The aim of this thesis is, firstly, to design and create the measuring environment for the research of electromagnetic side-channel attacks in cryptography; and secondly, to inform readers about the basics of electromagnetic and power side-channel attacks which present effective ways of the modern cryptosystems’ cryptoanalysis. In the theoretical part, the basic side-channel attacks, including their history and models, are described. The main part is focused on the explanation of the basic principles of power and electromagnetic side-channel attacks. Then, the work describes the basic physical principles of electromagnetic fields; and also the methods which can be used to measure the electromagnetic field. An example of the origination of the electromagnetic field in microprocessors is included. In the next part of the work the theoretical foundation necessary for successful implementation of the measurement of electromagnetic fields on the PIC microprocessor is presented. Next part of the chapter is devoted to the AES encryption standard, the activity of which is examined in the practical part. Furthermore, the magnetic probes, designed according to the theoretical knowledge are described. Also the research environment is described in this chapter. The list of measuring instruments used in the practical part is also included. The practical part of the work deals with the implementation aspects designed to achieve the ideal measurement conditions, such as the choice of appropriate probe, the appropriate location and distance between the probe and the measured system, setup of the oscilloscope and signal synchronization. Furthermore, the measured electromagnetic waveforms for selected instructions are presented. After that follows an analysis of the individual rounds of the AES encryption standard; the analysis of whole AES standard is also included. Then, the methods of simple and differential electromagnetic analysis are implemented. With regard to the knowledge gained in the practical part of the work, the possible countermeasures implemented against the power and electromagnetic side channel attacks are described. The final part of the work comprises a brief review of results.
Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nusl.cz/oai:invenio.nusl.cz:218984 |
Date | January 2011 |
Creators | Nečas, Ondřej |
Contributors | Martinásek, Zdeněk, Stančík, Peter |
Publisher | Vysoké učení technické v Brně. Fakulta elektrotechniky a komunikačních technologií |
Source Sets | Czech ETDs |
Language | Czech |
Detected Language | English |
Type | info:eu-repo/semantics/masterThesis |
Rights | info:eu-repo/semantics/restrictedAccess |
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