The minority party in the House of Representatives possesses few procedural advantages. As a result, it is typically dominated by the majority party. I argue that the minority controls the use of one procedure in the House, the motion to recommit, and that it uses this control to strategically cross-pressure members of the majority party. Ultimately, this cross-pressuring places the minority in a win-win situation where they either receive a policy victory or better election results. The results of this project overwhelming support the theory of cross-pressuring and indicate that the minority is able to design, implement, and reap the benefits of its own strategy in the House.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:GEORGIA/oai:scholarworks.gsu.edu:political_science_diss-1027 |
| Date | 07 December 2012 |
| Creators | Webb, Brian M |
| Publisher | ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University |
| Source Sets | Georgia State University |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Source | Political Science Dissertations |
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