Despite the evident importance of beauty (τὸ καλόν) in Plato, the precise relation between beauty and goodness (τὸ ἀγαθόν) has yet to be specified. Part of the reason for this seems to be the belief that καλός should not be translated ‘beautiful,’ because it has a broader sense and application than our word ‘beautiful.’ A better translation, on this view, would be something like ‘fine.’ But it is difficult to see the difference between fineness and goodness, and it is perhaps for this reason that determining the relation between the two has not been felt an urgent task. In the first chapter we shall investigate the use of the Greek word καλός in some of the major authors prior to and contemporary with Plato in order to determine the strength of the evidence for translations of καλός other than ‘beautiful.’ It will be argued that the evidence for translations of καλός other than ‘beautiful’ is weak, and thus that the word should generally be translated ‘beautiful.’ When we turn to Plato’s understanding of τὸ καλόν, we find that he often seems to associate the concept closely with goodness, and yet there are also passages which suggest a difference between the two. Thus the first question to ask is whether beauty and goodness are at least coextensive for Plato? In the second chapter it will be argued that despite some apparent evidence to the contrary, he does seem to think they are coextensive. In the third chapter we argue that Plato identifies goodness and unity, and that the coextension of goodness and beauty is explained on the model of the necessary connection between certain forms, or immanent characters, in the Phaedo. But it does not follow from this that goodness and beauty are identical. In the fourth chapter we will argue that, though beauty and goodness are connected in concrete particulars, qua forms they are distinct, i.e., there are two separate forms, the form of the good (which is identical to the one) and the form of beauty.
Finally, a theme which runs more or less throughout this work is that, contrary to what one might expect, Plato seems to discover what is good by asking what is beautiful. This may seem counterintuitive, because there are passages, like Republic 452d-e and 509b, where it seems that goodness determines or in a way causes beauty, but it seems that when trying to discover what is truly good, Plato always settles on what is beautiful. It may be agreed, even by those who disagree about what goodness is, that things like justice and courage are beautiful, and it is these that Plato always thinks constitute the human good.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TORONTO/oai:tspace.library.utoronto.ca:1807/29848 |
| Date | 31 August 2011 |
| Creators | Riegel, Nicholas |
| Contributors | Gerson, Lloyd |
| Source Sets | University of Toronto |
| Language | en_ca |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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