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Evidence for Moral Knowledge

My aim in this thesis is to examine two sources of plausibility for moral anti-realism. First, I address some popular arguments that appeal to moral disagreement, ultimately finding that the route from disagreement to anti-realism is less clear than it might seem. Second, I outline one particular argument from moral luck, which highlights the inexplicable coincidence of our moral beliefs and objective moral fact. In response to this argument, I show how our moral sentiments can serve as a specific kind of evidence for moral knowledge, namely evidence that connects our moral opinions non-accidentally with objective moral fact. In that way, on the view developed in this thesis, our moral sentiments make objective moral knowledge possible.

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:PITT/oai:PITTETD:etd-04202010-183558
Date12 May 2010
CreatorsAli, Arden
ContributorsKarl Schafer, Sharon Street, John McDowell, Kieran Setiya
PublisherUniversity of Pittsburgh
Source SetsUniversity of Pittsburgh
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
Typetext
Formatapplication/pdf
Sourcehttp://etd.library.pitt.edu/ETD/available/etd-04202010-183558/
Rightsunrestricted, I hereby certify that, if appropriate, I have obtained and attached hereto a written permission statement from the owner(s) of each third party copyrighted matter to be included in my thesis, dissertation, or project report, allowing distribution as specified below. I certify that the version I submitted is the same as that approved by my advisory committee. I hereby grant to University of Pittsburgh or its agents the non-exclusive license to archive and make accessible, under the conditions specified below, my thesis, dissertation, or project report in whole or in part in all forms of media, now or hereafter known. I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of the thesis, dissertation or project report. I also retain the right to use in future works (such as articles or books) all or part of this thesis, dissertation, or project report.

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