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The Mathematics of principal-agent problem with adverse selection

This thesis studies existence and characterization of optimal solutions to the principal-agent problem with adverse selection for both discrete and continuous problems. The existence results are derived by the abstract concepts of differentiability and convexity.
Under the Spence Mirrlees condition, we show that the discrete problem reduces to a problem that always satisfies the linear independence constraint qualification, while the continuum of type problem becomes an optimal control problem. We then use the Ellipsoid algorithm to solve the problem in the discrete and convex case. For the problem without the Spence Mirrlees condition, we consider different classes of constraint qualifications. Then we introduce some easy-to-check conditions to verify these constraint qualifications. Finally we give economic interpretations for several numerical examples. / Graduate

Identiferoai:union.ndltd.org:uvic.ca/oai:dspace.library.uvic.ca:1828/3482
Date19 August 2011
CreatorsShadnam, Mojdeh
ContributorsAgueh, Martial, Ye, Juan Juan
Source SetsUniversity of Victoria
LanguageEnglish, English
Detected LanguageEnglish
TypeThesis
RightsAvailable to the World Wide Web

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