My dissertation consists of three essays of violent conflicts. In the first essay, we propose a novel solution to improve the efficiency of third- party interventions in conflicts. When an intervener coerces the rivals of conflicts into peace, he may face a tradeoff between the effectiveness and cost of interventions. Extant studies generally suggest that severe measures are more effective, but also more costly. Using a game-theoretical model, with the assumption that the rivals' power endogenously shift in conflicts, we find that moderate measures can achieve peace by inducing a reciprocal rival that attacks aggressively only if the other side strikes first. However, when the power dynamics determine that the rival's interest lies in exploiting the other side's passiveness instead of coordinating for peace, severe measures are needed to counteract opportunism. We also show that a weaker rival is not necessarily easier to restrain, and sometimes its aggressiveness comes from its weakness. In addition, we outline the empirical implications of another finding that interventions can work exclusively through the target's expectation instead of implementation. For example, the relationship between the presence of penalties and their effects may be correlational rather than causal. In the second essay, we tackle how the ownership of endowments in dispute affects the actor's behavior in crisis bargaining and the outbreak of costly conflicts. We design tailor-made Nash bargaining games and experimentally test the hypotheses derived. The results indicate that, first, the endowment as a salient focal point serves as a strategic tool rather than a reference associated with biased valuations; and second, the legitimacy of ownership can elicit behavioral responses from the actor, when it is in line with rational expectations. We also find that, conditioned on the actors' expectations, a chance to back down can but does not necessarily reduce conflicts when the status quo and power are roughly balanced. Due to the self-selection effect, aggressive demands do not necessarily cause more conflicts. More generally, we highlight two important perspectives to understand bargaining---the strategic application of focal points, and the subtle influence of the legitimacy of ownership. The third essay is a continuation of the second one. Crisis bargaining most often is a process, in which the disputants sequentially propose a demand and try to arrive at an agreement that both sides deem acceptable. Depending on the disputants' preferences, equilibrium of a bargaining game very likely varies. In this paper, we use variants of the Rubinstein bargaining game and a lab experiment to explore how the disputants communicate about their preferences in crisis bargaining, and the effect of such communication on the likelihood of bargaining failure and conflict. We find that the players mostly communicate their preference strategically according to rational expectations. Besides, inequality aversion and some overoptimism are observed. We also find that more focal points do not necessarily lead to more conflict, and a chance to back down decreases conflict only when the player's endowment in balanced with his probability of winning. / A Dissertation submitted to the Department of Political Science in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. / Spring Semester 2018. / April 18, 2018. / bargaining, endowment effect, focal point, interventions, power shift / Includes bibliographical references. / Jens Grosser, Professor Directing Dissertation; David J. Cooper, University Representative; Robert J. Carroll, Committee Member; David A. Siegel, Committee Member; Mark Souva, Committee Member.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:fsu.edu/oai:fsu.digital.flvc.org:fsu_653431 |
| Contributors | Guo, Xiaoli (author), Großer, Jens W. (professor directing dissertation), Cooper, David J (university representative), Carroll, Robert J. (committee member), Siegel, David A. (committee member), Souva, Mark A. (committee member), Florida State University (degree granting institution), College of Social Sciences and Public Policy (degree granting college), Department of Political Science (degree granting departmentdgg) |
| Publisher | Florida State University |
| Source Sets | Florida State University |
| Language | English, English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Text, text, doctoral thesis |
| Format | 1 online resource (106 pages), computer, application/pdf |
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