In many (social, economic, and political) strategic situations, conflict and cooperations coexist and group (or coalitional) behavior is as important as individual behavior. This dissertation studies several issues in such situations. / Chapter 1 provides an overview of the theoretical background and motivates the analysis undertaken. / Chapter 2 analyzes strategic situations with diverse coalitional interactions to ascertain the "stable" outcomes that will not be replaced by any rational (hence farsighted) coalition of individuals, and the coalitions that are likely to form. The analysis takes into full account the perfect foresight of rational individuals, which has been overlooked in the literature. / Chapter 3 defines "negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium", a notion that applies to environments where players can negotiate openly and directly prior to the play of a noncooperative game. The merit of the notion of negotiation-proof Nash equilibrium is twofold: (1) It resolves the nestedness and myopia embedded in the notion of coalition-proof Nash equilibrium. (2) The negotiation process, which is formalized by a "graph", serves as a natural alternative to the approach that models pre-play communication by an extensive form game. / Chapter 4 examines the notion of "renegotiation-proofness" in infinitely repeated games. It is shown that imposing renegotiation in all contingencies creates both conceptual and technical difficulties. A notion of self-enforcing agreements is offered: an agreement is self-enforcing if it is immune to any deviation by any coalition which cannot (confidently) count on renegotiation.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:LACETR/oai:collectionscanada.gc.ca:QMM.40287 |
| Date | January 1996 |
| Creators | Xue, Licun |
| Contributors | Greenberg, Joseph (advisor) |
| Publisher | McGill University |
| Source Sets | Library and Archives Canada ETDs Repository / Centre d'archives des thèses électroniques de Bibliothèque et Archives Canada |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Electronic Thesis or Dissertation |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Coverage | Doctor of Philosophy (Department of Economics.) |
| Rights | All items in eScholarship@McGill are protected by copyright with all rights reserved unless otherwise indicated. |
| Relation | alephsysno: 001500475, proquestno: NN12513, Theses scanned by UMI/ProQuest. |
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