The American Army's first encounter during World War II with the German Army in North Africa at the Battle of Kasserine Pass resulted in a tactical defeat. Lloyd Fredendall, the II Corps commander, did not lead from the front and instead preferred to remain at a safe distance in his man-made command post cut into a mountain over one hundred miles from his forward positions. After the Wehrmacht launched its attack on 14 February 1943, the American positions quickly disintegrated and headquarters elements fled to the rear stranding entire infantry units on mountaintops. As the senior leaders were running for their lives, they ordered field grade officers to conduct counterattacks against a superior German armor force. These battalion commanders fought valiantly, but were overmatched and their units became combat ineffective. Finally, two days into the fight, British General Kenneth Anderson released a substantial reinforcement element to bolster the lines and slow down the German thrust enough to allow the American 9th Infantry Division artillery forces to be brought 735 miles to eventually stop Field Marshall Erwin Rommel's offensive. Following the defeat, General Dwight Eisenhower replaced senior generals who had made glaring tactical mistakes throughout the battle with capable leaders. The new commanders instilled discipline within the ranks which would play a critical role in future battles in North Africa. Eisenhower realized that the men under his command made mistakes throughout the battle and he was inspired to create changes in combat training. First, lessons had to be collected from the men at the frontlines. "Ike" issued training directives based on combined arms lessons to the units under his command, but he also had a bolder plan to influence the training cycles of basic training and unit predeployment training in the United States. Armed with combat experience, Eisenhower flooded the War Department with recommendations to intensify training to better prepare the units for war. The bureaucracy of the War Department prevented immediate modifications to existing training cycles, but by late summer 1943 training regiments were infused with battle lessons. The ability of the American Army to change training based on the lessons it received from the frontlines of North Africa was decisive to success in the North African, Mediterranean, and European theater of operations. / A Thesis submitted to the Department of History in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts. / Fall Semester, 2013. / October 29, 2013. / Kasserine Pass, Training / Includes bibliographical references. / G. Kurt Piehler, Professor Directing Thesis; James Jones, Committee Member; Jonathan Grant, Committee Member.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_185168 |
| Contributors | Sherwood, Christopher Eric Jacob (authoraut), Piehler, G. Kurt (professor directing thesis), Jones, James (committee member), Grant, Jonathan (committee member), Department of History (degree granting department), Florida State University (degree granting institution) |
| Publisher | Florida State University, Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, text |
| Format | 1 online resource, computer, application/pdf |
| Rights | This Item is protected by copyright and/or related rights. You are free to use this Item in any way that is permitted by the copyright and related rights legislation that applies to your use. For other uses you need to obtain permission from the rights-holder(s). The copyright in theses and dissertations completed at Florida State University is held by the students who author them. |
Page generated in 0.0012 seconds