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A strategic investment game with endogenous absorptive capacity

R&D plays a dual role: First, it generates new knowledge and second, it develops a firm's absorptive capacity. Most of the existing strategic investment game models neglect, however, the second role of R&D. The aim of this paper is to incorporate the absorptive capacity hypothesis in such a model by endogenizing the spillover. A two-stage game is established and subsequently solved, looking for the subgame perfect Nash equilibria. Considering the comparative static properties of the model as well as the simulation results, a new effect appears: The "free-rider effect" of the models with exogenous spillover, which deteriorates the higher the spillover becomes, is now counteracted by the "absorptive capacity effect". It is found that firms will invest more in R&D to strengthen absorptive capacity when the spillover parameter is higher. (author's abstract) / Series: Department of Economics Working Paper Series

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:VIENNA/oai:epub.wu-wien.ac.at:epub-wu-01_97b
Date January 2006
CreatorsHammerschmidt, Anna
PublisherInst. fĂĽr Volkswirtschaftstheorie und -politik, WU Vienna University of Economics and Business
Source SetsWirtschaftsuniversität Wien
LanguageEnglish
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypePaper, NonPeerReviewed
Formatapplication/pdf
Relationhttp://epub.wu.ac.at/106/

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