Political parties are the basic building blocks of representative democracy. They reduce information costs for voters, enhance executive accountability, and contribute to democratic governability by facilitating legislative organization and aggregating the interests of powerful societal groups. Yet we continue to know relatively little about the conditions under which strong parties form. The dominant theories of party-building are mostly based on historical studies of the United States and Western European countries, almost all of which developed stable party systems. Drawing on this literature, a segment of the early scholarship on party-building in third-wave democracies optimistically took "party development" for granted, assuming that parties would follow from democracy, cleavages, or certain electoral rules. Yet party-building outcomes in third-wave democracies fell short of scholars' initial, optimistic expectations. In many third-wave polities, social cleavages, attempts at electoral engineering, and decades of democratic competition did not produce durable parties. On the other hand, in numerous third-wave democracies, new political parties did take root. What accounts for the variation in party-building outcomes observed across the developing world? More generally, under what conditions does party-building succeed? / Government
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:harvard.edu/oai:dash.harvard.edu:1/11744418 |
Date | 25 February 2014 |
Creators | Van Dyck, Brandon Philip |
Contributors | Dominguez, Jorge Ignacio |
Publisher | Harvard University |
Source Sets | Harvard University |
Language | en_US |
Detected Language | English |
Type | Thesis or Dissertation |
Rights | open |
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