This dissertation consists in a defence of the claim that belief is a state on which its bearer can reflect only deliberatively. That partial characterization of the concept is intended to throw light on the status of belief as a rational phenomenon. I defend it by appeal to features of our actual and imagined practices of ascribing belief linguistically, both to others and ourselves.
Having set out the characterization in the first of four chapters, in the second chapter I survey the ways of learning from words: evidentially, by report, and by belief-expression. I go on to propose that where a person’s words afford belief of his belief, they do so through the belief-expressive character of assertoric speech. In the third chapter, I defend that claim as it applies to the case of ascribing belief to another. I argue that my characterization best explains the fact that we do not ordinarily report our beliefs or invite others to do so. I explain our ordinarily ascribing belief from the expressive character of assertoric speech by appeal to the relation between assertion and belief. In the fourth chapter, I turn to the prospect of ascribing oneself belief based on one’s own words. I argue that self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of words is alone consistent with the self-ascriber’s basic psychological and linguistic integrity. I recommend my characterization of belief for its capacity to explain the disintegrating effects of self-ascribing belief by one’s own report. I again appeal to the relation between assertoric speech and belief to explain the feasibility of self-ascribing belief through the expressive character of one’s words.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TORONTO/oai:tspace.library.utoronto.ca:1807/26230 |
| Date | 17 February 2011 |
| Creators | Richardson, Carolyn |
| Contributors | Franks, Paul |
| Source Sets | University of Toronto |
| Language | en_ca |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
Page generated in 0.002 seconds