Opportunistic wireless channel access by non-licensed users has emerged as a promising solution for addressing the bandwidth scarcity challenge. In this thesis, we first design both a deterministic heuristic auction and a randomized auction with a provable performance bound with the guarantee of truthfulness, for networked secondary users. We then turn our attention to mobility support for the secondary users. We introduce two-dimensional bids that reflect a secondary user's willingness to pay for exclusive and nonexclusive channel usage, for the single-channel and multiple-channel scenarios, under which we prove their performances under desired equilibria, respectively. We also devise core-selecting auctions in a combinatorial setting, where secondary users can submit flexible preferences on channels. These auctions can resolve VCG's vulnerability to collusion and shill bidding, and improves seller revenue.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:TORONTO/oai:tspace.library.utoronto.ca:1807/33624 |
| Date | 27 November 2012 |
| Creators | Zhu, Yuefei |
| Contributors | Li, Baochun |
| Source Sets | University of Toronto |
| Language | en_ca |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
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