We study a stochastic game of hiring and firing in which the employee has a random capacity which is not directly observable for the employer, and only par- tially observable for the employee. In this setting, we derive a Nash Equilibrium of strategies.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:UPSALLA1/oai:DiVA.org:uu-507239 |
| Date | January 2023 |
| Creators | An, Yoo-An |
| Publisher | Uppsala universitet, Sannolikhetsteori och kombinatorik |
| Source Sets | DiVA Archive at Upsalla University |
| Language | English |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Student thesis, info:eu-repo/semantics/bachelorThesis, text |
| Format | application/pdf |
| Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/openAccess |
| Relation | U.U.D.M. project report ; U.U.D.M. Project Report 2023:25 |
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