This thesis concerns two main questions: What is intuition? And can it be a source of knowledge or justification? In addressing these questions, it advances several ongoing philosophical debates, and does so in two main ways: firstly, by formulating a general account of the nature of intuitive judgement that establishes common ground amongst the often disparate views of scholars working on intuition (or intuitions) in psychology, linguistics, philosophy and various other disciplines; and, secondly, by developing a new epistemological position that combines scepticism about the evidential value of intuition with a new account of philosophical skill. The general account of the nature of intuitive judgement mainly consists in drawing a distinction between intuitive judgement and intuitive appearance which is analogous to a distinction that can be drawn between perceptual judgement and perceptual appearance. It is argued that a common type of paradox entails the distinction for the non-perceptual case; it is then demonstrated how various related notions, such as intuitive belief, intuitive thinking and intuition as a cognitive faculty, can be derived from the notion of intuitive judgement. The epistemological account receives additional support from a new theory regarding the objects of intuition, according to which the analogy between intuition and perception holds specifically for what is sometimes called 'aspect perception': it is argued that some intuitive appearances are partially constituted by an appearance of meaning and that, consequently, the analysis of intuitive judgement must distinguish between two types of object, an intentional object (typically, a thought) and a causal one (typically, an expression of thought). It is further argued that the focus on evidential value that has been prevalent in the philosophical literature is too restrictive. By contrast with the prevalent view, it is demonstrated that intuition plays a significant role in human thinking, including in philosophical and scientific enquiry, independently of whether intuition is of great or only of minimal evidential value.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:bl.uk/oai:ethos.bl.uk:757808 |
| Date | January 2018 |
| Creators | Greve, Sebastian |
| Contributors | Child, William ; Williamson, Timothy |
| Publisher | University of Oxford |
| Source Sets | Ethos UK |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Source | http://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:1bd76173-f478-4f31-9a1d-8f6a5e3923ce |
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