This thesis analyzes Libya's historic 2003 decision to abandon its weapons of mass destruction (WMD) programs. In the 2 years following the decision, several theories have emerged to explain why the Libyan regime renounced these dangerous weapons. The author uses current literature and relevant sources to analyze the three most probable external causal factors: sanctions and diplomacy, intelligence, and coercive diplomacy. He finds that sanctions, diplomacy, and intelligence were significant in altering the Libyan cost-benefit analysis in favor of the West. These findings have political and theoretical implications. Lessons learned from the Libyan case will not be effective against Iran and North Korea due to differences between these countries' proliferation motivation levels and the Libyan case. However, the influence strategies that were effective against Libya are likely to be applicable in other situations. The author finds that more research is still needed to identify the conditions when different strategies are most likely to be effective.
| Identifer | oai:union.ndltd.org:nps.edu/oai:calhoun.nps.edu:10945/1968 |
| Date | 09 1900 |
| Creators | McFall, Joseph D. |
| Contributors | Lavoy, Peter R., Knopf, Jeffrey, Naval Postgraduate School (U.S.)., Department of National Security Affairs |
| Publisher | Monterey California. Naval Postgraduate School |
| Source Sets | Naval Postgraduate School |
| Detected Language | English |
| Type | Thesis |
| Format | xiv, 85 p. ;, application/pdf |
| Rights | Approved for public release, distribution unlimited |
Page generated in 0.0016 seconds