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The Compatibility of Religious Exclusivism and Religious Pluralism

What are we to make of the religious diversity present in our world? There are two main views in the face of such diversity. The religious exclusivist (RE) holds that the truth claims of only his or her tradition are the correct claims. Alternatively, the religious pluralist (RP) asserts that the truth claims of all traditions are correct in some sense. In this paper I explore several philosophical arguments in favor of each view including: Alvin Plantinga, William P. Alston, and John Hick. I argue that the distinction between the RE and the RP is actually based in different domains. The RE is posing a solution in the domain of the individual practitioner, while the religious pluralist is offering a solution in the global domain. These two views are distinguished by the distinct set of concerns defining each domain. The main concern defining the individual practitioner domain relates to the genuine belief of the practitioner, and the global domain defining concern is the problem of epistemic peers. Finally, I argue that it is possible to consistently be a RE in one domain and a RP in another, so long as the agent can successfully navigate the differences between domains.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:arizona.edu/oai:arizona.openrepository.com:10150/297796
Date January 2013
CreatorsWilliams, Louise Ann
ContributorsSmit, Houston
PublisherThe University of Arizona.
Source SetsUniversity of Arizona
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext, Electronic Thesis
RightsCopyright © is held by the author. Digital access to this material is made possible by the University Libraries, University of Arizona. Further transmission, reproduction or presentation (such as public display or performance) of protected items is prohibited except with permission of the author.

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