The conditions under which legislators engage in idiosyncratic behavior remain poorly understood. Their personal ambitions and desires constantly confront obligations to constituents and institutional constraints. Often, lawmakers pursue goals that are destructive if seen through an institutional or voter-based lens, but rational if the legislator's individual preferences are taken into account. This dissertation develops our understanding of the idiosyncratic incentives of lawmakers, and how they translate into policy outcomes. My results find that lawmakers are not driven to pursue wealth at the expense of governing. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Summer Semester 2017. / June 27, 2017. / elite behavior, financial gains, legislative goals / Includes bibliographical references. / Carol Weissert, Professor Directing Dissertation; Frances Berry, University Representative; Robert Jackson, Committee Member; Quintin Beazer, Committee Member.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_552062 |
| Contributors | Fahey, Kevin Thomas (authoraut), Weissert, Carol S. (professor directing dissertation), Berry, Frances Stokes (university representative), Jackson, Robert (Professor of Political Science) (committee member), Beazer, Quintin (committee member), Florida State University (degree granting institution), College of Social Sciences and Public Policy (degree granting college), Department of Political Science (degree granting departmentdgg) |
| Publisher | Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, text, doctoral thesis |
| Format | 1 online resource (144 pages), computer, application/pdf |
Page generated in 0.0017 seconds