social discontent and violent crime? In the first two papers, I use public opinion data in order to examine the determinants of citizens' participation in protest with a special focus on dissatisfaction with the quality of public services, demands for inequality-reduction policies and economic deprivation. The results show that among other factors, protest participation is motivated by citizens' discontent over the quality of basic social services, support for redistributive policies, and relative economic deprivation. The third and fourth papers analyze the "supply side" of social spending in the region focusing on collective protest and violent crime, respectively. The third article argues that under democracy, organized labor is in a better position relative to other groups in society to obtain social policy concessions as a consequence of their collective action efforts. The results show that whereas social security spending increases as a consequence of labor militancy, cutbacks in human capital spending are less likely as peaceful large-scale demonstrations increase. The fourth paper argues that political leaders use education spending as an instrument to mitigate violent crime. It also argues that the effect of violent crime on education spending is larger when leftist governments are in power. The empirical analysis provides support for these arguments.